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PREFACE
This volume contains considerably-expanded versions of a series of
invited papers read at the NUARS Spring Conference at Bradford
University, on March 22nd 1986.
NUARS, The Northern University Archaeologists' Research Seminar, was
founded in November 1977 by John Bintliff (Bradford University) and
Chris Arnold (then at Leeds University). It aimed, and still aims, to
fill a perceptible void in Northern England, to create an intellectual
'clearing house' or forum for discussion of new ideas and approaches in
Archaeology that operates between the yearly TAG (Theoretical
Archaeology Group) meetings and international conferences. Meetings
are held twice or three times a year, as a day-conference, and the
venue rotates around the Northern universities. This meeting in March
1986 was the 16th day-conference, and was financed by the Students'
Archaeological Society at the University of Bradford.
Hitherto, NUARS meetings have been fairly themeless, to encourage
the widest range of papers and emphasize new thinking and practice
rather than period or specialist interests. However this year we
decided to organise an autumn and summer term 'open meeting' , but
sandwich between these a deliberately thematic meeting on some topic of
current concern or interest. Also we broke with the open-meeting
tradition of asking for offers of papers, and in this case made formal
invitations to scholars in the North to prepare papers on the chosen
theme, these scholars being selected because of their especial
knowledge of particular aspects of our theme.
That theme is self-explanatory from the title of this book:
ARCHAEOLOGY AT THE INTERFACE: STUDIES IN ARCHAEOLOGY'S RELATIONSHIPS.
WITH HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, BIOLOGY AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE. Obviously we
could not hope to cover all the disciplinary interfaces in a single
day-conference, and we preferred a rapid publication to postponement
while we solicited additional papers on missing interfaces. We hope
you enjoy the varied diet that has resulted!
The editors would like to thank Mike Heyworth,
Jean Brown for helping to produce this volume.
Colin Merrony and

ARCHAEOLOGY AT THE INTERFACE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
J.L.Bintliff
"Disciplines rarely evolve in isolation; there is a strong arid often
unsuspected parallelism in the variety of stances which they encompass"
(Herbert and Johnston 1978, p.2)
The interface I wish to deal with in this paper, and that which is
the dominant concern of this volume, is that connecting Archaeology
with sister disciplines such as Geography, History and Social
Anthropology/Sociology, as well as more remote disciplines in the
Physical, Earth and Social Sciences. My particular theme, which I hope
will serve as a helpful introduction to the papers that are to follow,
is that of 'winds of change' flowing from these other disciplines into
Archaeology, and very occasionally in the reverse direction. I shall
trace these revitalizing packages of stimuli from subject to subject,
and ultimately back to their source in major transformations within
society as a whole. I shall focus my discussion on the following
sequence of major developmental stages for our discipline:
ARCHAEOLOGY IN ITS FIRST PARADIGM: 16th-EARLY 19TH CENTURIES
ARCHAEOLOGY DURING THE VICTORIAN ERA
ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE DOLDRUMS: TILL WORLD WAR II
THE POSTWAR REVOLUTION: POSITIVISM RAMPANT
THE RESCUE PHENOMENON
IS ARCHAEOLOGY IN A 'POST-NEW ARCHAEOLOGY' ERA?
Behavi ouralism
Structuralism
Macro-Social Structuralism
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS
ARCHAEOLOGY AND ITS NEIGHBOURS IN ITS FIRST PARADIGM: 16TH - EARLY 19TH
CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
Archaeology in its nascent 16th—18th century form in Western Europe
inevitably grew up as an adjunct to History, and with its definition
and continuing distinctiveness being its concern with the material
culture of the past. Until the mid 19th century, adherence to the
literal truth of the Old Testament deprived Europe of any significant
prehistory. For if, as was proclaimed by the Church from Biblical
analysis, the World had been created in 4004 BC, and later all but
depopulated by Noah's flood, the repeopling of the World would have
brought human groups to Western Europe little earlier than the first
historic descriptions of these 'barbarian' regions by the Greeks. The
material culture in the first museums and to be seen by the
Antiquarians in the field therefore belonged to peoples belonging
properly to History (such as the Celts and Germans, whose ways are
"lively sett down by Caesar" (Aubrey) - then the Romans, Saxons, etc).
Alongside this early dependence upon History, Archaeology by the
17th century had soon developed an active concern with landscape, and
many of the major early archaeologists or 'Antiquaries' travelled
extensively, placing field monuments into connection with each other
and into 'landscapes of the past', as well as noting relevant features
of the physical landscape including ancient field systems. So from the
first a permanent tie with History and to a lesser extent with
Geography was forged.
ARCHAEOLOGY AND ITS NEIGHBOURS DURING THE VICTORIAN ERA REVOLUTION IN
SCIENCE AND THOUGHT
In the 19th century the rise of scientific Geology was intimately
bound up with the demolition of Biblical chronology, and during the
course of the century Archaeology was swept into a veritable revolution
in European science and thought, in which it was profoundly influenced
by the rise of Geology, Darwinian Evolution and Social Anthropology, as
well as contributing very significantly to these disciplines via its
pioneer research into Stone Age Man. By the latter 19th century a
constant flow of interdisciplinary cooperation and influence created an
impressive, rapidly-advancing research front combining the study of
Man's past through material culture (Archaeology) with the evolution of
the physical landscape (Geology and Physical Geography), the evolution
of the animal world including the human species (Evolutionary Zoology
and Biology) and the origins and development of human social and
political systems (Social Anthropology). This interdisciplinary new
approach to the Earth and its occupants was united in its rejection of
the theoretical underpinnings that had characterised the previous phase
in Archaeology's development, a paradigm dominated by the primacy of
Biblical and Classical sources. Instead, Uniform!tarianism and
empirical science were the key features of the new disciplinary
approach, and the shifts in thought involved were radical enough to
concern the whole of Western society, both in the way people saw Man in
nature and society and obviously in the way practical and theoretical
science was practised. In the terminology of the philosopher of
Science, Thomas Kühn (1962) we can justifiably refer to a revolutionary
change in the predominant way of thought and explanation, or
'paradigm', at this time.
However, these major transformations in which Archaeology was
fundamentally involved, refashioned Prehistoric Archaeology. It is
only in the more limited but nonetheless important area of practical
methodology that other branches of Archaeology such as Classical and,
later, Medieval Archaeology received major stimuli: here we can look at
the mutual advances made by Geology and Archaeology in data collection
and recording via stratigraphy and accurate planning. Apart from this,
Historic Archaeology took little or no interest in the heightened
interactions that Prehistory had achieved with Geology and Social
Anthropology, and till relatively recently has remained committed to a
view of Archaeology as an illustrator of historic texts. It also
naturally followed the perennial concerns of mainstream History, which
since the Tudor era had centred on a 'Battles and Famous Men' view of
the past, in which individual and national character were at the
forefront of attention. In Britain, for example, pre-1914 History was
essentially 'continuous national history' presented in linear sequence:
"The grand theme of the pre-1914 historians was that of the foundations
of national greatness...In the schools, historical subjects seem to
have been deliberately chosen for their inspirational qualities...or to
register milestones of national progress" (Samuel 1984, p.7). A Board
of Education circular in 1905 states: "For children in English schools
the chief interest in history will rightly centre in the stirring
events and in the striking qualities of the central figures of our
history". European History was a conspicuous absentee from school
curricula, and indeed even today History contains a powerful body of
adherence to traditional disciplinary concerns: the Professor of Modern
History at Cambridge, Prof.Elton, recently argued that "Long stretches
of English history" ought to be the backbone of a university course,
expressed wonder at the attention paid to "that curious extra-
terrestrial place, the Third World", and regretted the recent invasion
of History by the Social Sciences (Samuel 1984, pp.6-7).
ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE DOLDRUMS: ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE AND ITS
NEIGHBOURS UP TILL WORLD WAR II
A general trend discernible in (Prehistoric) Archaeology and its
sister disciplines during the first half of this century has been a
retreat from the self-confident generalising approaches of the
Victorian era. The contemporary pressures that led to this shift have
been analysed elsewhere (cf. Bintliff 1984, Introduction), and include
a rejection of evolutionary approaches involving value judgements about
contemporary 'primitive peoples', a crisis of confidence about the
validity of a Uniformitarian approach to social evolution, and a
cultural and biological relativism seeking to analyse the particular
qualities of distinct human cultures or forms of animal life. Social
Anthropology decisively turned away from its association with
Archaeology in reconstructing past social systems, and under the
Structuro-Functionalist banner in Europe and Boasian regional
particularism in th States, focussed on the systematic analysis of
contemporary non-industrial communities as almost ahistorical
organisms.
The mainsprings of this crisis of confidence clearly emanated in the
nascent Social Sciences. In Geography, whereas the Physical branch
continued to develop throughout this period a series of bold general
models, those branches concerned with Man exhibit the same
characteristics of a retreat towards the unique and towards a-nalysis,
and away from generalising explanation. Describing the period up till
the 1960's in fact, it has been stated that: "it is clear that human
geography in practice was centrally concerned with exceptionalism and
stood in some contrast to the search for general laws in several
branches of physical geography" and "a form of urban geography which
continued without major conceptual change until the early 1960's...was
still centrally concerned with the inanimate qualities of the city and
its setting...the urban morphology trend up to this time remained
descriptive and essentially idiographic" (Herbert and Johnson 1978
pp.8,11).
In History, the crisis of confidence in national destiny and
Progress created a similar shift of direction to greater particularism:
"after the trauma of the First World War...in history as in politics, a
more introverted view prevails...historians deliberately turned
attention from the history of the state to that of everyday
things...the rhetoric of the 'small man' prevails" (Samuel 1984, p-8).
Abandoned by Social Science, Prehistory fled from its Victorian
grand models of evolving society inarching hand-in-hand with
technological stages, into the same ethnocentric and particularising
approach. The record of material culture was attributed to distinct
peoples or races, and changes in this record were normally attributed
to historic events such as migrations or the spread of ideas and
innovations from the historic centres of civilisation to the non-
historic peoples of prehistory. Even where Prehistory could not be
'explained' by ultimate reference to the historic record in this way,
which obviously meant a 'Battles and Famous Men' interpretation, the
same approach as a 'pseudo-history' was employed to make sense of
prehistoric societies, the archaeological data being force-fitted into
untested scenarios derived from traditional history and injected into
the mute past. In the figure most characteristic for this tradition in
this century, Sir Mortimer Wheeler, we see the steady advance of
scientific techniques of data collection and recording shackled
incongruously to a limited historic and 'pseudo-historic' mode of
interpretation (Bintliff 1983). Under the surface, however,
prehistorians remained faithful to the Victorian model of technological
and social stages in human progress, but were constrained by the
disapproval of Social Anthropology into only oblique references to such
conceptions (Bintliff 1984, Introduction).
On the other hand, Gordon Childe strove to integrate the complex
'organic system' approach of Social Anthropology into his mature works,
and dared not only to defend explicitly the 'Stage Schemes' for human
progress but also introduce the generalising models of Eastern Bloc
.historical materialism into his interpretations of European and Near
Eastern prehistory and early history. Significantly during his
lifetime it was his reconstructions of 'what happened next', (which
remained to the end coloured by Migration and Diffusion), that were
widely accepted by fellow archaeologists, and his pioneering
achievements in generalising theory and social archaeology were
ignored.
Historic Archaeology, meanwhile, was not troubled by a divorce from
Social Science, merely moving in step with the latest debates in
History and with more myopic debates in period-f ocussed, text-
orientated research; it did however continue to advance its practical
skills along with Prehistory, especially in the sphere of excavation.
Archaeology as a whole did not lose touch, though, with Geography
and Geology, and indeed the primacy of local culture and the unique
qualities of place and people was a shared theme that brought
influences into Archaeology from Human and Historical Geography. Both
Geography and Archaeology adapted the idea of a 'cultural system* from
Social Anthropology and created the view of closed populations sealed
within natural regions. The 'super organic', self-regulating culture
was often seen as overriding individual fates, and the influential
cultural geographer Carl Sauer was to write that Human Geography was "a
science that has nothing to do with individuals but only with human
institutions, or cultures" (1963, p.358). Especially in Britain we can
trace a strong branch of Geographic Archaeology in early to mid-century
associated with Cambridge and the names of Crawford, Fox and Grahame
Clark. The fortunate longevity of Professor Clark ensured that British
Archaeology was well-prepared to accept, at least in the Universities,
a reorientât i on in Man-Landscape studies towards the growth field of
Ecology, from the 1960s, onwards, and it was Clark's protege Eric Higgs
who fronted the influential pressure group in the New Archaeology
dubbed by David Clarke (1972a) the 'Ecological Paradigm'. Grahame
Clark's willingness to shift from Geographical influences to influences
from the Biological Sciences demonstrates another continuing link that
a minority of archaeologists maintained with other disciplines actively
researching into the changing environment. Normally however
Archaeology's ties to the Earth and Biological Sciences were like those
it had even more tenuously to the Physical Sciences, ie occasional
background information was obtained as a service; the method and theory
of those disciplines did not impinge significantly on those of
Archaeology. Certainly no longer, as in the heady days of the mid 19th
century, did Earth and Social Scientists, or Biological Scientists look
to Archaeology for mutual influence and collaboration towards common
goals.
In summary, Archaeology during the first half of this century has
been broadly characterised (cf. Binford 1968a; Trigger 1984, p.277) as
dominated by:
(1) Culture History: the delineation of races and peoples by means of
their material culture, and where possible, their historic record,
leading to interpretations of the past centred on specific events and
national or even individual character, mainly aimed at achieving a
linear narrative.
(2) Lifeways: a concern with the particularistic description of
everyday life in its wonderful diversity through the past.
By the end of World War II, Archaeology existed as a strange,
immature and fragmented discipline (cf. Clarke's famous dictum: "an
undisciplined empirical discipline" (1968, preface)). On the one hand,
its early association with Geology had spawned an increasing
sophistication in the physical recovery of material culture, its
recording in the field and later analysis in the laboratory. Yet the
purpose of this meticulous and increasingly 'scientific' activity was
highly variable, generally depending on the period specialisation of
the archaeologist and especially on his perception of the relation of
his finds to History. For Prehistorians, the unnacceptability (except
in the Communist World) of a Social Darwinism or Historical Materialist
approach, "both of which favoured analysis of local processes of change,
had led to the largely erroneous pseudo-history of the migration of
peoples and diffusion of innovations from historic centres. Historic
archaeologists suffered from a disciplinary inferiority-complex towards
textual historians, and this effectively stifled the development of an
independent approach to archaeological data. This continues to this
day amongst most Classical and Medieval archaeologists, who give the
impression that their activities are less useful, less accurate and too
impersonal a data-base for the reconstruction and explanation of the
past compared to written sources. Syntheses such as Frere's Britannia
(1978), most contributions to the synthesis Anglo-Saxon England (Wilson
1976), and the historical chapters in the synthesis The Origins of
Europe (Collins 1975) exemplify this attitude.
THE POSTWAR REVOLUTION: POSITIVISM RAMPANT
The Second World War, and the immediate postwar decades of
restructuring and redeveloping of Western society, had a profound
effect on most academic disciplines. First to respond were naturally
practitioners of the hard sciences (and spin-offs were to include
radiocarbon dating), followed closely, especially after the War, by
Social Science, then with increasing belatedness by Geography, History
and Archaeology. This development has been traced for Human Geography
by Herbert and Johnson (1978):
"The growth of industrial capitalism was characterised by, and
advanced because of, the widespread cooption of academic-Intellectual
effort into the economic system. Not surprisingly, it was the physical
scientists who were initially involved in the movement away from the
'ivory tower', for it was they, particularly in the applied science
offshoots, who provided many of the technological and technical
breakthroughs necessary for the increases in the surplus value of
labour which fuelled the growth of capital. Major contributions also
came with the development of the techniques of global warfare in the
twentieth century and the growth in size and influence of the military-
industrial complex, with which many scientists are deeply involved".
"The important public role of physical scientists was observed by
those who wished to emulate them in terms of methodology, and making a
contribution to public policy became a part of the scientific ethos to
which, increasingly, social as well as physical scientists were
attached. ..it was economists and social psychologists who first
achieved a recognition of relevance—to be followed by sociologists
and social administrators. Emulation of this apparent eminence thus
became a desideratum of human geographers, too, and 'policy
implications' increasingly formed the basis of the conclusions of
positivist research reports...It was the regionalism paradigm...which
provided the first major area within which human geographers could
practise their expertise in the service of governments. This avenue
was opened by the development, after the Second World War, of physical
planning programmes" (op. cit. pp.25-26).
"After the Second World War, a number of changes occurred in the
geographical discipline, several of them reaching their apogee in the
United States between 1955 and 1960 and in Great Britain a few years
later...(The) origins of these are many and varied. Important among
them was probably the war itself, the organisation of which involved
geographers working in teams with members of other disciplines...and
thereby becoming aware of the current methods, interests, and issues
beyond the narrow horizons of the few other subjects - anthropology,
geology, history - with which they had maintained some contact. This
was indeed a period of major change in many social science disciplines.
All of this work had the following characteristics:
1. It was nomothetic (ie law seeking) rather than idiographic, (ie
descriptive), focussing on the general trends and patterns and
interpreting specifics within an explicit theoretical matrix.
2. It used numerical methods to analyse its data and so was
scientifically 'respectable'.
3. It apparently, had predictive power and so could be used in the
development of public policy" (op.cit. pp.7-8).
A similar analysis has been preferred by Grano (1981, pp.31-32), who
identifies a new atmosphere spreading to the Social Sciences, which was
"based on probability and used statistical quantification as its main
method. The background to this was the change that was taking place in
the relations between society and science. Science was seen as the
best way to achieve economic growth. This resulted in geography
disparaging its own object of study and instead laying emphasis on
quantitative methods...This period of 'social physics' was also non-
humanistic: man was seen only in terms of statistical distribution and
region as a topological surface."
These trends in Geography peaked during the 1960s, and in Britain
culminated in major textbooks of this 'New Geography' such as Models in
Geography (Chorley and Raggett 1967) and Explanation in Geography
(Harvey 1969):
"Throughout the 1960s the methodology of those investigations was
both extended and sharpened. The aim was to be scientific - as physics
and chemistry are - and to provide quantifiable theories and
laws...These theories had a basis, often perhaps only implicit, in
mechanistic assumptions of human decision-making, the concept of
economic or perfectly rational man who made decisions on the basis of
complete knowledge and omniscience and who was translated by
geographers into spatial man.. .whose choice of locations was based upon
the minimization of movement costs. Later, there were models adapted
from Parsonian sociology, which accepted a view of society as composed
of individuals allocated to particular places within the economic and
social order from which, by dint of personal effort, they might escape
to a higher level. The members of these various groups then compete
for territory, with the resulting spatial order representing a
consensus acceptance of a certain pattern. These derivative sources,
and the ways in which they were translated into geographical models and
theories, ensured an essentially positivist and functional suite of
postures" (Herbert and Johnson 1978, pp. 15-16). The positivist label
attached to this whole movement reflects its lack of concern for human
values and experience and a reductionism to the gross movement of data
that is empirically observable and quantifiable.
History was to respond in very similar ways to the wind of change
blowing from Social Science and public involvement, and this
development and what was to follow it have been fruitfully analysed by
Tilly (1984):
"in the 1960's, many historians felt that historical theory and
practice alike were undergoing great changes. Some felt the changes
threatened the proper performance of the historian's function...Others
felt that history finally stood on the threshold of Science."
"Let us pay particular attention to the historical endeavours which
in the 1960's began to display the stigmata of social science: self-
conscious explication of concepts and models; deliberate comparison of
individuals, groups, places, or events (often many of them) placed
within a common framework; and fixation on reliable forms of
measurement, frequently involving numerical treatment of evidence.
Economic history, archaeology, demographic history, urban history, plus
some kinds of political, labour, agricultural, and family history
qualify" (op.cit. pp.363-365).
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A key figure was Lawrence Stone, whose research was "designed to
apply statistical methods of analysis to data of varying quality, in
order to teat some subjective impressions and traditional assumptions
about English social structure and social mobility in the Early Modern
and Modern periods" (Stone and Stone 1972, p.56). Stone also aimed to
"combine the humane skill in historical reconstruction through
meticulous concentration on the significant detail and the particular
example, with the statistical and theoretical preoccupations of the
social scientists. ..It could help reconcile history to sociology and
psychology" (Stone 1972, p.134).
Even later than the 'New History' in Europe was to be the inception
and diffusion of the 'New Archaeology'. Its origins were likewise both
direct, from changes in society, and indirect, by the emulation of
transformations that had already occurred in the Social Sciences,
Geography and History:
"By the 1950's, a growing number of archaeologists were smarting
from the charge that their discipline was descriptive rather than
theoretical in orientation" (Trigger 1984, p.277).
After some kite-flying demanding new approaches in the late 50's (eg
Willey and Phillips 1958), the 1960's witnessed a gradual
crystallization in the United States of the elements necessary for a
new approach to Archaeology. The various strands were skilfully
brought together with forceful polemic by the acknowledged leader of
the movement, Lewis Binford, in the 1968 volume New Perspectives in
Archaeology. Acceptance of the virtues of the New Archaeology spread
rapidly throughout America during the 1970's and informs almost all
major public and University archaeology at the present day.
The effect of the 'wind of change' in Europe was to be a very
different affair. The initial battle standard was raised by the lone
figure of David Clarke in his remarkable and still infamous volume,
also of 1968, Analytical Archaeology. By 1972 he was able to assemble
a second, equallyinfluentialvolume, Models In Archaeology. The
contributors formed a rather shaky 'School', and the title was a direct
homage to its obvious inspiration of the mid-1960's, Chorley and
Raggett's Models in Geography. Through the 1970's the New Archaeology
made slow progress through the British universities, greatly aided by a
second front opened up with the emergence of Colin Renfrew as a leading
propagandist for the primarily American version (eg Renfrew 1972).
.However for reasons which we shall investigate shortly, New Archaeology
by the 1980's had succeeded merely in influencing most university
prehistorians into new approaches; Classical and Medieval Archaeology
remained virtually unscathed, and the professional archaeologists and
amateurs were paying little or no attention to the phenomenon. Britain
was actually the most receptive to the 'wind of change'. Also by the
1980's Scandinavian prehistorians and those in Holland were largely won
over, major inroads were being recorded in Italy, but France and
Germany remained virtually insulated from the contagion.
In line with those trends already cited for parallel programmes of
change in sister disciplines, Archaeology's 'New' format was
characterised by:
1. A desire to push the discipline out of its traditional, literary
mode into one typified by quantification and statistical testing.
2. The rejection of particularist concerns, whether focussing on
discrete events or individuals, in favour of generalising explanations
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Lfocussed on trends, societies and systems (cf. Figure 1).
3. A search for law—like propositions about human culture in the past,
such as might be found useful by the Social Sciences and thereby bring
Archaeology back Into the fold of mainstream studies of Man.
4. A deliberate policy of demolishing disciplinary boundaries,
bringing in by the cartload new 'models' and practical techniques
developed in other disciplines.
The success of New Archaeology in the States need detain us little
in this discussion. American Archaeology being formally integrated
with Social Science under the rubric of Anthropology had made its
exposure to the wind of change in the Social Sciences quite inevitable.
Significantly, the crucial decade when New Archaeology established
itself in the States was a time when state funding for Archaeology
leapt into a multi-million dollar investment. The massive demand for
trained personnel was fed by graduates freshly-indoctrinated by the New
Archaeology in its most virulent form. The provision by law that
public and private developers provide in their budgets for all
necessary archaeological investigations thereby brought under threat
has created a source of funds hitherto undreamt of and the opportunity
to test and refine the full range of theories dreamed up in academia by
the gurus of the new movement.
In Europe many factors conspired against any radical change in the
discipline of Archaeology. Historical archaeologists were little
affected by the New History, which naturally was concentrated on the
post-Medieval periods where data was most reliable and easiest to
quantify. Their interests in developments in Geography and Social
Science were traditionally minimal. As recently as 1981 Professor
Philip Rahtz in his inaugural lecture at York University set out for
the first time a programme for a future 'New Medieval Archaeology' in
this fashion:
"I will also indicate the extent to which medieval archaeology still
retains its original role as the 'handmaid of history', working wholly
within a framework provided by written sources, - and how it may begin
to establish itself as a more autonomous study. This latter aim is
part of a more general trend in archaeology in its aspiration to be a
science" (op.cit. p.3).
"There is, as in many subjects, a wind of change, the effect of
which on medieval archaeology we cannot yet estimate. This is the
impact of the modern theoretical or 'new' archaeology, developed
primarily in prehistoric studies, and only now beginning to penetrate
into those of later periods" (op.cit. p.6).
For "Classical Archaeology, likewise, the influence of the New
Archaeology has been slight and highly localised. Surprisingly this is
almost as true of American Classical archaeologists as European, but
the reason lies in a traditional background in Classics and History on
both sides of the Atlantic. As late as 1980 Colin Renfrew was to throw
out a challenge for American Classicists to bestir themselves and find
out what was happening in other branches of Archaeology, where fresh
horizons of method and theory had been revealed by the New Archaeology
movement:
"There is therefore a brilliant opportunity for anyone who can
command the data and the scholarship of the Great Tradition while
employing the problem-orientât!on and the research methods of current
anthropological archaeology" (Renfrew 1980, p.297).
The challenge has been thought necessary to repeat by a 'New
12
Figure 1
Economic
subsystem
Religious
subsystem
Material
culture
subsystem
}= Psychological
' subsystem
TIME
"A static and schematic model of the dynamic equilibrium between the
subsystem networks of a single sociocultural system and its total
environment system. 5 represents the summation of the effects of the
alien sociocultural systems connected to S by cultural 'coactions' (dashed
lines) and to the environment by 'interactions' (solid lines).
To set the model in motion all the components must oscillate randomly
along intercorrelated trending trajectories."
( David Clarke, Analytical archaeology 2nd Ed (1979), Figure 23 )
13
Classical Archaeologist' in 1985 (Snodgrass 1985). But there are many
specialist areas of traditional Archaeology where the absence of
theoretical awareness is truly staggering. The revised edition of
I.E.S.Edwards' standard study of the pyramids of Egypt (1985), for
example, treats these monuments as all but disconnected from the wider
context of socio-economic development in Egypt, whilst the lengthy
bibliography shows no single citation of studies of comparable
monuments in other civilisations. The innovative 'New Archaeology'-
orientated studies of Ancient Egypt by Karl Butzer and Fekri Hassan are
likewise ignored.
The situation in Britain was particularly complex as a potential
seed-ground for the New Archaeology. As we have seen, archaeologists
of all periods had a limited confidence in their subject's credentials
for 'writing history* or even 'prehistory'. The official abandonment
of grand stage schemes for human progress had concentrated the
archaeological mind on narrative, sequential description site-by-site,
culture-by-culture, or for historic periods on the material evidence
for known historic events; this was coupled with a concern attractive
to the public, of reconstructing 'how it was to live then' via the
recovered details of everyday life. With particularism rife, naturally
scholars rarely crossed period boundaries; even today those who do are
immediately castigated for being 'out of their element'. The common
approach of the discipline was essentially the sphere of practical
archaeology, and the major British general archaeology textbooks of the
60's and 70's were digging handbooks (Webster 1963, Coles 1972, Barker
1977). There was no common desire to formulate a common theory towards
testing propositions about the past, indeed the way archaeologists
explained things was generally a matter of an act of sober imagination.
No-one had pretensions that Archaeology could provide important
statements about Society of interest to other disciplines concerned
with Man. Rather than being tempted by the growing quantitative
revolution around them, archaeologists were usually more tempted to
stray into Art History. And most significantly, there had already
developed an unconscious rift between those archaeologists,
professional and amateur, working largely in the field, and the 'ivory
tower' archaeologists of the universities with their occasional forays
in vacations. And this last situation was to be catalysed violently at
the decisive time of the late 60's and early 70's, with severe effects
on the fledgling European New Archaeology.
THE RESCUE PHENOMENON: A PROFESSION ILL-PREPARED FOR THE LIMELIGHT
It has earlier been pointed out that the war and postwar decades of
redevelopment in Western Europe forged a key link between public
service and those academic subjects concerned with Man, Landscape and
Society. With massive opportunities arising from expanding employment
niches, these subjects responded with a new format stressing their
explanatory and even predictive power, at the same time evincing their
responsible attitude by a rapid shift towards quantification and
testing of propositions. Furthermore, to cope with State demands,
generalising analysis overrode partlcularist, the individual yielded to
the population. Management strategies seemed more appropriately met by
treating units of data as structured into systems whose whole was
larger than its parts. Systems of culture were envisaged as changing
not by the behavioural variability of individual people but by gross
shifts in major component subsystems. Terms such as mutual feedback,
multiplier effect, system déstabilisation were the 'buzz' words, and
the whole approach has rightly been characterised as mechanistic and
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de-humanising.
i n K *f°clal Silence. Geography a n d Modern History were drawn
inexorably into new formats dominated by such ~nn = iT ,-,
Archaeology's public profile remained ^far î^ger "o^t "f °
bureaucratic eye; nor was it immediately clear that after
service in Air Photography and Mapping %^
role to play in the postwar rebuilding of Europe. U was a belated
m ί ! i6 and the "Ρ"17 iacreasln8 rate of site destruction(linked to that very process of physical reconstruction) that finally
dragged a reluctant discipline into a major public role. Firstly to
take Britain as our example, that majority group of British
archaeologists whose main interests lay in fieldwork rather than in the
library, were all too aware of the accelerating loss of Britain's past
in both town and country; at the same time, and partly in response to
pressure from that community, the State wished to see the 'national
heritage' organised properly, with realistic funding but at the same
time a clear limit placed on the State's responsibility.
The fieldworkers' pressure group had meetings f rom 1969 and finally
established a national committee called RESCUE in 1971. The origins
and purpose of the RESCUE phenomenon were later clearly set out in a
volume edited by Philip Rahtz (1974). The philosophy of RESCUE took
issue with the academic viewpoint, which seemed to turn an uncaring eye
on the increasing pace of site destruction, and which was epitomised by
Collingwood's pre-war dicta: "that no excavation should be done except
to answer a specific problem; that this was the only scientific and
scholarly way of approaching archaeological research; that the
incidental fact that a site was going to be destroyed was no good
reason for stepping out of the academic path to deal with it" (quoted
in Rahtz, op. cit. p. 56). In contrast, Rahtz - (clearly in an earlier
and different manifestation from his 1981 New Archaeology self
cf. infra.) - defended a quite contrasted viewpoint: "A site exists· it
contains evidence of potentially historic value; it is going to' be
destroyed; there are a limited and decreasing number of such sites left
in this country; surely the evidence should be rescued. Even if it
does not answer the problems currently posed by research workers it
will be needed by posterity and should be recorded for its benefit"
(p. 56). And as a sop to theory - "Most of us still believe that some
research work should continue" (p. 58).
Other leading figures in RESCUE were more impatient with academic
research concerns, and clearly also academic practitioners. Chris
Musson, in a remarkable chapter entitled 'Rescue Digging all the Time'
conjures up a new world dominated by the practical men of Archaeology:
"there is no reason why six archaeologists should not dig a whole
hillf ort or a Roman camp, so long as they are allowed to spend a year
or more over it" (1974, p. 83) - Yes, but what was being sacrificed for
speed?
"the full-time excavator can overtake the professor in no more than
three years' continuous digging" (p. 86) - Maybe in wielding a pickaxe,
but what about the research progress?
"a growth in the number of professional diggers - specialists in
excavation - should not be seen as a surprising or even a dangerous
departure. . .In the simplest terms the contrast is perhaps between the
'thinker' and the 'doer ', without implying that the thinker never acts,
nor that the doer never applies his mental faculties. Indeed one of
the greatest pleasures of excavation is its demand for the exercise of
both mind and body in an intensely practical task. . .The full-time
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digger enjoys the exercise of his practical skills, just as the thinker
draws satisfaction from his mental agilities...For the right kind of
person full-time rescue work can be infinitely more satisfying than a
career, with its more ephemeral
the vast majority of students, when
archaeology, see university teaching or
misconceived academic
objectives...Unf ortunately
considering a career in
research as their ultimate objective. Perhaps this is in ignorance
the alternatives" (Musson, op.cit. pp.87-88).
of
Graham Webster further encourages the creation of a non-academic,
non-research, and non-theory community of archaeologists in Britain in
a chapter that ironically demonstrates a total lack of awareness of the
wind of change emanating from the United States since the 1960s; his
chapter is entitled: 'Training the New Archaeologist' -
"In the long term there is a need for the provision of permanent
training centres, permanently staffed and where there are facilities
for training in all branches of practical archaeology.·.These centres
could be enterprises shared by the Government (DOE), the new regional
authorities, and the universities. In addition to permanent staff to
carry out teaching and research, it should be possible by secondment
for members of university departments and local-authority museums to
play an effective role...This field training, as distinct from academic
training, is a primary necessity" (Webster 1974, pp.237-238).
The suggested syllabus for Webster's training centre is
conspicuously lacking in any role for interpreting past societies,
concentrating rather on the techniques of data recovery, description
and the reconstruction of the changing physical format of the site.
Significantly, the recommended reading for this major book on Rescue
Archaeology of 1974 focusses on traditional digging handbooks 10 and 20
years out of date, and an article dismissing the relevance of New
Archaeology by Hogarth (1972).
British Archaeology had responded to the growing destruction of our
heritage; the State had recognised its responsibility and wished also
to systematize its financial and legal commitment to the national
heritage. The result was a massive input of funds into the kind of
practical archaeology promulgated by the RESCUE pressure group. In
this atmosphere it is hardly surprising that the excitement generated
in some university archaeology departments by the messianic doctrines
of Binford and Clarke, calling for a central focussing on matters of
philosophy, theory, f or an end to literary, humanistic archaeology and
a move towards a hard science subject ruled by statistics and
computers, and for the pulling of Archaeology into the trendy world of
Social Science - all this was little more than esoteric, ritual mumbo-
jumbo in the ivory towers for the 'diggers' who now had the bit between
their teeth!
To the outside, bureaucratic eye, limitless academic horizons which
are beyond the frames of reference of public body priorities (such as
economic return, public demand), have inevitably replaced the concept
of Archaeology as 'a search for the meaning of the past' with that of
Archaeology as 'management of the past'. In Britain, as embodied in
the creation of the quango English Heritage, such an interpretation
predicates the necessary personnel to protect and analyse 'objects' of
public interest (museum artefacts, standing monuments), devoid of the
intent to further illuminate the human past. Beyond this area of
responsibility for the physical heritage, public demand may
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increasingly be satisfied by the traditional goals such as the
reconstruction of lifeways for public titillation (eg the Mary Rose
the York Archaeological Trust's 'sniffing through the past' train
ride).
Despite the generally pervasive paradigm of New Archaeology in the
States, there have also been pressures there to remove academic and
theoretical considerations from non-university professional archaeology
or 'Public Archaeology'. Thus Lipe argued in 1974 (p.214):
"If our field is to last beyond a few more decades, we need to shift to
resource conservation as a primary model". As King has pointed out,
this can lead to entirely negative feedback: "if the consulting
archaeologist says the thing is 'archaeological', it is avoided. This
being the case, it is a short step to the conclusion that we need not
even describe the phenomenon; we need merely specify that it is
archaeological" (King 1983, p.147). Unfortunately: "The argument
against a responsibility to do research is that the legal and business
contexts in which public archaeology is done have nothing to do with
research...With the partial exception of the National Park Service, no
federal agency that funds public archaeology has archaeological
research as its mission. To the agency or industry supporting an
archaeological project, if not to the laws that require that support,
the outcome and indeed the existence of the research is truly
'incidental'" (King op.cit. pp.152,155).
IS ARCHAEOLOGY IN A 'POST-NEW ARCHAEOLOGY' ERA?
Having identified in Europe an embattled minority of primarily
university archaeologists closely committed to a New Archaeology
approach, directly comparable to the new postwar formats in sister
disciplines, it has to be admitted that that battle seems to have been
lost, for not only do we see most of the territory still in enemy
hands, ie the traditionalists, but formerly loyal figures are deserting
New Archaeology strongholds and proclaiming that New Archaeology as a
movement is a phenomenon of the past. John Barrett, for example, has
written (1983, p.189): "The New Archaeology is now some twenty years
old, and although it cannot be dismissed simply to seek a new fad,
ideas are being developed which stand in sharp contrast to those
developed in the 60's and 70's". Bruce Trigger opens an article
significantly entitled 'Archaeology at the Crossroads: What's New?',
with the statement: "Is archaeology in serious trouble or does it stand
on the threshold of brilliant new accomplishments?.. .There is growing
uncertainty about the theoretical propositions relating to human
behaviour that have guided the interpretation of archaeological data
for the past twenty-five years" (1984, p.275). Ian H odder (1982),
explicitly rejecting the assumptions of the New Archaeology, and
attempting to float a new school of theory, has sought reconciliation
with the aspirations and priorities of traditional archaeologists such
as Daniel and Piggott. Even Professor Colin Renfrew, in his inaugural
lecture at Cambridge (Renfrew 1982), appeared to at least one reviewer
to be seeking a path back to traditional, humanistic approaches:
"perhaps the first example of the 'post new archaeology' phase"
(Selkirk 1983, p.68). In a survey of recent publications in American
Archaeology, DÛnnell (1984) singles out: "a loss of faith in the
dominant strategy of Americanist archaeology, the so-called new
archaeology" as "the most important occurrence in the last decade"
(p.490).
But to understand this apparently perplexing turn of events in
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academie Archaeology we need only turn to trends in our sister
disciplines, and ultimately to shifting attitudes in contemporary
society, where we shall find that Archaeology once again has been
exposed, this time with great effectiveness as far as academic
archaeologists are concerned, to the dominant wind of change.
In Geography we are informed: "in part a reaction against some of
the early excesses of quantification and models based upon the
assumption of economic man...there has been since the late 1960's a
general reaction against positivism as a conceptual position and the
examination of alternative philosophical stances within human
geography.. .Phenomenology and the behavioural emphasis have provided
one reaction against positivism, others have included the call for a
conflict rather than a consensus view of society. . .which owes its major
stimulus to...Karl Marx, whose influence has permeated geography much
later than other disciplines...Finally... there has been a much more
persistent questioning of the ways in which geographical research
should be made relevant and for whom it should be relevant. Should
geographers be content to concentrate their efforts on the spatial
outcomes of social problems or should they more profitably examine the
societal structures and allocative systems which produce the problems
in the first instance?" (Herbert and Johnson 1978, p.9,10).
"During the last decade, geography has witnessed the re-emergence of
a critical, reflective attitude towards explanation and understanding.
In contrast to the legacy of a positivist philosophy of science,
epitomized in geography by an emphasis on quantitative analysis and
model building as fundamental to the development of spatial science, a
desire for greater philosophical articulation has typified the various
attempts by human geographers to appropriate for their discipline a
suitable philosophy of the explanation of human behaviour" (Harrison
and Livingstone 1982, p.l).
"Attempts have...been made to reverse the scientific method's
process of isolation of the object of study and return it to its real
local and temporal context and situation. In this approach, the object
of study is a combination of empirical data from nature and human life
in the outside observed real environment...The result is a
psychological view of the environment...The new humanistic geography
and radical geography, which have been united...under the name of
'social humanism', have developed the perceptual-cognitive approach
further to a stage where the scholar is identified with his object of
study, individuals' or social groups' perceptual-cognized environment.
The application of geography is in that case directed...to the future
potential environment as expressed in values" (Grano 1981, p.33).
It will be worthwhile briefly examining these different new
directions in turn:
Behaviourism
Within the Social Sciences a strong reaction began to develop in the
States from the mid-1960's towards the implicit positivism of the
quantitative theorists; the reaction reflected the advance of
Phenomenology as an alternative. In Psychology, the work of Lewin
(1938) is often taken as the initiation of the phenomenological
approach. "In a phenomenological perspective, the existence of an
objective reality is denied and each individual is recognized as having
a living world of experience within which decisions are made and which
are reflected in, for example, man's model of nature and his tastes in
landscape...As geographers have employed the phenomenological
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perspective, différent cultural groups have been socialized to
appreciate different aspects and components of the natural world, in
whose image they create their own worlds, and the study of physical
space can be pursued only through knowledge of these perceptions, just
as the study of behaviour in social space can only be comprehended in
the light of people's ideas about society" (Herbert and Johnson 1978,
p.16).
Macro-Social Structuralism
"By the early 1970s, both the quantitative-theoretical and the
behavioural approaches were coming under attack - on new grounds. This
development, termed 'radical' and 'structural' by some (Robson 1976),
with origins in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam movements in the
United States in the late 1960's" stressed
1) The quantitative—theoretical methodology is grounded in a model of
'market capitalism' - but a major trend in recent society has been
towards monopolies.
2) Consensus is inadequate for capitalist societies - conflict is
equally important in its analysis.
3) Quantitative methodology is able at best "only to describe patterns,
and its predictive powers for planning and policy purposes produce
solutions which will continue the current situation...Given that most
of the social and economic problems of the world are fundamentally a
consequence of inequalities in power at all spatial scales...their
solution will only come about through recognition of this fact,
followed by action to remove the inequalities and not merely to patch
up the associated ills"
4) "The behavioural approach...sees the individual as an independent
decision-maker and not one whose actions are very much constrained by
the institutional nature of his society, be it capitalist or socialist,
primitive or advanced. Behaviouralism in its extreme form would take
us back to the idiographic, except!onalist stances which have proved to
be inhibiting to theory formation in human geography in the past"
"The thrust of this critique is often clearly political" and
interestingly, a striking convert and propagandist was formerly a
leader of the New Geography, David Harvey (Herbert and Johnson 1978,
pp.17-18).
Structuralism, as it was passing rapidly through the Humanities, was
essentially concerned to argue a purer point of view, that: "all mature
experience and knowledge possess a universal, necessary structure, and
that this structure is derived, not from the empirical properties of
the 'external' world of objects towards which experience is directed
and about which knowledge is claimed, but from the manner in which
human thinkers impose order on their own 'internal' world of perception
and thought" (Toulmin 1972, quoted in Harrison and Livingstone 1982,
p.3).
Structuralism may then be used either as a philosophical
underpinning to Behaviourism, stressing the individual perception of
the world, or in the 'radical' and often Marxist interpretation where
Man is seen as dominated by 'structures' around him eg social
formations, the capitalist Mode of Production and other group social
forces. In any case, Geography has proceeded to pursue these separate
lines of analysis very fruitfully, whether emphasizing the individual's
perception of the world around him, or that of the specific community
rooted in time, place and culture.
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In History, the same reaction has occurred against the New History
of the 1960's (Tilly 1984). A doyen of the New History, Stone, by 1979
had lost his zeal f.or the new ways, and wrote welcoming a "revival of
narrative". He argued that events had come back into style, as the
techniques and determinism that had captured the historians of the
I960's began to lose their appeal: "Many historians now believe that
the culture of the group, and even the will of the individual, are
potentially at least as important causal agents of growth as the
impersonal forces of material output and demographic growth" (Stone
1979, p.9). The New History floated on "heady optimism...buttressed by
the belief that material conditions such as changes in the relationship
between population and food supply, changes in the means of production
and class conflict, were the driving forces in history. Many regarded
intellectual, cultural, religious, psychological, legal, even
political, developments as mere epiphenomena" (Stone op.cit. p.7).
Casting particular scorn on quantitative studies, he goes on to attack
those who "specialize in the assembling of vast quantities of data by
teams of assistants, the use of the electronic computer to process it
all, and the application of highly sophisticated mathematical
procedures to the results obtained...in general the sophistication of
the methodology has tended to exceed the reliability of the data, while
the usefulness of the results seems - up to a point - to be in inverse
correlation to the mathematical complexity of the methodology and the
grandiose scale of data-collection" (Stone op.cit. pp.11,13). Tilly
(1984) shows how in Urban History, the 1960's was dominated by such
typical trends as modelling, large data sets, multiple comparisons,
quantitative analysis, but this then yields during the 1970's to
studies that tried to "enrich their pallid collective biographies with
colourings of individual experience" (p.376). He further points out
that one of the major reactions to the alleged excesses of social-
scientific history was 'retrospective ethnography', a "self-conscious
turn to anthropology as a guide to historical reconstruction.. .The idea
is to recreate crucial situations of the past as a thoughtful
participant-observer would have experienced them" (Tilly op.cit.
p.380).
It may be noted here that Marxist collective models are equally
castigated with New History mechanistic models as straying from,
individual perceptive history.
The parallel is so obvious that I cannot resist at this point
introducing the contemporary and identical debate in Modern
Architecture. That very postwar boom whose consequences we have been
following in academic thought began most directly with city replanning,
and we are all by now familiar with the great impetus this gave to the
Modern Movement in Architecture, the landscape of tower blocks, urban
glasshouse skyscrapers, drawing board fantasies where the individual
and the local community were lost to sight and to each other. The same
philosophy of mechanistic gross modelling, simple law-like solutions,
and the celebration of technological wizardry, permeate these all too
real townscapes. And just as inevitably has come the reaction: the
literal demolition of much of this landscape, the halt called to the
implantation of additional glass monsters in historic contexts, and the
thorough questioning of the philosophical and moral failings of the
associated Modernist paradigm.
For many architects, financial considerations have led to a minimal
attempt to reintroduce traditional points of cultural identification
into their new blocks: this 'post-Modern Classicism' as seen flashily
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in J ohne ons's AT and T Building in New York, is seen by many as in no
respect different from the 'suppressive corporation of High-Tech': "It
is a long time since architects believed that they could revolutionise
society through their buildings. But to assume that architecture has
no effect at all on social affairs is just as absurd. The advocates of
both High-Tech and Post-Modern Classicism postulate that their
architectures are politically value-free. In fact such approaches,
with their celebration of corporatism and the status quo make very
specific political statements" (Darley and Davey 1983, pp.23,25).
Amongst various contrasting alternatives that are now being built as
rejections of Modernism, there is an obvious Revivalist Movement, as a
result of which much new buiding on a private and to a lesser extent
public basis is a direct imitation of historic styles familiar to the
public and on a more manageable perceptive scale. More original is a
school attempting to design new buildings that nonetheless respond to
the criticisms of Modernism: Romantic Pragmatism. "Romantic
Pragmatism...celebrates the primacy of the individual and particular
and, pragmatically, it responds to the exigencies of brief and site
without introducing (unlike Classicism, pure, Neo, or Post-Modern) an
irrelevant geometric discipline between programme and product...It
suggests multifarious ways in which people who use buildings can
identify with locality...The aim is an architecture which recognizes
and enhances the life of the individual and group as well as the
organisation" (Darley and Davey 1983, p.23).
And so, at last, to Archaeology. John Barrett's critique will raise
some of the key issues, which will now appear quite familiar:
"The New Archaeology embraced the ideas of science because, I
suspect, most people regard scientific knowledge as the only credible
kind of knowledge; this view of science is beginning to be challenged.
The embrace with science was two-fold. Firstly, theories were
established which were aimed at achieving a law-like status, in other
words to become...applicable in all times and at all places. Many of
these so called laws were very trivial and this aim has been slowly
eroded; none the less certain high levels of generalisation are still
aimed for. These generalisations concern the working and organisation
of systems, such as states, urban centres or hunter-gatherer
c ommunities".
"Secondly, there have been developments in methodology, and here
there have been very real advances, even if the overall aim of
.hypothesis testing has defied clear definition. In all this the idea
of tracing specific historical developments has been put to one
side...systems change, apparently, through such mysterious means as
'maladaption','positive feedback' and 'multiplier effects'. In all
this people appear to act out the roles in which they have been
cast...Let us make a quite essential distinction here, namely that
between behaviour and action. I will characterise the former as humans
responding to the requirements of the system to maintain that system:
defining laws of human behaviour is the main concern of the New
Archaeologist. Action... looks at the way individuals and groups
actively construct and manipulate a social order. Action is about
people at specific times and in specific social contexts, and long term
change is the result of those conscious and unconscious actions. If we
are interested in past human action then, I believe, we write history.
To my mind this distinction between behaviour and action (with its
broad moral and political implications) lies at the heart of the
current debate in theoretical archaeology" (Barrett 1983, p.189). And
to this we may add that even the founder of New Archaeology, Lewis
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Binford, could be said to have fled from his (1968a) search for
'general laws' of human behaviour, and moved down to 'archaeological
problems for archaeologists' in his (1977) Middle Range Theory. "Uia
distinction between middle—range theory, which supplies archaeologists
with behavioral information, and general theories, that seek to explain
cultural change...is of great practical importance because it
distinguishes theoretical problems that are of particular interest only
to archaeologists from those which are of general interest to the
social sciences" (Trigger 1984, p.276).
Colin Renfrew, after a long espousal of characteristic New
Archaeology approaches such as Systems Theory and mathematical
modelling, has clearly shifted his ground to acknowledge the need for
'An Archaeology of the Mind' (Renfrew 1982) or 'Cognitive Archaeology'.
It is apparently the states of mind of human participants that must now
be allowed for alongside the usual New Archaeology large—scale,
impersonal variables of the culture system: "now we are beginning to
see very much more clearly that in the process of development of new,
more complex social formations, including early states and
civilizations, there are important cognitive factors accompanying the
demographic, economic and social changest without which these can
hardly be explained" (op.cit. p.25). Both Renfrew (1983) and
Wagstaff(1983) have also pointed to the common ground of Archaeology
and Geography in post-positivistic soul-searching, tentatively
indicating the potential for future collaboration on themes more
recently favoured in Geography such as behaviourist/cognitive
approaches and 'idealist'/socially-committed approaches.
Easily the most thorough-going critique of New Archaeology has come
from Ian H odder, in setting out an alternative paradigm of 'Symbolic
and Structural Archaeology' (Hodder 1982a). He challenges the Systems
Approach, reintroduces the individual, finds quantification totally
inadequate for explanation, and focusses instead on the structures of
the individual and community mind - considerably adapting Structuralist
thought to this purpose. The future aim of Archaeology should be more
'historic', ie rediscovering the unique attitudes of mind and belief
that belonged to particular cultures at particular epochs:
"functionalism refers to the use of an organic analogy and to the
viewpoint that an adequate explanation of a past society involves
reference to a system, equilibrium and adaptation..·processual and
systems archaeology is almost by definition a functionalist
archaeology" (p.2).
"The evolutionary perspective has employed adaptive relationships at
different levels of complexity, but it has not encouraged an
examination of the particular historic context...The uniqueness of
cultures and historical sequences must be recognised...Another
limitation of the functionalist perspective of the New Archaeology is
the relationship between the individual and society...Individual human
beings become little more than the means to achieve the needs of
society...In fact...individuals are not simply instruments in some
orchestrated game and it is difficult to see how subsystems and roles
can have 'goals' of their own" (pp.3-5).
"Levels of probabilility and statistical evidence of correlation are
no substitute for an understanding of causal links and of the relevant
context for human action. The use of mathematical and statistical
formulae which provide good fits to archaeological data leads to little
understanding of the past" (p.5).
"Material culture can be examined as a structured set of
differences. This structural symbolising behaviour has functional
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Utility, and it must be understood in those terms. But it also has a
logic of Its own which is not chiefly observable as pattern or style.
The structure must be interpreted as having existed partly Independent
of the observable data, having generated and produced those data"
(P-7).
Matching the 'Macro-Social Structuralism' of Geography, there has
been a significant development in archaeological theory towards
explanations emphasizing exploitation and class struggle in the
prehistory and history of pre-Industrial communities (cf.Gilman 1981,
Chapman 1979, Bintliff 1982, 1984 pp.26,173-174). This trend almost
certainly reflects a direct influence from anti-Establishment
tendencies in contemporary society on archaeologists rather than
influence from related academic areas such as Geography, and may be
considered as in part a response to the linked phenomena of economic
recession and a wave of (government-supported) anti-liberal, anti-
socialist activity in the Western world:
"it could be said that the rise of New Archaeology correlated with
the 'anti-authoritarianism' of '68, but this correlation can hardly be
ascribed any direct causal significance. The new Archaeology never
took up the other aspect of the '68 movement: the social, and political
critique."
"It is symptomatic that while major parts of the progressive
elements within social and humanistic sciences discussed Marx-inspired
theories, then at the same time 'progressive' archaeologists discussed
mechanical evolutionary theories, inspired by Service and Sahlins.
This is perhaps one of the best indicators of archaeology's academic
isolation nowadays. A foundation in historical materialism would have
implied a useful evaluation of the institutional and ideological
content of archaeology, and its context" (Mahler, Paludan-Muller and
Hansen, 1984, p.217).
In summary, current trends throughout the Humanities represent a
rejection of what we might call postwar Modernism. The assumptions
under challenge include:
1) Study of, and manipulation of, human communities in the present or
past are best done at the aggregate, impersonal level, because
2) Forces at work in the past, and to be played with in the present.,
are most potent at the community level and are those most amenable to
statistical treatment eg demography, modes of production, economic
performance
3) Since data about the past is fragmentary, the only explanatory
factors we can control are those operative on the large scale, as the
Logical Positivist philosophy requires empirical testing for serious
attempts at interpretation and causation.
If one can risk a sociological interpretion, this trend has occurred
at a time of acute alienation of the public from government and public
bureaucracy, with the latter encouraging a focus on self-promotion; at
the same time economic depression and the activities of anti-
Establishment pressure groups in areas such as ecology, feminism,
ethnic minorities have reinforced feelings towards local community and
the diversity of subgroups in society. The priority of the individual
and the subculture, of creating one's own future, seems reflected in
contemporary 'post-Modernist' approaches.
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS
It is more than timely to confirm that the earlier experience of our
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sister disciplines in such a post-Modern crisis can offer the prospect
of ways out of our current difficulties and crisis of confidence.
In Geography, fear example, the Behaviourist appeal to the power of
individual perception soon had to come to terms with collective
realities and the unavoidable advantages of New Geography in methods in
analysis: "the urban studies which adopted the behavioural approach
neither focussed on the activities of particular individuals nor
adopted the more discursive, literary style which was typical of
geographical phenomenology. The concerns of urban geography - where
people shop, work, live, or move to, etc - involved millions of
decisions, many of them made daily, which even when sampled required
the quantitative arsenal of the earlier methodology in order to find
spatial order, the morphological laws, and the laws of association.
Thus Gould's mental map studies are based on components and regression
analysis and on an inferred spatial order" (Herbert and Johnston 1978,
p.17). In fact, the recent wind of change has merely broadened the
range of models and operational conditions of geographers: "Urban
geographers are more sophistictaed in the quantitative methodologies
which they employ; a basic statistical competence is almost universal,
but at the same time a healthy, informed, and mature scepticism of the
proper role of quantification is now evident" (op cit, p.20).
Interestingly, it is suggested that this broadening of Geography's
perspectives, especially as regards the Social Sciences, may lead to
the end of disciplinary boundaries and the corresponding time-lags for
intellectual waves of innovation:
"As Harvey (1973) and others now argue, disciplinary boundaries
within the social sciences are largely obfuscatory. Society must be
studies as a whole, and its use of space, which is the main focus of
geographical endeavour, cannot be studied independently or be the
source of independent theory."
"On a broader front, urban geographers have also become more aware
of the existence of alternative methodologies and philosophies and have
shown a willingness to delve into the literature of the evolution of
thought in the social sciences. New concepts rarely have an internal
relevance only, and the waves of innovations which have repercussions
throughout the literature are now more easily identified and
incorporated into urban geography. It is unlikely that time lags of.
the scale which preceded the arrival of innovations from the earlier
part of this century will be replicated. There is also a greater
acceptance of the fact that an investigation of the human condition
cannot be ideologically neutral" (op cit, p.20).
In general, these authors envisage a fruitful collaboration between
the generalising, model-building and numerate approach and the most
recent concern with the individual and collective perceptions (cf
Figure 2): "One of the problems with the behavioural perspective has
been its reductionism. Having returned to the individual as the unit,
how then does the geographer return to his appropriate level of
generalisation? The aggregate is the appropriate scale,
generalisations are the aims; behavioural input allows these
generalisations to be reached from a better qualitative base...One
possibility, already exploited by urban geographers, is that of using
the aggregate statistics as a framework from which to develop
behavioural approaches" (op cit, p.24).
Harrison and Livingstone comment: "Under the panoply of 'humanism'
the various attempts to reinstate Man as a knowing subject in encounter
with an object constitute a confused melange of subjective
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Figure 2 (From Harris on and Livingstone 1982, fig.1-4)
Functionalism
Subjectivism Structuralism
Metaphors of geography
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geographies., .little more than introspective esotericlsm, lacking a
cohesive framework for substantive research" (1982, p.2). In fact,
synthesis to the aggregate level is possible, because "understanding Is
never purely individual but communal" (op cit, p.30).
Johnston (1980) presents a noteworthy compromise to bring the real
potential of the new approaches into a framework of progress in the
discipline of Geography: "The case presented here, therefore, is that
human geography is the study of particular realizations of general
processes, and that it needs to develop an arsenal of methodological
procedures which allows it to explain those particualr
realizations...it seems didactically necessary to explain not only the
general processes but also the particular geographical realizations"
(p.410).
In the case of History, Hobsbawn (1980) has effectively responded to
the crisis of confidence in New History. He suggests that the revival
of narrative constitutes experiments in presenting the results of
complex modern analysis, the desire to have a well-defined and sharply-
portrayed social situation serve as the junction between large-scale
social processes and individual historical experience. "On the one
side, Stone interprets recent trends in the writing of history as signs
of disillusion with what we must now, alas, call the old new social
history, as augurs of the rise of the new old social history. On the
other side, Hobsbawn sees the same trends ...as likely evidence that
historians are now building on the accomplishments of the sort of
social history that began to flourish in the 1960's" (Tilly 1984,
pp.370-371). Tilly goes on to cite the well-known case-studies in
support of Hobsbawn's position, such as the work of the Cambridge
Demography Group, and that of the Annales scholars such as Le Roy
Ladurie and Braudel. Such syntheses: "build their cases on the very
quantitative, demographic, and social scientific works that Lawrence
Stone has condemned to bankruptcy.. .Works of the old new social
history...have...made the historical specificity of social structures
and processes all the more apparent. But the old new social history
has made it possible to connect individual experience with large social
processes more clearly, more precisely, and more fully than ever
before" (op cit, p.394).
In Modern Architecture, where we have played a fleeting call - we
may note that new schools such as Romantic Pragmatism deride slavish
Revivalism, since it acts as if Modernism had not its own unique and
useful heritage to be incorporated: "One thing that unites the
designers...is the need to generate a humane architecture while drawing
on the rational disciplines of Modernism" (Darley and Davey 1983,
p.23).
In Archaeology, Ian H odder seems at times to be fumbling for an
operational role for Symbolic and Structural approaches. On the one
hand we are given orthodox Structuralist theory, where the outside
world is merely the plaything of the ordering processes of the mind.
This facility, in turn, may be unique to each person or at least each
culture,· in the pattern it creates. How then can one hope to infer or
read such vital organising principles? In effect, we must read between
the lines of Structuralist Archaeology and pick up certain notable
contradictions to predict a solution. Ethnographic parallels are the
clues in H odder's book, a practice of course entirely dependent on a
trust in general principles found in widely differing cultures. We are
already moving towards collective rather than unique, individual
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patterns. Thus Hodder (1982a) has to admit for his edited volume: "the
approaches developed by the majority of the contributors of this volume
are not structuralist" (p-9), and indeed: "The chapters by Tilley and
Shanks, Shennan and Hodder...use.generalisations from ethnographic and
anthropological studies to link Neolithic megalithic ritual into other
aspects of archaeological evidence" (p. 11). Although Hodder also toys
with the possibility of unreadable, or at least historically unique
patterns, it is left to other observers such as Trigger (1984,
pp.282,292) to suggest that on that route we find ourselves back where
we started from, with Hawkes warning archaeologists off the mysterious
and unattackable worlds of social and belief systems in the past. And
Trigger goes on to conclude:
"individual societies are so complex, their structures so loose and
the exogenous forces influencing them so eclectic that the precise
course for their development can at best be predicted only partially
and for the short term. For many archaeologists the complexity of
early civilisations, or of any human society, renders the concept of
causality meaningless for discussing their origins...The explanation of
the past is thus by its very nature idiographic" (op cit, p.289).
It is to Renfrew that we must turn for the precise statement of how
the potential of Cognitive Archaeology is to be realized in practice:
"if people's actions are systematically patterned by their beliefs,
the patterning (if not the beliefs as such) can become embodied in the
archaeological record.. .My purpose has been to indicate that the
materials of archaeology can indeed be used to allow inferences about
the cognitive processes of past societies, and that in order to attain
this goal it is necessary to develop explicit procedures, a coherent
body of theory, which will allow us to do so without dizzy, intuitive
leaps" (1982, p.11,23).
Furthermore, far from seeing such an approach as denying the
achievements of New Archaeology, Renfrew sees it as the natural new
frontier now that such progress has been made in the related study of
Social Archaeology (1982, p.10):
"Whatever one's reactions to some of the pretensions of the 'New
Archaeology'...the r e can be no doubt that its new look at the
theoretical underpinnings of the subject has had the consequence of
enlarging its scope. This is particularly clear in the field of what
one might call social archaeology...Indeed it is partly the successful
emergence of a social archaeology over the past fifteen years which
emboldens me to argue that a cognitive archaeology is indeed possible"
(p.10).
Moreover, significantly in an address to the Institute of British
Geographers i Renfrew has written: "The assumption is frequently made
that the generalizing approach, often categorized as positivist, can
only view men as mindless automata, and that to cope with the
functioning of the human mind and with the achievements of human
creativity it is necessary to adopt an idiographic, particularistic
approach. To overcome this false assumption we shall need the
aspiration and perhaps the insight of the idealist, tempered by the
scepticism and the rigour of the positivist, who can help him to keep
his feet on the ground"
"...geography, like processual archaeology, has in recent years often
overlooked the importance of human thought and action, and of that
uniquely human ability to create and use symbols. The current trend in
both subjects to seek ways of dealing rigorously with matters that
sometimes seem largely subjective is thus of the greatest interest, and
probably fundamental to their effective development" (Renfrew 1981,
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pp.275-276).
This brief survey of Archaeology and related subjects has, I hope,
not only revealed a way forward that is far from revivalist, but also
exposed for discussion some highly intriguing opportunities for the
future of our discipline.
1) It is hardly possible to consider, despite the hopes of
traditionalists, that Archaeology will reject such central emphases of
the New Archaeology as: the testing of propositions, problem-
orientation in fieldwork, quantitative methods wherever possible, the
search for generalisations about our past - in order to go back to
imaginative intuition, inadequate data bases, descriptions of endless
unique events and fieldwork as an end in itself or to provide more data
for 'what happened next' or 'how it was to live then' scenarios of ever
increasing detail.
2) Cognitive Archaeology is here to stay, but nothing will be achieved
by it unless it adopts the explicit, scientific procedures of the New
Archaeology. Nor will it offer much of interest unless it identifies
collective, rather than individually unique, structural and symbolic
representations. Probably it will also fail to contribute to our
understanding of the past in any major way unless it merges the
cultural specific to general and recurrent aspects or processes in
human life in the past (and here the essential role of ethnoarchaeology
suggests an implicit reality to this request).
3) A maturer discipline combining research on the specific with that of
the general, or inner experience and perception with external
'realities', impossible, as recent developments in Geography and
History can show.
4) The isolation of Archaeology from other disciplines has meant
infrequent and sluggish flows of innovations into the discipline, and a
minimal role for Archaeology's achievements to feed back out of our
subject. As is being suggested for Geography, it should be encouraged
that Archaeologists integrate their concern with Man, Society and
Environment into a general Social Science perspective which would
increasingly ignore disciplinary boundaries. The effects of such a
shift of emphasis, beginning merely with Archaeologists regularly
reading key journals in sister disciplines, would be momentous on the
rate of evolution of Archaeology as a discipline.
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ARCHAEOLOGY AND HISTORY: THE SHADES OF CONFRONTATION AND COOPERATION
C.J.Arnold
"It is in my view a cultural disaster of the
English-speaking world that...we have no single
word for academic research in all fields - a
disaster because it tends to create division where
none should exist."
(Harvey 1983, p.74)
The division between archaeology and history (in the narrow sense)
came about largely as a result of the study of written evidence being
an older discipline and of archaeology originating within the
prehistoric field (hence the confusion between 'archaeology' and
'prehistory')(Clarke 1978, pp.10-11). Classical historians' interest
in the physical remains has a long ancestry, but the formation of a
society specialising in the archaeology of post-Roman centuries, The
Society for Medieval Archaeology, did not occur until 1956. While the
age of the various disciplines may go some way toward explaining the
divisions that exist, it does not explain why the integration of
archaeological and written evidence occurs so rarely.
Archaeology and history, by whatever means they are defined, are
concerned with the past dimension of anthropology. Past societies can
only be studied through man's material remains, artefacts and the wide
variety of means by which man has altered the earth's surface by
relocating and reconstituting materials from it. In more specific
terms it may include artefacts of various materials, coins,
inscriptions and documents, human and animal bone, excrement, plant and
insect remains, structures surviving in various forms including houses,
storage facilities, military installations, administrative offices
(including libraries and record offices), religious structures, places
for rubbish disposal, graves, industrial activity. We may note in
passing the varying degrees of protection, statutory or non-statutory,
afforded to this wide variety of material remains. The data are
studied by archaeologists who divide themselves into a variety of
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specialisations with specialist collaboration with other disciplines.
There are some areas which, for historic reasons, have been parcelled
off, especially numismatics, epigraphy and written sources. This
peculiar division is found running through much of the literature
concerned with historic periods, which serves to emphasise the deep-
rooted belief that written records are distinct from other artefacts:-
"As we are dealing with an historical period, it
would obviously be ridiculous to disregard the
documentary evidence entirely, and it is brought
into the discussion as a necessary background, but
the emphasis throughout will fall on the material
evidence [my underlining] for the period."
(Clarke 1984, p.9)
This view has been taken to extremes by some writers, not necessarily
recent ones, who, for instance, have stated the belief that
'Archaeological data are historical documents in their own right, not
illustrations to written texts' (quoted by Pyddoke 1964, p.16).
One result of the separation between archaeology and history (and
also art history) is a tendency for archaeologists, to varying degrees,
almost to ignore the results of studying inscriptions, coins and
written records, except when they provide a means of obtaining
calendrical dates; this is presumably a hangover in attitude from the
pre-scientific dating era. It is a way of thinking which persists
despite the fact that all artefacts (including documents) adhere to the
same patterns; they consist of materials which are altered, shaped,
reconstituted, embellished, inscribed, decorated and in varying ways
transmit information. All, despite what we are sometimes led to
believe, are bedevilled by differential survival and a variety of
distorting factors considered by archaeologists under the heading of
formation processes. Nothing is done to any particular artefact type
which differs, except in detail, from the practices of research which
are carried out on the others; there is always a concern with material,
origin, technology, content, authenticity, context, function and
meaning. Despite this there remains an ingrained belief that the
problems faced by archaeologists in using the data they have chosen to
concentrate on are different to those faced by the student of written
records. Speaking of archaeology Sawyer has suggested (1983, p.46)
that "All too often they [archaeologists' hypotheses] owe more to the
assumptions than to the evidence" as though this is a problem peculiar
to archaeology and not one shared by all disciplines concerned with
past material remains.
Archaeologists have failed to view all surviving remains as
artefacts (or 'society' has given greater attention to certain
specialisations than others) to the same extent that they do, for
instance, pottery; why are archaeologists concerned with the content,
function and meaning of palaeolithic cave art but not of the works of
Hogarth? They rarely assess societies in terms of the use of written
documents so that when operating within an historic period, in which
historians automatically operate, the archaeologists must consult an
historian for detail. Should historic societies not be viewed in terms
of the contexts in which documents are found, the origins of the
documents, their content etc? There are nearly as few archaeologists
who view coins in this manner. The suggestion that all of man's
material remains should be considered in the same manner is by no means
novel:-
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"Archaeology can trace the same process [adaption
of human societies to their environments] in
historic .times with the additional aid of written
records. Without any change of method it can
follow down to the present day the working out of
trends discerned already in prehistory."
(Childe 1942, p.7)
All lines of study of man's past are concerned with both what happened
and why and there should be a desire to use all sources of information
to that end. We should not allow ourselves to be distracted by the
varying degrees to which the data relate to different aspects of the
past, with varying degrees of detail being obtainable. Written records
can especially enlarge on political, legal and administrative areas of
human activity, often in great detail, whereas the study of the
remainder of man's material remains is concerned with a wide variety,
nearly all, areas of past human activity; these include the same areas
as those for which documents are a source, but to varying degrees of
detail and by different routes. To say that there are areas of overlap
between what are traditionally archaeological concerns and what is
frequently contained in primary written sources, and that there is
considerable scope for collaboration, indicates a particular belief
about the subjects' relationship. The implication has been that they
have different goals. It is only possible to study the past using all
sources, but the data must be presented in forms by which they are
compatible, and this applies equally to the specialisms of all types of
artefact, soil features and standing structures.
There really would not be a problem, and it may seem odd to many
readers that one exists, if it were not that some historians imply that
what is contained within written sources is impenetrable to
archaeologists and that they allow the only 'real' reconstruction of
the past. This attitude has encouraged much research based on written
records which is carried out in isolation of other material remains.
In the words of one historian:-
"Archaeologists should concentrate on being
archaeologists and resist the temptation to draw
heavily on other types of evidence, historical or
linguistic."
(Sawyer 1983, p.46)
and:-
"If archaeological evidence is fitted with the
supposed historical situation, the result is
obviously circular."
(ibid, p.47)
The contention here is that data gleaned from written sources is but
one contribution which material remains can make to the study of the
past, without denying that their study, like that of any aspect of past
material remains, is a specialised task. The problem as this writer
sees it, often reaches ludicrous levels:-
"There is a danger in their [medieval historians]
regarding archaeological evidence simply as a
source of background or illustrative material used
to confirm historical statements which have already
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been inferred from the documents. This in Sawyer's
words reduces archaeology to 'an expensive way of
telling -us what we know already'. In fact, of
course, there are myriad aspects which archaeology
can illumine from the pre-literate origins of
medieval society, the many gaps in the documentary
record and in particular, the interests of the non-
record making classes."
(Steane 1985, p.xv)
This statement perpetuates the view that history tells us a great deal
about the past and that archaeology can fill in the gaps, with some
overlap. Typically, it is often claimed that far more can be achieved
by the study of written sources in isolation than is actually possible.
The written sources can only inform us about what is mentioned in them,
but this tends to be viewed as all-embracing because historians have
laid down the range of subjects concerning the past which are
appropriate for study; these are determined by the sources. Thus
'history' in the narrow sense is often 'History' in the general sense
as if the only obtainable past is contained within documents. The
alternative viewpoint is that the historian is a specialist of a
particular type of artefact which can manifest itself in a variety of
forms and materials collected together under one heading by the
existence of various scripts - a heading which includes written and
printed documents, inscriptions, to a lesser extent coins and to an
even lesser extent inscriptions on pottery. Archaeologists attempt to
use all material remains for as detailed a study of past human
behaviour as is possible. They rely on specialists to deal with
certain categories of material. They are guilty, however, of a
tendency to ignore a major class of artefact, written records. This is
in part because the specialists concerned with them naively believe
they are creating a meaningful past by examining them largely in
isolation, and because archaeologists rarely dig them up. But, as with
all specialist fields, documents have to be integrated with all other
forms of data- The problems of differential survival apply to all
artefacts, not only those traditionally dealt with by historians.
Generations have been brainwashed into believing that because documents
have for long been studied by a separate group they are somehow
different to the remainder of the past material and non-material
record.
Documents can be considered in general terms to determine the manner
in which past societies actually used them, and in more specific terms
as a source of knowledge regarding aspects of human behaviour. But if
these data are to be capable of integration with the knowledge gained
from all other material remains, they must be comparable and there must
be a desire to see a specialist topic in a broader context. Studies of
specific types of artefact or of an aspect of types of artefacts are
rarely comparable at the specific level and can only be integrated with
each other at a level of abstraction of the raw data. Those few
archaeologists of historic periods who are concerned with such
manipulation and abstraction find it difficult to integrate their
knowledge with that gained from written sources because the specialists
of the latter are too often concerned with the detail and there is a
widespread lack of concern with the implications of the evidence for
the study of man. Particularism is rife amongst archaeologists of
historic periods and historians of earlier historic periods. Hence the
term 'history' is often applied to a very specific form of
reconstruction of the past. There has to be a desire to achieve a
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level of generalisation where integration becomes possible. The
petrologists must pursue their detailed research, but at the end of the
day it may be, for instance, the source of the raw material that needs
to be known to enable a generalisation to be made regarding pottery
production and distribution mechanisms in a particular period which can
then form a part of a broader understanding of that society. This
applies to all artefacts.
Many writers piously state that integration is essential, but few
explain how they think this may be achieved and why it hasn't been
achieved previously. A reason why historians often believe that their
data base is somehow of greater value than archaeological data stems
from a misunderstanding of the goals of archaeology and the place of
written sources in that quest. Medieval archaeologists only have
themselves to blame as their work is often theoretically weak and
particularistic; integration of archaeological data with the written
sources is generally only at the detailed and trivial level of, for
instance, linking the phasing of a castle on the basis of
archaeological analysis with the known historical sequence. At present
it is possible to identify three common standpoints. The first states
that archaeologists and historians should pursue their own research
independently. The second is that the evidence should be integrated
but there is uncertainty about how this may be achieved. The third
assumes that one discipline, normally archaeology, can illustrate the
other. This writer has sympathy with the view that "medieval
archaeology could have a major role, if it ceases to be
particularistic, descriptive and historically-based" (Rahtz 1983, p.13)
but to say that 'Medieval Archaeology' should develop as an autonomous
discipline (ibid, p.12) is shortsighted. It is often stated that
medieval archaeology is a new discipline going through the necessary
phase of data-gathering. One may ask when, given that the questions we
ask of the data are continually evolving, sufficient data will have
been gathered for the next phase to ccme into operation, and also what
is that next phase? It is also inexcusable (even if explained by
historical archaeologists' particularism) that this data-gathering
should be carried out in a vacuum with so little involvement in
theoretical debates. It is almost as though Roman and Medieval
archaeologists believe that written records are a substitute for a.
sound theoretical basis, that they are immune from theoretical problems
and that the need for theory disappears when a chronological narrative
is achievable (for what it is worth). This stems from an over-
dependence on 'historical sequence' and a failure to realise that
written records are no different to other material remains and make up
a part of that data-base on which the theoretical debates are, or
should be, based. It is interesting that the naivity regarding the
power of written records is also displayed by prehistorians who look
enviously over the fence in the belief that they can test their own
theories within an historic period; the documentation is supposed to
provide such an improved data-base as to make this feasible. What is
being overlooked is that the problems faced by prehistorians in
interpreting their data are the same as those in the historic periods,
including the written records (see for example: Rahtz, 1983). The
written records do not necessarily provide all the answers to the
questions which prehistorians find difficult or impossible to approach,
except at the most trivial level. Prehistorians are as dependent on
material remains as are archaeologists of the historic period (in which
category we include documents), and it is from the former group that
the majority of the theoretical debates flow with a minimal involvement
by the latter who shun theoretical issues partly by the excuse that
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they're still gathering data, but also because of an over-dependence on
historical frameworks and because of their particularistic approach.
There are, albeit very few, examples where writers have successfully
integrated generalisations based on all classes of artefact including
written sources. There are others where attempts have been made to
integrate the specifics of primary and secondary written sources with
the specifics of the remainder of the material world; these are always
methodologically unsound and their outcome is confused unless the
archaeology is squeezed into the chosen historical framework.
Part of the problem has been discussed by one student of the past,
who stated the belief that the problem lay in the lack of a theoretical
framework especially for early historic periods and that:-
"The framework we chose will be founded in our
philosophic response to the problem of acquiring
knowledge of the human past, particularly from
material evidence, and ^in our opinion of what
governs human behaviour."
(Dickinson 1983, p.43)
This writer would not disagree with the view that theoretical
frameworks are essential and eagerly waits for others to put their
money where their typewriter is. But the statement assumes that there
must be one correct theoretical framework and avoids the fundamental
point that very few students of historic periods make use of the
'theoretical frameworks' that already exist; even fewer would agree
that they are working towards an understanding of past human behaviour.
The majority use an 'historical framework' whereby our whole
understanding of the past has to be fitted to the very narrow and
immeasurably partial view extrapolated from one type of artefact, the
written sources. This is as ludicrous as attempting to relate the
remainder of material remains to a framework of the past constructed on
the basis of metal analyses. Yet such an approach is frequently found.
Myres has written a "history book" in which only "the more distinctive
and significant features" of the archaeological evidence are
considered, in "broad outline...where it has been essential to the
course of an historical argument" (1986, p.xxiv); that is, only that
evidence which can be seen to conform to his historical narrative,
often based on a rather literal interpretation of written sources which
we know to be spurious in terms of their factual content.
Too often students working on the material remains of historic
periods (including written evidence) are immersed in their own 'period'
and there follows from this the absence of a desire to attempt to
generalise- those that find it difficult to generalise about tneir
data or even to see any patterning in it might do well to question the
whole basis for their initial ordering of the material. When
theoretical concepts are introduced to an historic period by
archaeologists the response is negative and the objections
particularistic. It is as though many fear to leave the details in
their proper place, that one's credibility will be diminished if one
ceases to argue the details of individual artefacts or types of
structures and use that knowledge to take a more generalised stance.
There is no denying the need to study detail; pottery fabrics are of
as much concern as the content of medieval statutes, but an exchange
between the specialists and the generalists is an essential dialogue if
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both areas are to develop. For the purposes of integration it may be
sufficient to know that a society's socio-political development was
such, and paver was being used in a particular way, that laws were
being made by X over Y at Z, which can often be determined as the
result of analysis and generalisation of and about a variety of
artefact types, not only those with writing on them; this has to be
appreciated and admitted by all. Historians may claim that
generalisation is impossible until consensus is reached and, like the
medieval archaeologist, disappear once again under the mountain of
detail; generalisation is an essential part of the route to that
mythical consensus. It is often the absence of generalisation by
historians that frustrates the early medieval archaeologists, but those
generalisations that exist can be integrated very fruitfully with
archaeological data (for a practical example and detailed discussion of
the problems see: Arnold forth).
Communication is essential; archaeologists would have serious
problems if petrologists claimed that their results couldn't be used
because the archaeologists didn't understand how they were arrived at,
and that when they were used the archaeologists ignored the problems.
Levels of communication between archaeologists, specialists and
generalists are such that there is an equal and fruitful flow of ideas
and data between them. Specialists of artefacts with writing on them
should be able to achieve the same goal, of presenting their data in a
form which can be understood and with the problems, assumptions and
limitations clearly stated for all to use. We would not expect a
ceramicist to try and write the history of the world from pottery
alone, although it is possible to write the world history of ceramics
from which there would be a great deal of data for general
understanding of social, technological and economic systems in society.
The necessary level of generalisation is more easily obtained at some
periods than others, depending on our appreciation of the reliability
and the particular nature of the data. Thus it is as difficult to
generalise about the earliest human behaviour as it is for the earliest
written records when so little of the material is found in a primary
context; it is only by the application of cross-cultural and
theoretical models that the earliest hominid behaviour is beginning to
come into focus. The very unreliability of the data at such times i.s
informative about society and the environment in which it lived.
Specialists must continue with their research; none need, nor has
any right to, believe that their specialisation is superior to any
other; each must feed their data, observed patterns and generalisations
to those who seek to take a more generalised overview of past human
behaviour, an overview which must incorporate all types of evidence.
Historians continue to enjoy a separate existence to the other
specialists of past material remains because of the continuing
misconception about the place of written records in the material past.
Harvey may bemoan the absence of a word which encapsulates all academic
research into the past; how easy it is for an historian to overlook the
meaning of the word Archaeology.
38
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnold,C. J. , fortii. - "Territories and Leadership: frameworks for the
study of emergent polities in early Anglo-Saxon southern England" in
S.Driscoll and M.Nieke (Eds) Early Historic Archaeology. Edinburgh.
Childe,G., 1942 - What happened in History, Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth.
Clarke,D.L., 1978 - Analytical Archaeology. Revised Edition. Methuen,
London.
Clarke H. 1984 - The Archaeology of Medieval England. British Museum
Publications, London.
Dickinson,T.M., 1983 - "Anglo-Saxon Archaeology: twenty-five years on",
pp.38-43, in Hint on 1983.
Harvey P D A 1983 - "English Archaeology after the Conquest: A
historian's view", pp.74-82, in Hinton 1983.
Hinton,D.A.(Ed), 1983 - 25 Years of Medieval Archaeology. University
of Sheffield, Sheffield.
Myres.J.N.L., 1986 - The English Settlements. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Pyddoke.E., 1964 - What is Archaeology?. John Baker, London.
Rahtz.P., 1983- "New approaches to Medieval Archaeology: Part 1",
pp.12-23^ in Hinton 1983.
Sawyer P.H. 1983 - "English Archaeology before the Conquest: A
historian's'view", pp.44-47, in Hinton 1983.
Steane, J.M., 1985 - The Archaeology of Medieval England and Wales.
Groom Helm, Beckenham.
39
WHY SHOULD HISTORIANS TAKE ARCHAEOLOGY SERIOUSLY?
J.A.Lloyd
There are excellent reasons why historians should take
archaeologists seriously. Naturally, as Finley (1971, p.174) has
pointed out, the value of the material remains as a source of evidence
for history will diminish in proportion to the amount and quality of
written documents available, but there is surely no past era whose
physical heritage is of no historical interest and importance.
For the Graeco-Roman period, with which this paper is concerned, the
surviving textual documents, including inscriptions, are very numerous.
But the written record is quantitatively biased towards certain places
at certain times (for example, Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries
B.C.) and massive gaps exist. Archaeology, with its ability to aquire
vast amounts of new data, is uniquely placed to expand our knowledge,
especially in relation to economic and social history. This has long
been recognised by some ancient historians, although extensive
discussion of the interface is comparatively recent. Humphreys (1967),
Frederiksen (1970) and Finley (1971, 1985) offer some of the most
stimulating and constructive analyses of the possibilities. Snodgrass
(1983) gives a rare, and by a long way the best, discussion by a
classical archaeologist. All these works emphasise the common aims of
archaeology and history and suggest that the relationship of the two
disciplines, although beset by difficulties, is ultimately rewarding.
Nonetheless, the question which forms the title of this paper is
still asked, in one form or another, by a substantial number of
undergraduates, post-graduates and teaching staff in departments of
Ancient History and Classics (where many ancient historians are
located) at British universities. In research, and even more in
teaching, archaeological evidence is often rejected, dismissed or, most
frequently of all, ignored. The idea that history should simply employ
all sources of evidence, written and material, to investigate the past
(Finley 1985, p.26) seems to receive more lip-service than practical
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ene our agement .
Why should this be so? This paper offers some reasons, adopting the
hypothetical viewpoint of the sceptical historian. Although this has
difficulties for an archaeologist, it is no bad thing to try to
understand better the arguments of one's critics. An awareness of the
concerns of the historian, derived from reading and especially
discussion (here I acknowledge with gratitude the kindness and patience
of my colleagues at Sheffield), has led in my own case to a much more
informed appreciation of what archaeology can and cannot do in pursuit
of the historic past.
Ancient historians have been aware of the value of archaeological
evidence for a very long time- George Gróte's remarkable ten volume
History of Greece, the first volume of which was published in the
1840's — makes use of topographical research and the results of
excavation (not much, admittedly, but comparatively little
archaeological/antiquarian work had taken place in the Greek lands by
the time* that Grote was writing). A generation or so later the works
of the great Roman historian, the German Theodor Mommsen, shew his
concern for the more rigorous scrutiny of the literary sources - the
main body of evidence for the study of the Graeco-Roman period - and
for serious attention to be paid to other kinds of evidence, especially
inscriptions' and coins.
In 1926 another major figure, the Russian Mikhail Rostovtzeff,
published The Social and Economic History of the Reman Empire, the
first of his classic surveys ot the social and economic history of the
ancient world. In the preface he wrote "for a student of economic and
social life [the archaeological evidence] is as important and
indispensable as the written evidence".
In 1980,
Cambridee
of Ancient History at
niversity, deployed a variety of material evidence,
shipwreck and coin data, in developing a theory of the
bÎween taxation and trade in the Ronan Empire (Hopkins
Keith Hopkins, new Professor
1980).
The list of Ancient historians who have used and who do use material
i u.; l „! -„„ i-η a modern tradition whose origins lie in the
a suprise to kfn „holly »1th political events and personalities
historians as <=°fel™ej ! archaeology of war (Troy) or famous men and
and interested only ° is true, that
is excluded' ·
But what of archaeologists? To what extent, if at all, have they
been concerned that historian should take notice of their discoveries
and the?? interpretations of them? There seems to me to be strong
evîdence that most archaeologists (apart from those who reject any
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dialogue with history) view their work as a contribution to historical
enquiry (including here prehistory) in the sense just defined. The
Aegean archaeologis-ts Popham and Sackett (1980, pp.355-369) close the
first volume of the Lefkandi excavation report with a section entitled
"Historical Conclusions". The early medieval archaeologist Richard
Hodges stated in the editorial introduction to the papers of the second
(British) conference on Italian archaeology that "one aim of the
conference was to blow some fresh air through the corridors of our
ancient history/archaeology departments" (Barker and Hodges 1981, p.5).
The request for attention is clear. John F. Cherry, discussing the
emergence of the state in the prehistoric Aegean, remarked "Whether one
agrees or not, it remains true that, even for the historical states of
the Classical age, the question of origins is one in which the mute
archaeological evidence weighs heavily. This should mean that many of
the opportunities, problems and biases to be faced in studying the rise
of early poleis apply with equal force to the prehistoric world and
vice versa." (Cherry 1984, p.18).
In the light of this, why is it the case today that if we were to
enter a library devoted to Greek and Roman history we would find that
the great majority of books pay little or no attention to material
evidence? Why do so few school or university courses in ancient
history prescribe an archaeological element? Why are students of
ancient history at our universities, with very few exceptions, not
required to develop skills in archaeological method in the same way
that they are required to display skills in textual evaluation? Why
can the ancient historians in British universities who have acquired
serious experience and expertise in modern field techniques be counted
on the fingers of one hand? In other words, despite the existence of a
receptive climate for well over a century, why have so few of the
teaching and research resources of ancient history, at individual and
institutional level, been devoted to archaeology?
From the historian's point of view, there are many reasons why the
interface between the two disciplines is so narrow. They include the
susceptibility of many archaeologists to what Snodgrass (1983, p.142)
has called the "positivist fallacy of archaeology" - the notion that
what can be seen must be important - which has led, amongst other
absurdities, to a grotesque emphasis on the commercial significance of
the pottery trade; the over-ambition and myopia of some of
archaeology's leading spokesmen - Binford's (1962, p.220) claim that
"archaeology can present a systematic and understandable picture of the
total extinct [his italics] cultural system" is meat and drink to
historians inclined to be suspicious of archaeology; Hopkins (1978a,
p.71; 1980, p.104) has castigated the "hopelessly fragmented" nature of
archaeological reports and the reluctance of archaeologists to write
synthetic works. And so on. Sociological and psychological factors
may also come into play. For example, I suspect that historians and
archaeologists do not in general share the same attitude to manual
labour.
The' remainder of this paper deals, through case studies, with some
of the more intellectually challenging of the historian's criticisms.
Although archaeology can in theory inform us about a huge range of
past activity, the historian might argue: in practice the nature of
material evidence and the typical state of its preservation make it
very unlikely that its contribution to many fundamental questions about
the past will ever be more than marginal. If one is interested in,
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say politics, law, administration or an institution like slavery,
archaeology has yet to demonstrate that it can make a significant
impact upon interpretations based on the written record. This is not
to deny that such matters have an archaeological dimension but it is
essential to keep the amount and quality of the written and material
data in perspective, both in research and perhaps even more in
teaching. Car t ledge (1979, p. 9) sums up these reservations: "From
archaeological evidence alone we may infer (relatively) much about
material techniques, a considerable amount about patterns of
subsistence and utilization of the environment, far less about social
and political events, and least of all about mental structures,
religious and other 'spiritual' ideas and beliefs .
Is this overly pessimistic? Archaeologists might point out in reply
that their work can make an enormous difference too, for example, our
kuwledEe of political institutions. In the case of the eastern
Me£te«anean at numerous cities of Asia Minor and the Middle East
« « ÎnsÎance Priene, Hierapolis, Gerash), excavation has brought to
•HoL -imnnrtant evidence for urban political organisation. The
IvfdenceTkes the form of inscriptions, usually carved on the seats of
a theatre or theatre-like building, which name the voting tribes of the
council J assembly of the city. The buildings seem to have served as
the meeting places of these bodies.
The historian might object that the inscriptions are crucial to this
me m.t, . β writing is not classed as archaeological
identification and that ^£f effectively independently
evidence, since it can be ^^
 Hlstorians
archaeological «£££;
 r epigraphic material in isolation of
certainly been ^ntent to *ec Ρ In fact, in most cases they have not
its origi nal physi ^  ^ « ing ^ ^ ^  ^  ^ ^
 tohad to, for °b^
e
^
n
^
aS
^
S
-the informative value of the text (although
can
di
o
fffteenebr difficult and mistakes have frequently been
made) .
ι Mt-Pd however, the fact that the inscriptions are in
Λ weU-pr se v d bu^IIgY substantially augments their intrinsicsitu in well-preserved DU 0
 more certaint about the number
value. F<VTP Ϊ'Λί the voting body than if, say, the inscribed
of tribes and the size of the voting D y , structures. This
blocks had been f ound ^ ^^ ^  \
β recove
red archaeologically.precious contextual information can on y
 t±ai wQuld ^ eyen
gteLrif SE waiver" q^Ïion i restoring a re-used inscription
to its original place).
of
-Γ Î. «f
the historian. This la not to *eny ^ ^ ^
 has long
deficiencies of ™«\^1>
το
£
 and Moormsen, for example) and
been understood (by both G ^^ ^^ ^ ^
 discussed. It ^
methodologies f or ^aj^
 sure of meaning) the historian would
ll ' medi^of colunicatio, is language rather than mute
objects.
An earlier generation of archaeologists (e.g. Piggott 1959) was
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acutely aware of the limited range of Inferences which could
legitimately be drawn from the archaeological record alone.
Accordingly it set itself modest targets in terms of questions about
the past which it sought to address. In the last twenty years or so,
however, many archaeologists have been concerned with expanding the
horizons of the discipline. The cautious approach has given much
ground to an energetic, adventurous spirit which is continually setting
itself new goals of explanation (for example, Clarke 1968, Renfrew
1982, Cherry 1984). Some historians and archaeologists have mixed
feelings about some of the developments (for example, Flnley 1971;
Cartledge 1979, pp.8-9; Alcock 1984) but there Is no doubt that
advances in archaeological theory and method have been stimulated by
the pioneering atmosphere and the more ambitious questions which have
characterised the period. These questions range widely, from large and
complex political issues like peer polity interaction to details of
trade like the sourcing of marble by isotopic analysis. Historians
have obvious interest in such matters, indeed have often been
investigating similar questions for a very long time, so there is in
principle (and often in practice) a warm welcome for new approaches and
new evidence. What often gives cause for concern, however, is the
amount of confidence placed in what historians regard as inherently
problematic evidece. The circumspection of the earlier generation is
admired (Finley 1985, p.25) and there is a strong feeling that
archaeologists should work harder to understand the weaknesses as well
as the strengths of their discipline. The three examples which follow
develop aspects of these issues and are all taken from publications
which have appeared within the last ten years«
The first is a report of the excavation of a site called Tell el-
Maskhuta in the Delta region of Egypt (Holladay et al 1982). In his
account of the site's development (it was a place of modest importance)
the principal author presents a table (Table 2) which lists possible
correlations between documented external and internal events and site
features. Thus the capture of Jerusalem in 597 BC is linked with two
floorings for Building L.2002; the rebellion against Darius of 487-6 BC
with the deliberate blocking of Well H.4002. All things, perhaps, are
possible, but as Bailey (1985, p.55) remarked in his review of this
report "Buildings are destroyed and rebuilt for many reasons, not all
of them to do with invasion and response". Bailey added that this is a
.fine example of text-hindered archaeology, using a phrase that is much
in vogue these days. But I wonder whether this phrase accurately
describes the problem. 'Text-hindered' archaeology would seem to imply
that written information can in some way impede the interpretation of
material evidence. However, since archaeological finds and patterns of
finds very rarely, if ever, explain themselves, surely the
archaeologist ought to welcome the possibility that ancient documentary
testimony might shed light on whatever is being studied? This would
not, of course, take away the responsibility to evaluate that
information rigorously, as any good historian would. In the Egyptian
example, Table 2 overstretches the evidence, both written and material.
This is just bad archaeology and bad history.
All archaeologists who carry out research into historic periods,
however, will recognise the seductiveness of the written explanation or
the attested event. Many, including myself, have been lured into
faulty interpretation because of it, and Bailey is quite right to
condemn the uncritical "constant striving to equate archaeological
features with historical events" which is still widespread today. Only
very, very rarely can physical remains be linked to a moment in history
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with a high degree of certainty, at least for the Graeco- Roman world.
When it happens (Pompeii is one of the clearest examples) the
advantages are very considerable, particularly for dating. But in the
vast majority of cases there are strong technical objections to the
marriage of material remains and recorded events and the temptation to
unite them should be resisted.
My second example is taken from one of archaeology's recent growth
areas, the identification and interpretation of animal bones. The
American Steven Dyson has championed the alternative perspective which
archaeology has brought to research into historic periods. "Since most
of our literary texts look at society from the top down, it is
important to look at it literally and figuratively from the ground"
(Dyson 1979, p. 12). What then more basic, more in touch with the lives
of ordinary people than their food debris? And progress in the sphere
of faunal studies has been tremendous in recent years. Bones once
thrown away are now collected in ever greater numbers and with ever
greater care. The finds from classical period sites are very numerous
- 4,000 from the small 5th century AD Schola Praeconum deposit in Rome,
14,000 from Hellenistic and Roman levels at Berenice (Benghazi) in
Libya, nearly 400,000 from the late Iron Age town of Manching in
Bavaria (up to 1971). From these finds hypotheses about diet, about
the organisation of agricultural production and about meat marketing
can be made. This is of considerable interest to the ancient
historian, not only, as Dyson suggests, for the prospect of insights
into the lives of ordinary people, but because the textual data for
fundamental aspects of ancient society like agricultural production,
which was the resource base of the wealthy and the powerful as well as
the peasant, are scanty.
A special study which has been justifiably hailed as of pioneering
importance in this field is Mark Maltby's monograph on the animal bones
from Roman and Medieval Exeter (Maltby 1979). In his analysis of the
18,000 fragments from the Roman town Maltby found, for example, that
cattle figured very prominently in the sample, a piece of dietary
evidence which, as far as I am aware, is not recoverable from any other
source. There is much else of value in this report, but I wish to turn
directly to what seems to me to be an intriguing and important problem
of interpretation.
At Roman Exeter, how did meat reach the consumer? From the faunal
remains it was deduced that "Cattle were brought to the city on the
hoof for slaughter" "centres for slaughter" existed, and
"organised butchery" was practised as part of "a systematic policy for
the marketing of beef" and the "large scale organised marketing of
cattle in the early Roman period" (Maltby 1979, pp.38-40). The
institutional framework which seems to be posited here - producer to
wholesale market to slaughterhouse to retail market to customer's home
- is analogous to that which operates in our own society. And, as in
our own, the laws that govern the civilian supply systems seem to be
largely the laws of the marketplace.
But is this the only explanation which would fit the evidence?
Since the bones are not intrinsically unambiguous in their meaning,
there is at least a prima facie case for considering other, possibly
non-commercial mechanisms of supply and distribution. (The legitimacy
of ascribing modern economic concepts like 'systematic marketing
policy' to the inhabitants of Roman Exeter is another issue). Might
all the animals represented (and this is not many over a period of
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several hundred years) have been owned by the civic authorities,
slaughtered and cut up by one or two part-time butchers and the meat
distributed free of. charge? Other hypotheses are possible and equally
likely.
Without other data there is no way of resolving this difficulty.
Here the historian's knowledge of conditions of Roman society can help.
There is no written evidence directly relating to Exeter, as Maltby
knew, but elsewhere in Roman Britain (for instance, at Bath (Salway
1981, p.687)) and much more abundantly in the Mediterranean Graeco-
Roman world, which is comparatively well documented, there is a great
deal of information which relates to the problem of the food supply of
towns.
In the first place, the written record confirms the existence of
cattle markets and butcher's shops. These certainly existed in
antiquity and no-one would dispute that a supply and demand factor was
part of the process which ended with the deposition of bones in the
archaeological record. However, the written record suggests that other
forces must also be considered.
In classical antiquity a wealth of literary and epigraph!c data
reveals that religious festivals were of exceptional importance to
urban (and rural) communities. In the largest (and admittedly
exceptional) cities there might be well over 100 days allotted annually
to public festivals alone (Cartledge 1985b, p.99: Friedlander 1908,
pp.11-12); at smaller places they might still be numerous (for example,
Myconos (Sokolowski 1969: no.96)). It was normal practice on these
occasions to sacrifice at least one animal, of which part would be
reserved for the deity, part given to the priest and the rest consumed
by the celebrants. Sometimes the number of beasts could be very large.
On the second day of the festival of the Eleusinian Mysteries, for
example, each initiate was required to sacrifice a suckling pig (Parke
1977, p.63). Since there might be hundreds, even thousands, of
initiates in any one year the impact on the faunal record is likely to
have been substantial.
Another urban institution which is well attested is the sponsored,
feast. Literature and many Hellenistic and Roman inscriptions, from a
wide range of towns, small to large, record the provision by wealthy
citizens of banquets for the community or sections of it (see Hands
(1968) for a set of translated documents from Africa, Spain, Italy,
Greece and Asia Minor). At Athens in the second century AD the
millionaire Tiberius Claudius Atticus provided funds for 100 oxen "to
be sacrificed to the goddess on a single day on many occasions and in
providing a sacrificial feast for the whole people of Athens" (Hands
1968, D80), though generosity on this scale is rare. More typical,
perhaps, were the public feasts held in the country town of Corfinium
in central Italy (Hands 1968, D40) or at Aegialeon on the island of
Amorgos, where beef and pork were set before the community (Hands 1968,
D5). In the latter case, incidentally, it seems that joints of meat
were · given to the young men of the city to take away after the
celebration. There is evidence strongly suggestive of similar practice
elsewhere (Sokolowski 1969, no. 96) and it would be interesting to knew
how widespread it was.
There would seem to be important implications here for the
interpretation of faunal remains. Religious, social and political
values - piety, display, ambition, prestige, tradition - may have
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played a significant part In the distribution of meat within the
Greaco-Ronan city, more significant, perhaps, than marketplace
economics Without the written evidence, however, how could the
archaeologist be certain that such factors should be taken into
account?
Graeme Barker, whose elegant discussions of faunal data have done so
™ .h t- n make historians aware of the potential of this evidence (see,
f r ™1ΐΓ Cartledge (1985a, ρ.Π4)), has remarked that "in duefor example pledge ^ ;
 will ^ a very conslderable
^tribut on to our understanding of the economic life of the ancientcontribution to our ^ ^  ^  ^
 tljil|ltlCi as long
city' <Bar*«
s
^
at^he economy of the ancient world was embedded
as we ?%&£*£*SZ- CFiniey 1973) and proceeded accordingly. We
within its 2STS2e««k principally to the written evidence.
ewe this "«*5£?^ 5^£ld ^ver *eveal the lnterPlay of Political,
Archaeology Jf^f^^e factors which influenced the production
religious social and econom
 (cf. Finley (1985, pp.24-5) on
le gal* ad C Γόη ^ ic' structure s 'of local pottery productie, revealed
By papyri ?iom Oxyrhynchus in Egypt).
Th, final example concerns one of the largest archaeological
The final
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a Greek biographer writing in the late first or early second century
AD, tells us that Tiberius' impressions of this journey were recorded
in a pamphlet written by his younger brother Gaius. According to
Plutarch's version of this, Tiberius saw a largely deserted landscape,
peopled only by the slave herdsmen who had replaced peasant farmers
(Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 8) and he was so affected by this
experience that land reforms became the burning issue of his later
career; and indeed problems of the land remained very prominent in the
history of Italy for the next hundred years.
Potter (1979, p.125) remarks that there is little in the
archaeological record to support Plutarch's tale. Rather, the
coutryside is thickly settled, mainly with smallholdings. Is this a
clear case then of the material evidence undermining the written word
and forcing a reappraisal of long held views? As Potter acknowledges,
there are powerful objections. Apart from the question of location,
there is a dating difficulty. The later Republican sites can be dated
no more closely than to a third to first century BC bracket. All,
therefore, might be of the third century BC, or the second, or the
first. If not, what proportion should be allocated to each century?
What if a major change in the settlement pattern had taken place in the
second half of the second century? It makes a big difference to the
interpretation of these data. Also, the material remains do not tell
us how the land was owned - are we dealing with independant farms,
tenant farms, small slave farms? In our present state of knowledge we
cannot tell. Again, it makes a big difference.
Has this evidence then any value for historical enquiry? I would
say that it does, providing that appropriate questions are asked of it.
These should be questions which do not overstrain the evidence. For
technical reasons the South Etruria survey data cannot inform us
reliably about the nature of agricultural exploitation there in the
130's BC. However, along with other survey evidence from Italy, they
can be used, as Garnsey (1979) does, to answer an equally important but
different kind of question, "Where did the Italian peasant live?", for
which the literary evidence is negligible. Garnsey's approach
maximises the strengths of archaeological data - quantity, location,
regional coverage, long time sequence - and minimises the weaknesses -
imprecise dating, juridical definition - to produce plausible and to
the historian very interesting results.
"All too frequently a line still divides archaeological from
historical study" (Salmon 1984, Preface); "The present situation is
that with a few rare exceptions archaeologists and historians are
distinct groups with too little knowledge of each other's interests and
problems" (Humphreys 1967, p.375). In twenty years little seems to
have changed. Some of the reasons why a substantial sector of
historical opinion (not the authors quoted above) remains unconvinced
of the value of archaeology have been discussed. Perhaps the most
important of these is the perception that for large parts of ancient
history archaeology is a minor source of evidence and will remain so.
In those areas of antiquity where it has an equal or the major role to
play (Greek colonisation, trade, agriculture, settlement patterns and
many more) the problem of ambiguity looms large. As the examples have
shown, more work needs to be done on defining the limits of
archaeological inferences. There is a feeling that a discipline which
claims to have lost its innocence should be more prepared to admit, as
historians sometimes have to, that 'we just don't know' and even 'we
cannot know, without other evidence'.
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This has been in the main a deliberately one-sided view of the
interface between archaeology and history. It would be equally
possible to ask the question 'why should archaeologists take historians
seriously?' and I hope that someone, perhaps an historian, will do
this. There would be much to discuss. For example, historians too
have been reluctant to write synoptic works. To the best of my
knowledge no-one has collected and analysed the copious and very
detailed data available on animal sacrifice. The best discussion of
stock-raising which Maltby was able to find was White's Roman Farming
(1970), which does not set out to deal with consumption patterns. And
there is still no book on Greek farming, even though it is widely
recognised that agriculture accounted for at least four-fifths of the
productive activity of the classical world.
I will end on a more optimistic note. Today more historians than
ever before, especially the younger generation, are receptive to and
often knowledgeable about archaeology. More historians are getting
involved in joint fieldwork projects. The opportunity to break down
more of the remaining barriers is there and more co-operation will be
to the advantage of all. The illustrations which I have used in this
paper point clearly to achievements as well as problems. For the
archaeologist the challenge of working within an historical framework,
where material evidence can often be controlled by, or at least
compared with, other, frequently more powerful strands of information,
is an exciting one. We should invite more historians to work with us,
just as more historians are asking us to work with them.
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ARCHAEOLOGISTS IN ACADEME: AN INSTITUTIONAL CONFINEMENT?
J.G.Lewthwaite
INTRODUCTION
In this necessarily brief and superficial essay, I wish to reflect
on the contemporary crisis in archaeology, a crisis all the more
profoundly disturbing because of the cold and complacently silent mask
it wears, at least when compared with the quantities of heat and light
generated by the turbulent theoretical polemics which followed the
publications of Clarke and the Binfords in the annus mirabilis of 1968;
as its participants have gained weight and lost hair, succumbing to the
relative material comfort of middle-aged, middle-class professional
suburbanity (the video recorder to tape 'Spitting Images' while in the
pub, the golden labrador contentedly nestling among the Sainsbury's
groceries and the children's safety harness in the back of the family
Volvo estate...) all the last traces of the vigorous soaping and
scrubbing which once promised to open the disciplinary pores appear to
have evaporated, leaving only a disagreeable bathmark of opaque sub-
sociological jargon and some deep gurgling sounds from the politicised
opportunists in the academic plughole. Archaeology's fall from grace
through' tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge has yet to find
its Milton, although we have all grown weary of the skein of articles
entitled 'Paradigms lost'; a traumatic loss of innocence (Clarke 1973)
has initiated, not the eagerly sought 'meaningful and ongoing open-
ended relationship' with caring disciplines but a string of sordid
little affairs with every hustling paradigm in sight, a very library of
one-book stands.
At the heart of this disillusion lies the failure of the emulation
of Science (as then understood) to deliver the goods; it is instructive
in this respect to contemplate the slow transformation of Kent
Flannery, one of the discipline's most honest, incisive and articulate
spokesmen, from the optimistic arch-proponent of systems theory, albeit
already alert to the proliferation of 'Mickey Mouse Laws' (Flannery
1973) through his most celebrated role as the shrewd and witty observer
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of the human-zoo aspect of the archaeological microcosm (Flannery 1976)
into the conference-weary Juvenal, driven by outrage at the cynical
opportunism of the theoretical hotshots spawned by the New Archaeology
into a reawakened nostalgia for the values symbolised by the oldtimer's
trowel (Flannery 1982). While emotionally satisfying, this is no
lasting solution. To begin with, I would like to point out that the
alternative of a realignment with History was never seriously
considered by the 'generation of '68', particularly but not exclusively
the Americans among them, which I could explain as much in terms of the
fundamentally ahistorical and (to neologise) 'ageographical' quality of
transatlantic culture as through the more obvious effects of a
professional formation in departments of anthropology. In Britain the
situation is different: the historical consciousness is greater, the
departmental affiliation (particularly in the 'provinces') very often
with Classics and Ancient History, the influence of archaeologists such
as Gordon Childe, R.G.Colllngwood and Stuart Piggott profound and
persistent.
SCIENTIFIC STATUS
Science rules, O.K.?
If there has been one fetish or ju-ju of which the New
Archaeologists have been particularly enthralled, it is surely that of
the Scientific Method, that miraculous mode of establishing Theory of
progressively greater power, scope and elegance on a bedrock of
empirical reality. True believers are endowed with wondrous powers: if
not an invulnerability to bullets or the power to cast out demons, at
least of attaining that Scientific Status which can be guaranteed to
inspire a superstitious reverence among the uninitiated and a proper
place in the hierarchy of this poor world.
Such is not, however, the view of sociologists or historians of
science, who are at least tolerably familiar with what scientists do
and have done, nor even of a growing band of philosophers of science,
who believe they know what scientists ought to do; in retrospect, it is
perhaps unfortunate that the New Archaeologists placed their faith in
the latter rather than the former, although, to be fair, the
exponential growth of such research has occurred only very recently.
Thus, in a reflection on the supposed seventeenth-century Scientific
Revolution, Fores (1984, p. 227) observes that "There is no more a
single and identifiable 'scientific method', which has been used
regularly by scientists to generate science-as-knowledge, than there is
a single, identifiable, articulable and successful 'method of
wheelwrighting'...There is a range of particular methods of working to
choose from at the time of working...In each case the appropriate test
is applied to the product of working effort." Her microsociological
study of the day-to-day practices of a science laboratory has drawn
Knorr (1979) to conclude that: "The mechanisms ruling the progress of
research are more adequately described as successful 'tinkering' than
as hypothesis-testing or cumulative verification. Epistemologically, a
constructivist model of the scientific mode of operation suggests
itself...A satisfactory mode of operation in which successes are
achieved entirely through experimenting with locally existing
opportunities invokes the image of tinkering...Theories are the cocoons
left behind when practice is abstracted from the conduct of enquiry."
Finally, Laudan (1982) has argued that while philosophers of science
were once agreed that the essence of science lay in its capacity to
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generate consensus (compared with the interminable, subjective
squabbling elsewhere), the irruption of Messrs Kühn and Feyerabend has
generated a concern with the capacity of science to be controversial;
incidentally, neither generalisation necessarily involves much
correspondence with an objective 'reality', the consensus being
achieved through the successful internalisation of rules and norms in
an institutional context, the ubiquity of controversy being correlated
with the incommensurability of paradigms, the under-determination of
theory (cf Duhem-Quine thesis) and the many instances of successful
'deviant' behaviour.
Worse, Knorr (1979) depicts the everyday life of scientific folk in
a manner which may prove harrowing to the tender-minded; it seems that
they have more in common with laboratory rodents than white coats and
pink noses. Apparently, scientists compete for 'social credit' alias
'symbolic capital' in an 'antagonistic field' (cf Latour-Woolgar
thesis), invading slack 'contingency-space' in search of
'distinctiveness', an 'asset' to be milked for all it is worth;
experimentation and publication are pragmatic, tactical operations
planned in anticipation of accusations of incompetence or irrelevance
from territorial competitors; 'facts' are to be hoarded till useful,
facilities denied; truly, a laboratory red in tooth and claw! If we
learn anything, it is that scientists are, after all, much more like
archaeologists than we ever thought - or feared (cf Flannery 1976
passim, 1982).
Such a 'constructivist' position practically implies the irrelevance
of any correspondence with reality, attributing to Fores' knowledge-
wrighting a verification through 'internal' criteria of logic (if any
logic at all), in effect, an epistemology close to that of traditional
Idealism. The scientific 'tinkering' with assets at hand and such as
can be appropriated from slack contingency-space seems disturbingly
close to the Levi-Straussian bricolage (the activity of a 'bodger' or
handiman working with material at hand...) of mythopoeia (Levi-Strauss
1972, pp.16-22; Figlio 1976, pp.19,31; Fores 1983, pp.155-6): are
scientists, then, no more than successful mythmongers?
On reflection, Knorr's case study appears to be a case of David
Clarke's "attempt to explain the Vietnam war in terms of electron
displacements" (Clarke 1973, p.10), ie of a failure to relate the scale
of observations to that of the phenomenon under investigation. A more
useful examplar, particularly for archaeologists, is surely Martin
Rudwick's study of the Great Devonian Controversy in nineteenth century
geology (Rudwick 1985) precisely because it deals with a completed
cycle of scientific research resolved to the satisfaction of
participants and posterity: at least we know that he got the outcome of
the war right!
In an exemplary introduction, Rudwick outlines his aims - to achieve
a fine-grained 'thick' description of small facts relevant to large
issues through a narrative carefully crafted to convey subjective time,
to eschew anachronism and Whiggism, to zoom in and out in a 'dynamic
spiral of involvement and detachment, of immediacy and abstraction'
(Rudwick 1985, pp.3-16). Would that a single archaeologist were as
conscious of such a need, as capable of such finesse!
In brief, while Knorr's point of view is validated in terms of the
detail of the controversy, ie at the level of the electron
displacements, the conclusions with respect to the war are more germane
54
to Laudan's puzzle: "plotting the trajectories against the absolute
historical titnescale provided by the detailed documentation clearly
reveals the contrast between certain stable states (author's emphasis)
of interpretation, on the one hand, and the specific occasions which
destabilized them and produced rapid changes in the opinions of
particular individuals, on the other" (Rudwlck 1985, p.418). Rudwick
confirms:
(i) the existence of tacit bodies of craft knowledge - "It was not
from textbooks that the correct meaning and application of
technical terms and concepts was learned, but rather from
witnessing their use (author's emphasis) - whether routine or
still controversial - by authoritative and established
practitioners. . .The relatively stable core of this body of
practical knowledge was learned ostensively by newcomers to the
science, while more seasoned practitioners were continually
refining and modifying the application of even the most well
established categories" (Rudwick 1985, pp.445-6);
(ii) the existence of a 'gradient of attributed competence'
trichotomised into 'elite', 'accomplished' and 'amateur'
categories accepted by the participants themselves and
demonstrated in their actual behaviour (Rudwick 1985, pp.418-
428);
(iii) the existence of a 'core-set' of scientists whose attention was
focused on this transient 'hot-spot' in science - as suggested
by Collins (1981) - (Rudwick 1985, pp.426-428);
(iv) the theory-, even controversy-laden nature not only of
rhetorical, persuasive presentations (lectures, papers) but
even of field observations - "Modern practitioners of
scientific research have often been deceived by the imposed
conventions of their discipline into supposing that their
papers are unproblematic reports of experiments performed,
results obtained and conclusions reached...But the contrast
comes as no surprise to reflective practitioners of scientific
research, among whom there is a healthy tradition of deriding
and unmasking the pompous obliquities of formal, scientific
style. Nor should the contrast surprise any analysists of
science who recognise the persuasive intentions and rhetorical
character of any (author's emphasis) form of scientific
discourse...A scientific paper is designed, covertly if not
openly, to present the best possible case in court; except
fortuitously, its structure will therefore not (author's
emphasis) reflect the actual pathway of research...Any
scientific paper, if it is all substantial in content, presents
the favourable evidence with maximum rhetorical effect; weak
links in the argument are glossed over or concealed; any
antagonists' cases is (sic) attacked, and the force of their
evidence subtly undermined or openly dismissed or even
ridiculed...On the surface, almost all the papers relevant to
the Devonian controversy appeared to be straightforward
reports...yet contemporaries were not deceived by this; they
were well able to "read between the lines" of formal papers, as
their recorded informal comments amply demonstrate. They were
under no illusions about the persuasive and argumentative
intentions of what they read or heard in formal settings.. .From
its most private layers to the most public, the scientific
activities that constituted the Devonian controversy were
social as well as personal; and they were expressed throughout
in terms of rhetorical argument" (Rudwick 1985, pp.433-435).
"In fact, as the narrative of the controversy has shown, it was
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not only the changing uses of technical terms and the modified
conceptual meanings they expressed, but also the very reaility
of alleged "facts" that were shaped through argument and
debate" (Rudwick 1985, pp.447-448). "The particular
observations made, and their immediate ordering in the field,
were often manifestly directed toward finding empirical
evidence that would be not merely relevant to the controversy
but also persuasive (author's emphasis)" (Rudwick 1985, pp.431-
432);
(v) the existence of an antagonistic field (in the sense of Lat our
and Woolgar) pervaded by imagery drawn from the battlefield,
the courtrooms or Parliament - prompting the aside that "Apart
from their abstract formalisms, nothing has more seriously
vitiated analyses of scientific work by philosophers of science
than their tacit assumption that science Is governed by
procedures analogous to statute law rather than common law"
(Rudwick 1985, p.436 n.ll);
(vi) the existence of social credit, even a social identity, as a
motivation in scientific research - "On occasion the
participants themselves distinguished clearly between
substantive geological questions and the assignment of credit
for priority in discovery..; but in the ordinary course of
argument...they were mixed almost Inextricably" (Rudwick 1985,
p.440);
(vii) the inapplicability of the conventional distinction between
contexts of discovery and of justification (Rudwick 1985,
p.338);
(viii) the inapplicability of the Kuhnian concepts of 'paradigm' and
'scientific revolution' - "The Devonian controversy was not a
major "scientific revolution" or episode of extraordinary
science"; nor was it merely a minor puzzle within a humdrum and
static tradition of "normal science" the solution of which left
that "paradigm" essentially unchanged. As historians of
science have long recognised, the Kuhnian terms are difficult
to apply to real examples of scientific change without somewhat
procrustean adjustments. In retrospect, perhaps the most
important of Kühn's insights was his emphasis on the socially
embodied and socially sustained character of the traditions
within which virtually all scientific work is and has been
carried out- It is the activities of persons (author's
emphasis), not disembodied ideas, concepts, theories or
"research programs" that constitute research traditions...".
"In all these ways, the resolution of the Devonian controversy
left the practice of stratigraphie geology profoundly changed
from what it had been before. But this major transformation
was accomplished with none of the symptoms of a "scientific
revolution". It was achieved within (author's emphasis) an
established paradigm, or rather within a socially embedded
research tradition. It entailed the gradual (author's
emphasis) modification of the meanings and uses of technical
terms, methods, criteria, concepts and so forth. The
paradigms, like the terms and concepts in which it was
expressed, proved to be gradually but indefinitely malleable
and adaptable. The Devonian controversy shows how in
scientific research, no less than in politics, art, and
religion, human traditions continually provide from within
(author's emphasis) themselves the resources for creative
renewal" (Rudwick 1985, pp.445-450);
(ix) the hermeneutic aspect of scientific research: "Stratigraphical
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geology, like any other branch of scientific research though
more patently than most, was (and is) intrinsically a
herraeneutic activity. It is for this reason that the term
"interpretation" has been used so freely throughout this
narrative and analysis of the Devonian controversy, and terms
such as "theory" so sparingly. That stylistic preference not
only expresses the character of what was going on in the
controversy, seen in retrospect; it also reflects the
participants' own evident awareness that interpretation is what
they were engaged in" (Rudwick 1985, p.447).
Neverthelss Rudwick rejects the extreme constructivism of Knorr and
others in his concluding section on 'social construction and natural
knowledge1: "The Devonian controversy is an instructive case study...It
can be used to explore the way in which a consensual product of
scientific debate can be regarded as both artifactual and (author's
emphasis) natural, as a thoroughly social construction that may
nonetheless be a reliable representation of the natural world...In
place of the implausible extremes of either naive realism or social
constructivism, what is needed is not a compromise but a way of
transcending the dichotomy" (Rudwick 1985, pp.451-454). Rudwick sees
the solution in the analogy of a map and of mapping: "Bookish people
with no practical experience of mapping often assume that a map is an
umproblematic replica of reality...Those who make intensive use of
cartography know on the contrary that any map is a pervasively
conventional representation...it makes no sense to talk of ever
achieving a uniquely "perfect" representation, or a complete
"correspondence" with reality, since different kinds of maps are
designed for different uses, and there is no limit to the further
representations that may be needed for new and unforeseen
purposes...the analaogy of mapping yields a way of retaining the
constructivists' insistence on the social processes that went into the
making of a piece of scientific knowledge. . .while also allowing the
realists' insistence that the real natural world...had a more than
marginal effect on that claimed knowledge" (Rudwick 1985, p.454);
another analogy would be that of 'shaping' or 'forging': "To put the
point another way, neither "discovery" nor "construction" is by itself
(author's emphasis) an adequate metaphor for the production of
scientific knowledge. The outcome of research is neither the
unproblematic disclosure of the natural model nor a mere artifact of
social negotiation.. .For the Devonian controversy shows how new
knowledge is shaped from the materials of a real natural world,
.malleable yet often refractory; but it becomes knowledge only as those
materials are forged into new shapes with new meanings, on the anvil of
heated argumentative debate" (Rudwick 1985, pp.454-455). In
conclusion, Rudwick argues that: "In this way, it is possible to see
the cumulative empirical evidence in the Devonian debate neither
(author's emphasis) as having determined the result of the research in
any unambiguous way, as naive realists might claim, nor (author's
emphasis) as having been virtually irrelevant to the result of the
social contest on the antagonistic field, as constructivists might
maintain. It can be seen instead as having had a differentiating
effect on the course and outcome of the debate, constraining(author's
emphasis) the social construction into being a limited, but reliable
and indefinitely improvable, representation of natural reality"
(Rudwick 1985, pp.455-456).
In effect it is nothing if not ironic that the New Archaeologists
who profess to reject a normative model of culture have so eagerly
espoused a normative model of scientific research; to employ Rudwick1 s
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metaphor of the practice of the law courts, they have simply reduced
the drama of a trial to the formalities of the Judges' Rules.
The Wrighting of History
In contemplating the arrogant disdain which the New Archaeologists
reserve for History, Ί. am inevitably reminded of two passages from
George Huppert's article on the psychology of historical erudition in
France between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries (Huppert 1973),
appropriately enough lodged in a festschrift dedicated to Fernand
Braudel:
"While the literary historians took it for granted that the corpus of
histories inherited from the past could not be improved upon, the
antiquarians, on the contrary, declared all inherited histories
worthless and prepared to reconstruct the past starting from the
documents. The lack of comprehension the antiquarians met with can be
gauged from their constant need to explain what they were doing"
(Huppert 1973, p.268).
"The real distinction is between erudits and litterateurs. The
erudit's business - his only business as he sees it - is to make make
discoveries founded on the study of original sources (author's
emphasis). He does not care whether his discoveries are important,
philosophical, relevant or piquant. That is why we tend to think of
him as an antiquarian. The litterateur, on the other hand, is not
interested in discoveries at all. He does not necessarily care whether
his facts are correct or not. What he wants is an epic tale, nobly
told; or else, a philosophical tale, in which the historical narrative
serves only one purpose, that of providing material for moral analysis"
(Huppert 1973, p.275).
Our New Archaeologists seem to believe that little has changed under
the historical sun, that Clio's devotees whirl and babble in the same
old rituals, grabbing in musty archives and purveying novel faction to
the nostalgic throng; yet this war of the ancients and moderns closely
parodies our own recent debate, particularly as regards the attitudes
and behaviour of the antiquarians (our novi homines) while figures of
the erudit and the litterateur are, after all, but Flannery's Real
Mesoamerican Archaeologist and Great Synthesizer. No major historian,
since Charles Victor Langlois has argued that "the true role of the
historian is to put the people of today in contact with the original
documents that are the tracks left by the people of yesterday, without
mixing anything of himself in them" (Keylor 1975, p.178) while striving
"to establish the authenticity of the documents, clarify them,
catalogue them, and thus make a bibliography to orient scholars"
(Keylor 1975, p.180) or justified history purely in terms of the
intrinsic raison d'etre of historical studies, the pleasures of working
afforded to the historian, or his being "instinctively impelled to
collect, with the same seriousness, all the traces that subsist"
(Keylor 1975, p.179); according to Lawrence Stone (1971, p.49) such is
the displacement activity of the anal-erotic male.
The naive realism and positivism which underly these statements,
based on a misunderstanding of Ranke's hist orIsmus (Keylor 1975, ρρ·8-
9) has waned unceasingly since the last two decades of the last century
(Hughes 1959, pp.183-248), the historical breukvlak of Wesseling
(1978). The first to reflect and respond were Germans such as Dilthey,
Windelband, Rickert, Lamprecht and Weber - "a generalizing or theoretic
historian" rather than a sociologist, remember (Birnbaum 1978, p.226) -
soon followed by Croce in Italy (Cedronio 1981) and sundry fin de
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siècle Americans, Britons, Swedes and Spaniards; in France, the
decisive reorientât!on occurred with the founding of the annales in
1929 - a year before Binford's birth - eight before Clarke's (Burguiere
1978; Cedronio 1977, pp.3-18; Leullliot 1973; Revel 1978, 1979; other
references In Lewthwaite in press a). But three—score years before
Braudel rejected the renascent positivism of the social scientists on
account of their failure to deal with temporality, their adoption of
either the timeless mathematical model or the evanescent events of
actualité (Braudel 1958), before even his maitre Lucien Febvre "au lieu
de prétendre que l'histoire est une science comme les autres, essayera
plutôt de demonstrer que la science telle que la conçoivent les savants
de son temps et l'histoire telle qu'il la conçoit opèrent de la même
manière" (Massicotte 1981, p.27), rejecting the search for laws in
favour of the formulation of a problematic ( 1 ' hi s t oir e-pr obleme )
(Massicote 1981, esp. pp.21—42), an epistemological debate had raged
in and around the Sorbonne involving historians such as Seignobos,
Hauser, Mantoux, Lacombe and Xenopol, philosophers such as Berr and
Feuillee, the sociologist Durkheim and the economist Simiand, about
which we are particularly well informed (Keylor 1975, pp.55-207, esp.
75-89, 111-140, 178-18/; other references in Lewthwaite in press a).
Although there is a constant need to be aware of the contextual
phenomena - the French political situation in the wake of the Dreyfus
affair, the attempt to institutionalise sociology - there is much about
the debate which anticipates the polemic of the New Archaeologists and
the various reflections and reactions of the old:
(i) Langlois' brand of pedantic positivism was implicitly criticised by
his colleague and co-author, the leading theoretician of the Sorbonne
historical establishment Charles Seignobos, in terms of an epistemology
which strikingly anticipates that of Hawkes and Piggott. According to
Seignobos, history could not be classified as a science, because the
natural scientists observed reality directly, whereas the historian
apprehended the past only indirectly through the fragmentary body of
surviving documentation, the lacunae of which had to be filled in
through the historian's reasoning from models of present reality.
Despite his overall mood of pessimism, Seignobos opined that the
certitude of such inferences would be enhanced by the mutual
confirmation of several 'presumptions' grouped together. In the end,
history, while not a science, might yet be scientific, since the final
stage of historical synthesis, in discovering intelligible
generalisations from a mass of refractory evidence, approximated to
science in its process and its products (Keylor 1975, pp.78-80);
.(ii) the critique of established history instigated by Emile Durkheim
and his ally Francois Simiand evokes the charges brought by the
American New (or anthropological) Archaeologists against their mentors:
that they frittered away time and energy and resources on the mindless
accumulation of 'facts' without an idee directrice, that they aimed at
nothing more profound than showpiece monographs of specialised
erudition, that they failed to search for the laws of historical
development underlying the superficial manifestations of reality, that
they turned away from truly scientific universal principles of
causation (Keylor 1975, pp.113-115).
The economist Simiand's 'epistemological polemic' was particularly
scathing (Besnard 1983a, pp.251-253): sociology truly deserved the
title of science, since it referred to an objective domain, while
historicizing or traditional history (l'histoire historisante) focused
on unique, unrepeatable events; historians misunderstood causation as
the identification of motivation in the actor or in terms of
unsystematically selected anterior events, whereas social science
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sought through the detection of invariable and unconditional
antecedence between facts of the same order to identify stable
relationships between phenomena; historians (particularly Henri Hauser)
regarded the interdependence of facts within a single s exile ty as a
principle, whereas social scientists sought causal relationships
between phenomena in a sample of several societies; historians should
be verifying hypotheses rather than attempting to produce a sort of
photographic facsmile of the past. In effect, history could not even
accumulate the data for, or test against empirical evidence the theory
of, social science - as allowed by some more moderate Durkheimians. It
was presumably with this 1903 epistemological assault in mind that
Finley wrote, reviewing David Clarke's Analytical Archaeology, that
(Finley 1971, p.172) "we know where we are now; the familiar polemic of
the social scientist against history has been carried back into
prehistory".
(ill) All historians did not react with a uniform and predictable
chorus of outrage, some at least meeting the sociological onslaught
through an exhortation to their fellows to put their house in order.
Thus, Paul Lacombe initiated what has become known as the Lacombe-
Xenopol debate with an reasoned programme for a revitalised history.
According to Lacombe, historians had failed to identify the meaning,
and hence to adopt the aims and methods of the true sciences: in
respect of the former, they had pursued the reconstruction of
historical reality (mere detail) rather than historical truth (meaning)
through a timid refusal to apply principles of selection, such as those
of similitude and succession, whereby they might distinguish between
recurrent and persistent structures ('institut! ons') and the mass of
unique and transient events, arriving at general truths; in respect of
the latter, they had failed to combine inductive and deductive
reasoning, to dissect reality with the powerful heuristic devices of
the hypothesis and the imaginative experience, to call into being
'fictitious categories'. Nevertheless, Lacombe remained pessimistic,
appreciating the contingent nature of historical causation (Keylor
1975, p.118-121).
Lacombe's gauntlet was picked up by the Rumanian historian Alexandre
Xenopol in a championing of traditional historiography which is
generally reckoned unsuccessful, but which made a valiant effort to
defend historical methodology as valid and appropriate for its own
scientific domain, one shared with other 'historical' or diachronic
sciences such as geology and palaeontology, and quite distinct from the
timeless, ahistorical, synchronie sciences, both hard and soft, which
occupied the 'theoretical' domain. According to Xenopol, it was not
the historian's business to detect either institutions or general laws,
but rather to study unique causal chains or sequences - "not to
establish relations of similitude and coexistence, but rather of
difference and succession" (Keylor 1975, pp.121-124).
A similar faith in the absolute, universal and unchanging quality of
human reason as the historian's main heuristic instrument, and a
similar distinction between the timeless truths, susceptible to
mathematical formulation and symbolization, of the physical sciences
and the evolutionary phenomena apprehended only indirectly by the
descriptive sciences (geology, botany and zoology), the latter sharing
a common method with history, are apparent in the further works of
Charles Seignobos, who could not resist dismissing the sociological
critique with the clearly rhetorical trope to the effect that a
synchronie study of social phenomena was impossible, since social facts
became past events, and hence fell into the doimain of history,
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immediately on occurrence! The historical method was therefore the
only form of reasoning appropriate to the human sciences; occupying as
it did - another rhetorical flourish - the middle ground between
positivism and the metaphysical speculation of philosophers, history
was the natural unifying (sc. imperialist!) force among the social or
human sciences (Keylor 1975, pp.181-183);
(iv) Such rhetorical tropes were matched, inter alia, by the
philosopher Alfred Fouillée (keylor 1975, pp.185-187), who argued that
philosophy occupied the true middle ground between excessive
specialisation and ideological polemic; indeed, the moment a historian
departed from the study of the minutiae of the evidence to express
ideas, he was intruding into the domain of the philosopher! History
was not only ideological, he asserted, but irremediably cleft in twain
by an irréconciliable contradiction between an ontology of an eternal
becoming, of the evolutionary nature of reality and an epistemology
based on analogy between past, present and even predictable future
events, and doomed to disciplinary extinction through a bifurcation
between those who advanced towards a sociological future and those who
retreated in. to an ever more involuted erudition. Fouillee's alliance
of sociology with philosophy, it must be recalled, is but part of the
rather overlooked inheritance of the philosophical tradition by the
Durkheimians, particularly through the mediation of Emile Durkhelm's
mentor, Emile Boutroux (Keylor 1975, pp.183-184).
(v) Such a dialectic can hardly be said to have been resolved, yet in
the best Hegelian mode it engendered a synthesis: specifically, the
foundation of both a journal and a research-seminar centre for
historical synthesis by Henri Berr, a professeur of rhetoric in a
khâgne (the Lycée Henri IV) and another ex-normalien inspired by
Boutroux. Berr went so far as to admit the pre-eminence of history
among the human sciences, arguing that it dealt in causation without
losing touch with reality, while advocating an alliance with sociology,
on the grounds that each was but a complimentary aspect of a single
science; historians should, above all, rise above erudition and
empiricism to achieve synthesis, if for no other reason than that of
the deep human need for such pithy wisdom, which had been provided
previously only in an imperfect form by the various metaphysical
systems of philosophers of history from Vico to Hegel (Keylor 1975,
pp.251-253). Such recommendations went unhindered in the Sorbonne of
the day - Berr being a marginal figure - but through their
radicalisation of Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, members of the Berr
cercle (Braudel 1972; Clark 1971, 1973, pp.66-92) contributed to the
eventual emergence of the Annales school of history (Siegel 1970; other
references in Lewthwaite in press a).
Such episodes of epistemological renewal are far from rare in the
history of History, yet remain essentially Ignored by archaeologists,
as if the relatively trivial differences in the form of the evidence,
absolute tlmescales or degrees of temporal resolution outweighed the
positive similarities between the diachronic sciences of man and
invalidated the accumulated wisdom of the senior discipline. Two
problems are fundamental to any consideration of thler mutual
relationship:
(i) that of the identity or otherwise of the working practice of the
historical, humanistic or social-scientific disciplines compared
with the hard sciences (discussed in part above, from the
perspective of the latter);
(ii) that of the appropriateness of the narrative form traditional in
History as a vehicle of scientific explanation. With regard to
the first question, no-one has probed the issue more deeply than
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the historian Max Weber, whose reflections have been summarised
most clearly and concisely by McLemore (1984). In brief, Weber's
argument runs-as follows:
(a) The logic of the natural and cultural sciences does Indeed
differ, but not primarily on account of the nature of the
phenomena studied: "there is no logically necessary link between
the object domain of a science and the type of concept it uses."
The primary distinction is rather between the nomologlcal
sciences and those , dealing with concrete reality
(Wirklichkeitswissen schaften), in that· concept formation in the
one treats of the common properties of a set of phenomena, but in
the other with the peculiar properties of a particular
phenomenon, Nomological sciences seek to discover "systematic
causal hierarchies capable of providing deductive explanations"
through a process of increasing generalisation from reality: "The
definitive logical .instrument (author's emphasis) of these
disciplines is the use of concepts of an increasingly universal
extension (author's emphasis). For just this reason, these
concepts become .increasingly empty < in content (author's
emphasis). The definitive logical products (author's emphasis)
of these disciplines are abstract relations of general validity
(author's emphasis)." Sciences of concrete reality, however,
conceptualise essential properties or characteristic aspects of
phenomena into the form of "historical indiciduals", just as
abstract, just as selective as those of the nomological sciences,
but uniquely individual: "a complex of elements associated in
historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole from
the standpoint of their cultural significance." (McLemore 1984,
pp.279-282).
(b) Both the nomological sciences and the sciences of concrete
reality provide causal explanations, which differ in kind; if
anything, the latter pursue the concept of causality more fully:
for while the former regard explanation as a deductive process or
one of subsumption under a lawlike generalisation Buch as a
mathematical formula, thereby ultimately dissolving the dynamic
bond of cause-and-effeet into causal equivalence, the latter can
never in principle explain a concrete historical event by
deduction or subsumption, only by the imputation of a causal
relationship between qualitatively different phenomena, a
procedure which can be assisted but never supplanted by reference
to general laws, with or without 'boundary conditions' (McLemore
1984, pp.282-285).
(c) Nor does the criterion of value-relevance - of the significance
for the scientist of the object of his study - differentiate
natural and cultural sciences as such, but only as a function of
this primary distinction. For in effect "value-relevance is the
logically necessary (implicit and explicit) criterion for
selecting any time particular phenomena are chosen for study,
regardless of the social or natural character of these phenomena"
- but since socio-cultural science can only really deal with
concrete events, according to Weber, value-relevance is
inescapable. In effect Weber postulates on asymmetry: natural
science can either be nomological or idiographic, but a
nomological socio-cultural science would not contribute "to the
understanding (author's emphasis) of those aspects of cultural
realitywhich we regard as worth knowing" (author's
emphasis)(McLemore 1984, pp.285-291).
(d) One and only one property distinguishes the socio-cultural from
the natural sciences as such: the necessity of providing an
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Interpretative understanding (verstehen) is axiomatic for the
former: "As regards the interpretation of human conduct, we can,
at least in principle, set ourselves the goal not only of
representing it as "possible" - "comprehensible" in the sense of
being consistent with our nomological knowledge. We can also
attempt to "understand" (author's emphasis) it: that is to
identify a concrete "motive" or complex of motives "reproducible
in inner experience"... In other words, becasue of its
susceptibility to a meaningful interpretation (author's
emphasis).. .individual human conduct Is ΐή~ principle
intrinsically less "irrational" than the individual natural
event. "Explanation necessarily involves not only "causal" but
also "meaning adequacy": a historical novel lacks the former, a
mere statistical correlation deviod of a chain or motivation the
latter. Once again, socio-cultural phenomena require fuller
explanation than those of nature (McLemore 1984, pp.292-295).
There is an all-or-nothing quality about Weber's philosophy which is
not only unsettling (can archaeologists really hope ever to establish
verstehen with the denizens of the Lower Palaeolithic? Is 'meaning
adequacy' appropriate to, say, the origins of agriculture?) but
perhaps unnecessary, if we follow Knapp (1984) into an exploration of
the continuum of theory and historicity, or uniqueness. For this
author "Against any view of an uncrossable gap between theory and
history, I argue that observed regularities in social theory depend
upon historical content and milieu...when sociologists.. .decide that
concern with theory absolves them from concern with history, their
product will not only be irrelevant historically, it will not even be
adequate as theory...against the growing number of philosophers and
sociologists who deny the possibility of falsifiable theory, I argue
that social science can achieve it, but only if dependencies of
regularities upon milieu and content are explicitly considered.
Central theoretical tasks revolve around problems of content, that is,
that specification of a theory's boundary conditions or domain of
applicability - the historical or cultural conditions under which the
theory applies" (Knapp 1984, pp.34-35).
For Knapp, it is a question once again of the relationship between
form and content, or substance: "the formal elements of a theory or
model are not something reality imposes on the theorist but what the
theorist takes to reality...substantive elements are what the reality
imposes on the observer...Because any social theory can only deal with
selected aspects of any concrete reality, there are always indefinitely
many variables which are left over or residual to the theory: they
constitute its formal residue...A theory is falsifiable only when it is
possible to state when it ought to apply. Since the substantive
residue determines the domain of applicability of a theory, only a
theory with a finite substantive residue will be falsifiable...A theory
with a finite substantive residue is one which models a social
structure, process, or reality which is so tightly interrelated, yet
loosely enough connected to other realities, that it is determinative
of some consequences, regardless of other aspects of human social
behaviour" (Knapp 1984, pp.35-38).
Having defined what theory is, Knapp goes on to castigate
ahistorical social theorizing in terms very close to those of Weber or
indeed Braudel in his celebrated longue durée paper (Braudel 1958):
"Relatively few social theorists today pursue historical and
comparative studies to test out the substantive residue of their
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models. Instead they subsume all residual variables under a blanket
ceteris paribus clause. The result is unfalsifiable theory...s ome
theorists hold residual variables constant concretely...such a model
does not permit predictions because it is not in a form which can be
applied to realities other than the one it describes...some theorists
hold residual variables constant abstractly by stating the model as a
set of propositions such that no relations between its variables
logically follow from these conditions.. .It is a formalist, or
ahistorical, definitive model...it is vacuous and tautologous...best
viewed not as models, but as conceptual schemes (Knapp 1984, p.39).
Knapp concludes that "against any view that there is some finite
stock of events which are either lawful or idiosyncratic, topics of
sciences or of art, I suggest that it is processes or aspects of events
which have a longer or shorter substantive residue. Against the view
that events are exhaustible mines which must be claimed for one or
another discipline, I suggest that the disciplines increase the
material available to other disciplines...these considerations suggest
a dialectical process in which description of an historical
configuration encourages the growth of causal theory which, in turn,
requires the establishment of further configurations" (Knapp 1984,
p.51). In effect, Knapp is belatedly exacting the vengeance of the
tribe of historians on Simiand's social scientists: it is now they who
as antiquaries of the present mindlessly multiply monographs as
erudits, who fabricate formalist theory as litterateurs. In so doing,
he re-establishes not only the historical nature of all socio-cultural
theorising but the key role in history of socio-cultural concepts
corresponding to Weber's ideal type or Lacomb's corps fictif; a middle-
range construct dialectically suspended between formless substance and
denaturised theory. Finally, he is outlining a mode of scientific
behaviour fully comparable with that which Rudwick has identified in
the history of geology, if as yet inadequately realised.
With regard to the second question, that of "narrativity", White
(1984) will be taken to provide a concise and up-to-date summary of a
long-running and complex debate. The point of departure, according to
White, is the embarrassment occasioned by the feeling that narrative is
a fundamentally unscientific form of discourse among those historians
who would be scientists; among the traditionalists, the issue is
unproblematic, since it is held that only the 'form' of the discourse
could be confused with the mere telling of a story (myth, comedy, farce
etc) since the 'content' is the representation of real events. In
particular, the narrative or story-telling component is normally
distinct from any interpretive or 'dissertative' involvement of the
historian (White 1984, pp. 1-6). This orthodoxy, which was canonical
among the nineteenth-century historians of state, has been criticised
on a number of counts, more particularly in France than among exponents
of the Anglo-American analytical tradition:
(a) for the Annales historians (eg Furet 1975), narrative is inherently
the mode of expression of l'histoire événementielle, of political
history at the level of the individual, rather than longer-term
socioeconomic conjonctures and structure governed by impersonal forces
(White 1984, pp.8-10).This would appear to be a clear case of stone-
throwing by the.denizens of glass houses: as Kinser (1981, p.101) has
observed "What is true of "structure" is true of all of Braudel's
categorizing terms: they form part of a system of argument and are
nevertheless presented as facts, as "realities" for which no argument
is needed. In the end, Braudel's "concreteness" is metaphysical...".
(b) For the various tribes of structuralists (anthropological,
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psychological and semiological) the criticism is directed at the
ideological role of narrative in distinguishing 'historical' societies
in the western tradition from the pre-historical, primitive world, in
lauding western 'humanism' and in conditioning its citizenry through a
systematic, subliminal substitution of a constructed 'meaning' for a
supposedly value-free, described 'reality' (White 1984, pp.10-15).
Particularly insofar as this touches upon prehistory, White concurs:
"The distinction between a humanity, or kind of culture, or kind of
society that is historical and another that is nonhistorical is not óf
the same order as the distinction between two periods of time in the
development of the human species: pre-historical and historical...And
this is for at least two reasons: one is that the human species does
not enter into "history" only "in part". The very notion of "human
species" implies that if any part of it exists "in history" the whole
of it does. Second, the notion of the entrance "into history" of any
part of the human species could not properly be conceived as a purely
intramural operation, a transformation that certain cultures or
societies undergo that is merely internal to themselves...This is that
panorama of the domination of the so-called "higher" civilizations over
their "neolithic" subject cultures and the "expansion" of Western
civilization over the globe that is the subject of the standard
narrative of the world-history written from the point of view of
"historical" cultures (White 1984, pp.31-32).
(c) For Anglo-American analytical philosophers and continental
semiologists alike, narrative can be termed a discursive code.
Disagreement centres on the extent to which this serves a purely
communicative function, meeting correspondence as well as coherence
criteria of truth-value, as argued by the former. "On this view, the
narrative form of the discourse is only a medium (author's emphasis)
for the message, having no more truth value or informational content
than any other formal structure, such as a logical syllogism, a
metaphorical figure, or a mathematical equation...in the historical
narrative, it is the "content" alone that has "truth-value". All else
is "ornament" (White 1984, pp.15-18). For the semiologist, however,
historical texts partake of artistry (shades of early Croce!): "an
artistic text carries much more "information" than does the scientific
text, because the former disposes (sic) more codes and more levels of
encodation than does the latter...It is this complex multi-layeredness
of discourse and its consequent capacity to bear a wide variety of
interpretation of its meaning that the performance model of discourse
(author's emphasis) seeks to illuminate...a discourse is regarded as an
.apparatus for the production of meaning (author's emphasis)...As thus
envisaged, the "content" of the discourse consists as much of its form
as it does of whatever information might be extracted from a reading of
it...A chronicle, however, is not a narrative, even if it contains the
same set of facts as its informational content. And this is because a
narrative discourse performs (author's emphasis) differently from a
chronicle" (White 1984, pp.19-20).
(d) So far, so good. Where the average archaeologist may begin to
boggle is over White's discussion of historiography as a literature
differentiated by the reality of its content from that of the poesy
with which it shares a formal identity. White denies that it is the
reality of the events which is decisive: "The historical narrative does
not, as narrative, dispel false beliefs about the past, human life, the
nature of the community, and so on; what it does is test the capacity
of a culture's fictions to endow real events with the kinds of meaning
that literature displays to consciousness through its fashioning of
patterns of 'imaginary' events...Therefore, rather than regarding every
historical narrative as "myth" or "Ideological" in nature, it is more
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correct to regard it as allegorical, which is to to say it says one
thing and means another" (White 1984, pp.21-22).
In particular, a narrative must by definition mean more than the
'literal' truth of the sum of its parts (as a chronicle would): by way
of exemplification, White discusses Marx's representation of the 18th
Brumaire of Louis Buonaparte as a 'source': "There is noway in which
we could conclude on logical grounds than any set of "real" events is a
farce...The transition is effected by a process of transliteration, in
which events originally transcribed in the code of chronicle are re-
transcribed in the literary code of the farce" (White 1984, pp.22-24).
The analytical philosophers, in reducing narrative to a 'literalist'
paraphrase, regarding the poetic troping as 'mere' figurative speech
embedded in a straightforward representation of real events, made a
serious 'category mistake': "But in this process of literalization,
what gets left out is precisely those elements of figuration, tropes
and figures of thought, as the rhetoricians call them, without which
the narrativization of real events, the transformation of chronicle
into a story, could ever be effected...À narrative account is always a
figurative account, an allegory...and it is only a modern prejudice
against allegoryy, or, what amounts to the same thing, a scientific
prejudice in favour of literalism, that obscures this fact to many
modern analysts of historical narrative." (White 1984, pp.24-25).
(e) The final straw for the common-sense digger is likely to be White's
acceptance of the hermeneutic 'metaphysics of narrativity' of Ricoeur,
who "has assigned historical narrative to the category of symbolic
discourse, which is to say, a discourse whose principal force derives
neither from its informational content nor from its rhetorical effect,
but rather from its imagistic function" (White 1984, p.28). For
Ricoeur "in the writing of historical text, the aim in view should be
to represent (human) events in such a way that their status as part of
meaningful wholes will be made manifest...to understand historical
actions, then, is to "grasp together", as parts of wholes that are
"meaningful", the intentions motivating action, the actions themselves,
and their consequences as reflected in social and cultural contexts;
this is effected by their "configuration" in a. "plot" " (White 1984,
pp.26-27). Passing over the triads of "degrees of organization of
time" (within-time-ness, historicality and deep temporality) and the
three "representations of time in consciousness", which this writer at
.least confesses to having found obfuscatory and verging on the mystic
(why do temporalities always occur in threes?) one is confronted by
White's distillation of Ricoeur's metaphysics: "narrative is more than
a mode of explanation, more than a code, and much more than a vehicle
for conveying Information. It is not a discursive strategy ot tactic
that the historian may or may not use, according to some pragmatic aim
or purpose. It is a means of symbolizing events without which their
"historicality" cannot be indicated." (White 1984, p.29). In effect,
narrative conveys a "fuller meaning" than scientific explanation,
precisely in translating both the "reality" and the "mystery" of
history (White 1984, pp.29-30), in achieving that "mythistory" which
the 1985 President of the American Historical Association Is not afraid
to exhort his colleagues to attempt (McNeill 1986).
Only a fool-would wish to pretend that the above is more than a
trifingly small sample of the range and richness of scholarly thought
currently concerned with the scientific status and form of the
historical discipline and with the narrative mode of historiography.
There is therefore no point in attempting to find a spurious
consistency or in concocting some lowest common denominator among the
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articles summarised: the point is simply to demonstrate the existence,
the extent and the intensity of the debate, and to urge archaeologists
both to contribute, and to draw inspiration from it. Two conclusions
stand out to my mind:
(1) There is an impression of a convergence at least at the conceptual
level between the historians proper on the one hand and the historians
and sociologists of Science on the other, exemplified by the frequency
of recourse to the metaphor of 'tinkering' and by the extension of
hermeneutics even to observational-experimental Science (Fores 1983;
Knapp 1984; Knorr 1979; Rudwlck 1985; White 1984). In effect, if there
is no agreement as to the identity of the various disciplines, there is
a growing sense of a common semantic field within which differences can
be unambiguously identified;
(ii) precisely because the fin de siècle polemic among French
sociologists, historians, geographers et al has so often been described
as a classic case of wholesale misunderstanding among the participants
(cf Lewthwaite in press a) a full-scale explication of the controversy,
of the sort carried out by Rudwick for the Devonian episode (Rudwick
1985) in the history of geology, would greatly benefit those engaged in
similar, continuing polemics; I realise of course that the parallelism
is far from exact, since the fin de siècle controversy was never
'solved' in the same way.
Knowledge in forms?
The question of the variously 'scientific' or 'historical'
affiliation of archaeological activity can be approached from yet
another perspective: that of the partitioning of 'knowledge' into
distinct discursive domains or 'forms of knowledge' as advocated by
Prof. P.H.Hirst. In his first formulation, Hirst (1974a, p.44) argues
that "by a form of knowledge is meant a distinct way in which our
experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public symbols.
The symbols thus having public meaning, their use is in some way
testable against experience and there is the progressive development of
series of tested symbolic expressions." Hirst outlined four "related
distinguishing features":
(1) "central concepts peculiar in character to the form" which (ii)
"form a network of possible relationships in which experience can be
understood"; (lii) testability against experience "in accordance with
particular criteria that are peculiar to the form"; (iv) "particular
techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their
distinctive expressions "resulting in the amassing of all the
symbolically expressed knowledge that we now have in the arts and the
sciences" (Hirst 1974a, p.44).
Hirst initially suggested seven such "distinct disciplines or forms
of knowledge": mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history,
religion, literature and the fine arts, lastly philosophy; no place for
archaeology! (Hirst 1974a, p.46). The question therefore arises: if
the concept of distinct forms of knowledge be admitted, to which should
archaeology be assigned?
Hirst further postulated the existence of other classifications of
knowledge: "First there are those organisations which are not
themselves disciplines or subdivisions of any discipline. They are
formed by building together round specific objects, or phenomena, or
practical pursuits, knowledge that is characteristically rooted
elsewhere in more than one discipline...these organisations are not
concerned, as the disciplines are, to validate any one logically
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distinct form of expression. They are not concerned with developing a
particular structuring or experience. They are held together simply by
their subject matter, drawing on all forms of knowledge that can
contribute to them. Geography, as the study of man in relation to his
environment, is an example of a theoretical study of this kind..."
(Hirst 1974a, p.46). Is archaeology, perhaps, "held together simply by
its subject matter", drawing on the fundamental forms eclectically? In
a second formulation, Hirst deletes the fourth distinguishing feature,
recognising as the elements demarcating mutually irreducible categories
of knowledge only (i) concepts (ii) logical structure and (iii) truth
criteria (Hirst 1974b, pp.84-85). At the same time, Hirst admits that
"the question that for some time worried me considerably was the
character of history and the social sciences.. .it now seems tome that
both history and the social sciences...are...logically complex in
character. In part they are concerned with truths that are matters of
empirical observation and experiment...and...are therefore of the
strictly physical science variety. That some of these truths are about
the past...is Irrelevant for the purposes of the fundamental
distinctions being made...on the other hand, history and some of the
social sciences are not concerned simply with an understanding of
observable phenomena In terms of physical causation, but with
explanations of human behaviour in terms of intentions, will, hopes,
beliefs, etc. The concepts, logical structure and truth criteria of
propositions of this latter kind are, I would argue, different from,
and not reducible to, those of the former kind. For this reason it now
seems to me correct to speak of one form of knowledge as being
concerned with the truths of the physical world and another as
concerned with truths of a mental or personal kind...In these terms, I
now think it best not to refer to history or the social sciences in any
statement of forms of knowledge as such. These pursuits like so many
other so-called 'subjects' may well be concerned with truths of several
different logical kinds and only detailed examination can show to what
extent any one example of such a subject is or is not logically complex
and in what ways (Hirst 1974b, pp.86-87).
It is impossible to answer any of the questions raised by Hirst
without considering the obvious derivation of his classification from
the idealist philosophy of Oakeshott, exemplified by his Experience and,
its Modes, a philosophy, like Collingwood's, strongly and specifically
committed" to an explanation of the historical mode of experience and
discourse. In a recent review, Boucher (1984) provides not only a
specific guide to Oakeshott1s very individual thinking but an overview
of the British idealist tradition from Bradley onwards:
(i) the idealists privileged consciousness over external 'reality',
regarding 'facts' as constructs of an open mind rather than sensorily
perceived data, the truth value of which would necessarily depend on
internal (coherence, comprehensiveness) rather than external
(correspondence) criteria, but the meaning and intersubjective
understanding of which would be contextual within a given universe of
discourse or form of experience: "A mode, then, is a system of ideas,
or imaginings, and history is one such mode, capable of generating
conclusions appropriate to itself: it is the "arbiter of fact"... Each
mode, however, is limited .and abstract, and the truth which it
generates is conditional upon unquestioned postulates"; learned like a
language, each is nevertheless capable of generating unique utterances
(Boucher 1984, pp.194-202).
(ii) according to Oakeshott, the historian firstly constructs
"historical events" out of the "situational identities" of "artifacts
identified exclusively as survivals from the past" through the
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composition of a "contiguity" of antecedent "contingencies" and,
secondly, the further composition of such events into historical
individuals ("concrete universels") abstracted from experience on the
grounds of their "character": "the historian is compelled to assert
what the evidence obliges hium to believe...A history must be able to
accomodate all the evidence, and stands condemned when contradicted by
an alternative account which seems to incorporate the evidence more
satisfactorily. The conclusions of the historical manner of enquiry
are an invitation to imagine a certain set of arrangements or
compositions of circumstances which have not survived, as inferred from
placing together the available evidence in a particular way, and not in
another" (Boucher 1984, pp.203-214).
(iii) However, this "order of enquiry" only applies to "procedures or
practices, which are recognised as exhibitions of intelligence" as
opposed to processes "such as the formation of rock, or the evolution
of the universe "explicable in terms of general laws, or mechanical
causes and effects" (Boucher 1984, p.203). It is perhaps this crucial
premise which explains Hirst's reformulation of the historical and
social-scientific forms of knowledge in terms of the domains of the
physical and mental, and which allows us to reflect on the extent to
which archaeology may be another 'logically complex' discipline -
again, perhaps more complex, perhaps fuller in potential meaning, than
physical science.
As this essay is intended only to provoke a full discussion of such
neglected issues (in no way to resolve them!) and as I have certainly
not achieved any persoanl gestalt out of the ams of reading involved I
do not wish at this point to embrace an idealist position any more
warmly than my limited and inchoate sampling permits, but I must
confess that on reading and reflecting on Boucher's description of
Oakeshott's argument I felt intuitively that it approximated to what I
had been doing for some time in respect of the development of a so-
called 'Filter Model' of the transition to food production in the
western Mediterranean: from its genesis as an epiphenomenon of a
doctoral thesis on 'Transhumant and Sedentary Pastoralism in Earlier
Corsican Prehistory' in 1984-5 the model has been elaborated in a
series of articles through a process which is closer to the
constructionist ideal of "conferring conditonal intelligibility upon" a
"whole mass of undifferentiated human activity" than any other
(Lewthwaite in press b,c,d,e). Certainly I did not attempt to re-enact
the thoughts of the human actors involved, a la Collingwood!
By way of conclusion to this section and linking argument to the
next, it is perhaps appropriate to suggest that archaeologists in
general reveal more about their actual working practices - the candid
appraisal of how they do in fact go about solving their day-to-day
puzzles whether in the field, the laboratory or the study - in a manner
commensurate with a philosophical analysis. One suspects that it would
turn out that archaeology is a logically complex field of discourse, a
loose grouping in human and institutional terms of logically distinct
activities conveying very little real meaning between one sub-
discipline or research school and another.
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Works in practice
'Know thyself' =- a maxim of the Delphic oracle - has been strangely
little heeded by the archaeologist,, whose sense of inferiority and
failure appears to have driven him to try to know practically
everything else in sight, but most particularly Science. Insofar as I
have learned from observing myself and my colleagues at work I would
draw the following lessons:
(i) archaeology is anthropological! Science-oriented archaeologists
perceive the discipline as consisting of a single vertical dimension,
the observer observing the observed; in practice the discipline is
discursive and dialectical. More often than not the work-practice of
the discipline consists of the constant reordering and reinterpretation
of a quantum of only slowly accreting data in the light of some
perceptual 'gain' - an article, a conversation with a colleague, an
'aha experience' (Gruber 1981); for the remainder of the time, the
observers are observing each other, the observed serving only as a
reservoir of referents to a dialogue between self-conscious
pragmatists;
(ii) archaeologists are a territorial species with only a very weakly
developed linear dominance hierarchy: their behaviour typically
consists of the acquisition of a niche (defined by region, period and
perhaps topic or speciality) and its monopolisation (access to
knowledge) combined with a keen sense of performance-evaluation of the
competition, particularly in terms of the epideictic activity disguised
none too ingenuously as conferences. I am not enough of a dilettante
in palaeontology or zoological theory to pursue the topic in any depth,
but I have alwyas perceived the speciation of New or critical-
theoretical Archaeologists as the equivalent in terms of disciplinary
evolution to the appearance of heterophages among mammals. I am of
course a vegetarian myself;
(ill) insofar as archaeologists perceive failure in puzzle-solving to
be endemic, it is as much a case of structural (institutional) and
behavioural as of ideational deficiencies. The territorial behaviour
alluded to inhibits the coagulation of 'core-sets' around theoretical
'hot-spots' as perceived by Collins (1981) and instanced by Rudwick
(1985): nothing short of a major conflagration threatening the entire
structure seems able to rouse and assemble the sleepers from their
strictly segregated repose. Mostly, hot-spots remain confined to one
chamber, where they are safely doused with the cold water of
incomprehension or blanketed by the apathy of the occupant.
Paradigmatic change is minimal, because paradigms are never fully
explored, because archaeologists do not like practising normal, puzzle-
solving, science; as in the case of political theory (Wolin 1968,
pp.139-43); it's a case of too many would-be-hot-shots, not enough hot-
spots. Personally, I refuse to believe that a major puzzle such as the
Impressed Ware or Beaker phenomena, or the exploration and application
of the Sherrattian Secondary Products Revolution, would long resist the
massed cerebral pressure of the profession - if only it could be
cajoled into concert.
(iv) One highly efficient - because highly coercive - system of
accelerating the full working-out of paradigms, or at the very least of
puzzles within a widely shared paradigm, would be the institution of a
number of 'research schools' as defined by J.B.Morrell. I quote at
length from Geison's (1981, pp.21-24) summary of this concept, as I
have not seen the original: "an 'ideal' research school requires a
'charismatic' director, whose leadership qualities are 'most
effectively exerted in informal pre-bureaucratic contexts', and who
already enjoys a solid (but usually not spectacular) reputation for
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original research. This director must then conceive, and his school
must sustain, an effective research programme in which a distinctive
approach is initially brought to bear on one or a very few sharply
delimited problems within a broader field, often a new or growing one.
Since future success depends partly on the speed with which reliable
early results can be achieved, the director's initial research
programme should be sufficiently accessible to new recruits to allow
them to make an easy transition from learning to independent research.
Particularly effective towards this end is a set of fast, simple and
reliable effective techniques that can be easily applied to previously
unexplored areas of research. As the research programme is
successfully prosecuted, certain areas of research become recognised as
the 'property' of the school, which can then move on to other related
problems.
At a less immediately cognitive level, a successful research school
depends upon a readily available pool of talented potential recruits (a
condition that presumably works to the advantage of university-based
schools), and upon the director's capacity to inspire loyalty, social
cohesion, and esprits de corps among his students. To produce a school
that extends beyond himself, the director must nurture early
independence, self-reliance, and ambition among his students,
especially by encouraging them to publish under their own names at an
early stage in their career - even if and when the director has
contributed importantly to the published research. Towards this end it
is important that the school has easy access to (or, better still,
control over) publication outlets for the work of its younger members.
When their training is completed, students who have already published
will have enhanced their candidacy for positions elsewhere, and if the
director has 'placement power' in his discipline he can do much to
ensure their employment in a propitious academic setting, thereby
further extending the reputation and influence of his school. Finally,
to achieve sustained success, the director must have or must quickly
acquire sufficient power in the local and national institutional
setting to secure adequate financial support and an institutionalized
commitment to his enterprise."
Such a research school does not so far as I know exist in Britain.;
in some respects those Cambridge phenomena known to the initiated as
the Higgery or the Goggles may have approximated to the concept in some
respects, but not in many which are clearly significant. More to the
.point, it is difficult to see how such a school could develop in the
circumstances of the present day and proximate future. On the one
hand, the dearth of research studentships and fellowships and the lack
of well paid career prospects deters the high-quality graduates from
entering the system; on the other hand, an ageing and excessively
dispersed body of lecturers will be less and less capable of either
doing the research themselves or directing others except in an
'artisanal' guise of one master, one apprentice. Dissatisfaction is
liable to become all the more acute, as we have acquired the model of
the American university without the means (cf Berdoulay 1980).
ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONALISATION
In the necessarily short space remaining, the question of the
institut!onalisation of archaeology will be examined further. If it is
accepted, for the reasons given above, that many of the ailments which
already afflict or will come to afflict archaeology are institutional
rather than personal or ideational, then it follows that a comparison
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with the historical processes implicated in the institutionalisation of
other disciplines will be highly instructive. Only an outline sketch
can be provided here, in places mere hypothesis, to be expanded in some
other paper.
There are two levels to the problematic:
(i) that of the progressive adoption throughout Europe and America of
the German or more specifically 'Humboldtian' model of the university
in the course of the nineteenth century as the principal locus of
research activity in the humanities and social sciences. Obviously
this differed from country to country: France is a particularly well
documented case (eg Zeldin 1967);
(ii) that of the sequential institutionalisation od the various
disciplines as they developed, those earliest installed effectively
impeding the emplacement of later specialities inside the university.
Once again, the French case is the best documented: the early and
effective institutionalisation of history favoured geography over
sociology. First, with regard to the overall question, Ben-David and
Zloczower (1962, pp.47-48) argue that "the still prevalent conception
or 'idea' of the University, as well as the definition of the
professor's role, originated in Germany during the 19th century. It
was, furthermore, in the German universities more than anywhere else,
that the main fields of scientific enquiry developed into
'disciplines', possessing specialised methodologies and systematically
determined contents." The three principles of the Humboldtian model
first given concrete form äs the University of Berlin in 1910 were the
unity of knowledge (wissenschaft), education by knowledge and the unity
of teaching and research (Lundgreen 1980). In practice, unity soon
broke down because of the unequal rates of expansion and
differentiation of the fields of teaching and research: as only one
chair (Ordinarius) was allowed per discipline, initially, the swelling
body of academics had to specialise, resulting ina speciation of
disciplines; only later did expansion take place increasingly through
junior staff appointments (extraOrdinarius, privatdozent). Indeed,
Ben-David and Zloczower (1962, p.57) argue that the idea was really a
myth or rather an ideology, idealising a compromise between the
interests of academics and those of the state. Innovation in
nineteenth-century Germany, as in the twentieth-century U.S.A., was
intensified by the institutional structure - personal mobility, an open
jobs market and a high level of competition among a score of
universities.
Secondly, it is agreed that the 'idea' of the German university, the
impression of its superiority, nevertheless exerted a powerful
influence on the reformist elements within the moribund French academic
institutions of the early nineteenth century: "A highly idealized image
of German universities served to symbolize a variety of goods and
aspirations" (Weisz 1983a, pp.61-3); "the idea of universities was
equally significant, because it served as a powerful symbol for the
collective advancement of the academic community" sufficiently elastic
to mobilize all elements of this community to concerted lobbying with
the political establishment, itself to undergo major changes in the
course of the century. In particular, "assuming the identity of
'scientists' was a useful way of distinguishing academics...such
distinctions strengthened claims to elite status" (Weisz 1983a,
p.80)..."This professional autonomy based on scientific expertise was
at once a prerequisite for improving the status of the academic
profession and a public recognition of the technical competence which
its members possessed exclusively (Weisz 1983a, pp.70-71), science
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being defined as "all knowledge that emerged from a critical and
rational examination of concrete reality" (Weisz 1983a, p.76).
In effect, research productivity began to supplement, even supplant,
the mere transmission of a cultural heritage as the criterion of the
academic: "furthermore, any potential conflicts between the two roles
(sc. of teaching and research) were resolved by regarding students
exclusively as future scientists and scholars" (Weisz 1983a, p.81)
although "the dilemma specific to French higher education was the
structural inability to separate training for the research role from
training for the liberal and teaching professions (Weisz 1983a, p.221).
In effect, the higher teaching degree (agrégation) remains as important
in some disciplines in France as the university doctorate (troisième
cycle) because of this very dilemma.
Thirdly, the realisation of the Germanic ideal through the creation
in 1896-7 of fifteen regional universities out of the various faculties
of letters, science, law and medicine in the provinces retained two
typically French attributes of the Napoleonic system (centralised
control and the unity of careers in secondary and tertiary education)
while intensifying the third - the massive concentration of the
academic population into the Parisian faculties such as that of Letters
(Sorbonne), the specialist Grandes Ecoles and the influential academic
hothouse of the Ecole Normale Superieure (Fox and Weisz 1980; Smith
1982; Weisz 1983a). During the second half of the century, employment
in a provincial faculty chair - necessitating a doctorate - was
regarded as less attractive than that in a Paris lycée, because of the
attractions of the cultural facilities in the capital (Karady 1980).
As the century wore on and faculties blossomed into universities, more
and more were drawn into a lifecycle of centripetal and centrifugal
motion: schooling in a provincial lycée was followed by cramming in a
Parisian super-lycee (Henri IV, Louis-le-Grand) in order to enter the
Ecole Normale Superieure if at all possible and gain the licence and
agrégation which permitted appointment to a provincial lycée. The
doctorate would be written up during the tenure of this, leading to a
post in a provincial faculty and (rarely before 40) a final return to
Paris as maître de conferences and in time and with luck a full
professor (Singer 1982). The successful accomplishment of the full
cycle often depended on participation in a social institution peculiar
to France - the cercle or cluster of scholars forming a web of
cllentelage around a powerful universitaire (mandarin) (Clark 1971,
.1973, pp.66-92).
Such was the background against which the strategies were pursued by
the academic historians which resulted in the position of history as
science maitresse long before the much acclaimed hegemony of the
Annales; they have been described by Keylor (1975). In the 1860's,
history was still largely written as literature or philosophy by
amateurs; at the local level sociétés des savants busied themselves
with the 'ornamental learning'and 'bourgeois enthusiasms' of local
history, geography and archaeology (Fox 1980, pp.242-244). "Therefore,
but especially from the Second Empire, the professional academic became
ever more obtrusive in French intellectual life. Not only did he 'take
over' disciplines which had previously been pursued as avocations: he
also refashioned these disciplines in ways that made them more esoteric
and so less accessible to the self-taught" (Fox 1980, p.244). A symbol
of this was the founding of the research-oriented Ecole Pratique des
Hautes Etudes by Victor Duruy in 1868. The key group of historians who
effected the transformation - Gabriel Monod, Ernest Lavisse, Alfred
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Rambaud - linked themselves with the move to reform the universities
and the pressure group Société de l'Enseignement Superieure even before
the disastrous defeat at Sedan and the trauma of the Commune.
Thereafter, they simultaneously held up German 'scientific' history as
a model for emulation (most of the reformists had studied there), as an
erudition verging on pedantry and a cult of the disjunct fact which the
Gallic flair for synthesis and rhetoric would surpass, and as a
dangerous body of chauvinistic propaganda to be combatted. History was
institutionalised first and foremost as the promoter of patriotism and
revanchism.
As the spirit of revanche faded, a new justification for the
priority of history as science maîtresse was found - the need to
establish and then defendthesocial consensus and ideology of the
Third Republic against its enemies to the right and the left. This
culminated in the near-unanimous allegiance of the Sorbonne elite
historians in the Dreyfusard cause early in this century (Keylor 1975,
p. 147). Throughout the period, Monod, Lavisse, Rambaud and the Dean of
the Sorbonne, Alfred Croiset, succeeded in penetrating the key
ministerial councils and the bureaucracy of education, in supervising
and writing textbooks down to primary school level, and in the case of
the super-patriot Lavisse, in churning out masses of patriotic
propaganda of all genres. Above all, they valued the scientific status
of history. In this respect it is interesting that Keylor observes how
"Having had little or no exposure to scientific studies, a defect in
their intellectual formation which they bitterly regretted in later
life, they tended to romanticize and idealise the scientific method
without ever having acquired a precise notion of what it comprised.
Their resentment at the inadequacy of their own educational experience
led many of them to adopt a simplistic conception of the scientific
method which embodied many of the very virtues that they themselves had
sorely missed.." (Keylor 1975, p.7). Their reaction against
philosophy, rhetoric and the classics - the culture generale - had a
practical as well as an emotional edge, for one of the major hindrances
to the definitive monopolisation of historiography was the existence of
an independent non-academic intelligentsia which flourished in the
quality press and the Institut and which popularised an alternative
methodology and ideology. The academic historians such as Sagnac,
Caron and Aulard not only excluded such authors from the major
.periodicals and societies but in the case of Aulard went so far as to
"decree that any candidate for the doctorate at the Sorbonne who dared
to cite Taine as an authority on a question of historical fact would be
disqualified (Keylor 1975, pp.173-178). Finally, Alfred Croiset joined
Durkheim in his crusade to eliminate the classical humanist learning
from secondary education to favour of a utilitarian (today they would
say 'socially relevant1...) historical-sociological emphasis on
historical relativity and gradual progress (Keylor 1975, pp.190-194).
Democratic republicanism needed no false propaganda, according to
Croiset, since it was concomitant with any scientific faith (Keylor
1975, pp.195-196). Finally, Claries Seignobos argued that "the
scientific study of human institutions, therefore, implied not the
unprejudiced search for truth, but rather the creation of a blueprint
for inculcating students with.a preordained set of verities revealed by
the enlightened educational elite of the nation, whose mission it is to
rescue the citizenry from the darkness to which it had been consigned
by its human frailties...the democratic masses had already learned to
accept the existence of a scientific tradition because of the material
benefits that they received from scientific research" (Keylor 1975,
p.200). Thus the strategy of institut!onalism had its quid pro quo in
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the ideological services which the historical establishment were
willing to preform for the republican ideal.
Towards the end of the last century, a policy of curriculum
broadening was introduced through the initiative of the long-term head
of the education department of the Ministry of Public Instruction,
Louis Liard: "Descriptive geography, experimental psychology, and
educational science...were among the first disciplines that took
advantage of such administrative promotion. Sociology merely followed
suit... Some disciplines satisfied such strong needs, both social and
frequently academic, that their teaching was quickly generalised to
every faculty of letters (fifteen in all). Human geography, as
developed under Vidal de La Blache, is a case in point (Karady 1985,
p.75). The academic legitimation of geography is a topic to which I
have already drawn attention elsewhere (Lewthwaite in press a); it is
perhaps only necessary to emphasize how the institutionalisation of the
discipline was achieved as much through Vidal's opportunity as a
historian of great eminence and as a tutor with much influence among
the students at the Rue d'Ulm to achieve a sort of intra-mural coup,
whereas the sociologists of the Durkheim cercle had to fight their way
in against the resistance of the historical mandarinate; moreover their
success was transient, unlike that of geography. In effect, I would
argue that the very ease of institutionalisation of Vidalian geography
proved to be its undoing: major theoretical problems were to remain
inadequately or ambiguously resolved, buried beneath Vidal's
classically polished prose (cf. Robic 1976) only to leave French
geography cruelly exposed to the Anglo-American-Scandanavian paradigm
of the New Geography in the post-World War Two era; at present it is
ranked lowest among the humanities and social sciences in academic
prestige (Bourdieu 1984, p.223).
\
This is an opportune occasion to review the contrasting case of the
sociologists in a little more detail, taking advantage of the
researches of Clark (1973) and of the essays edited by Besnard (1983b),
particularly those of Weisz (1983b) and Karady (1983). Clark (1973,
p.242) concludes his study by making the following basic points: "For
most new fields to develop, three fundamental elements are essential:
good ideas to build on, talented individuals, and adequate
institutional support. A solid core of ideas, some sort of paradigm,
must be sufficiently original by institutionalized criteria to command
respect from persons in adjoining fields....A sizable critical mass to
.evaluate research, advance careers, and award grants is essential if
universalistic values are to become operating institutional norms."
Weisz (1983b) who explicitly rejects Clark's concept of 'clusters' or
cerclés - and Karady (1983), who does not - examining the
institutionalisation of sociology in greater depth, bring out four key
variables:
(1) Firstly, the socio-political context and the perceived
ideological affinities of the would-be discipline: "The ideological
déstabilisation of the ruling classes became such that their members
increasingly tend to act, in all major issues, as agents of competitive
establishments....In this situation the search for a discourse on
society invested with the authority of objective science gained a
strategic importance for the French power elites, regardless of
allegiance" (Karady 1983, p.73); "Representatives of many disciplines
in search of financial resources or more elevated status invoked
criteria of ideological efficacy...social scientists...unquestionably
staked their institutional destiny most directly on the ideological
75
needs of the republic" (Weisz 1983b, p.91);..."the rise of academic
social science in France was closely related to the ideological needs
of the moderate republic; the new diciplines were perceived as a weapon
of combat against socialism" (Weisz 1983b, p.115). The Durkheimians
were careful not to overplay their personal sympathies with the
Radicals: "Thus the Durkheimians' exploitation of their acquired social
legitimacy hardly meant that the cluster's work would rest on political
commentary...This caution proved to be...a vital asset which
contributed to their success in the other than social-ideological
market" (Karady 1983, p.74).
(ii) Secondly, the academic capital already accumulated by the
Durkheim cercle; "The academic legitimacy of the Durkheimians was based
almost exclusively on the prestigious academic backgrounds of its
sponsors and members. Most of them held the agrégation and a.
substantial number were educated in the Ecole Normale Superieure's
liberal-arts section, the most prestigious training the French
university system could provide...these assets virtually guaranteed job
security within the state secondary- or higher education systems and,
consequently, created rather high career prospects...the same high
academic placement also determined the limits of their disciplinary
orientations. Agrèges and normaliens, they were mostly trained as
philosophers or, less often, historials, hence the Durkheimians' bias
for philosophy and history. These academic assets operated as general
factors objectively determining the essential options open to the group
in its search for recognition as legitimate representatives of a new
academic profession. To obtain their collective goals the Durkheimians
did their utmost to capitalize on their initial investments in Academe
and to maximize the value of the institutional capital at their
disposal.. .The 'conversion' from a classical to a sociological
disciplinary pursuit and a move to make it recognised as a new academic
speciality were the crucial elements of these strategies. Their
success depended largely on the exceptional intellectual performance of
assigned scholarly tasks, no less than on direct pressure on
ministerial decision-makers and, above all, on the confirmation of the
discipline's identity, autonomy and utility as they were defined by
Durkheim" (Karady 1983: 75-77).
(ill) The strengths and weaknesses of established disciplines like,
philosophy, out of which sociology emerged, and history or law, with
.which it clashed. With regard to the first, Karady (1983: 78-79)
observes that "The ever-worsening critical state of academic philosophy
in France at the end of the nineteenth century left it unarmed in the
combat with the new sociologists"...Nevertheless "Durkheimian social
theory unwittingly came to take an important place in the field of
academic philosophy" for the following reasons: "First sociology, by
its internal cohesion, its scope and its ambition, was the most
powerful discourse in an intellectual field...Secondly, philosophy was
by far the most prestigious disciplinary association accessible to the
new sociology because it was at the top of the traditional disciplinary
hierarchy...Thirdly, the quasi-exclusiveness of the Durkheimians'
association with philosophy in the faculties reflected to a large
extent their failure to be received as equal partners by the dominant
disciplines...Enjoying a well established disciplinary autonomy...these
disciplines were reluctant to share their monopoly over professional
teaching in the faculties...due, in part, to the fact that the academic
market at the turn of the century...was far more favourable to
historians and geographers than to philosophers. The latter could hope
to improve their professional expectations by disciplinary conversion
to sociology, while the others could not. These circumstances, among
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others, determined the disciplinary pattern of recruitment in the
Durkheimian cluster, and explain its limited attraction for others than
those trained in philosophy".
With regard to the second sort of relationship, Weisz (1983b: 93-98)
notes that "the development of the social sciences in the faculties of
letters brought these into conflict with the schools of law. Sociology
was viewed with an especially jaundiced eye and Durkheim's appointment
to a course of social science in 1887 provoked intense
protests...Academic jurists recognized that the development of
sociology in other institutions threatened their monopoly over the
social sciences; but they were not especially eager to introduce the
discipline to the schools of law. Essentially, they wished that it
would go away." Weisz outlines at greater length than can be
summarized here the tortuous negotiations with the historians over the
chair of the history of social economy at the Sorbonne, featuring such
notable personalities as Ernest Lavisse, 'Dick May' (se. Mlle Jeanne
Weil), Count Aldebert de Chambrun, Emile Durkheim, Alfred Espinas,
Celestin Bougie, Henri Hauser and Alphonse Aulard in a characteristic
saga of chicanery (Weisz 1983b: 98-115). Simiand's onslaught against
the historians has of course been noted above (cf. Besnard 1983a).
(iv) The intellectual performance of the early sociologists as
polemicists for their own discipline at the expense of others'. Karady
(1983: 79-87) argues that the 'legitimation strategy' of the
Durkheimians broke with established tradition to a significant degree,
while maintaining certain tactical conventions: "reliance upon the
existing or supposed legitimacy of the discipline abroad (most notably
in Germany) and the strict observance of academic practices." The
tactical innovations were: firstly, the elaboration of a distinctive
'imperialist' paradigm which "tended to picture the various disciplines
as mere purveyors of facts, while reserving for itself the noble tasks
of interpretation and explanation"; secondly, the construction of a
collective organ of criticism, the Année Sociologique, which "fixed, in
practical terms, the thematic outline of the discipline", serving
simultaneously as a master-key to gain "entry to every major
contemporary debate related to the social sciences" in a multitude of
other disciplines, as a shield and sword against rivals ("ignoring the
self-proclaimed sociological works of their contemporaries.. .they
tended actively to disregard the latter as a means of disassociating
themselves from the competing groups") and as a rope thrown to
established schools abroad ("the Durkheimians elevated their own status
.by association with highbrow international companionship"); finally,
"they violated several fundamental rules that implicitly governed
intellectual production in the nineteenth-century university. They
ignored the traditional separation of the humanities and law, failed to
respect disciplinary specialization, refused to give preference to the
culturally established subjects, attacked the ethnocentrism inherent in
the choice of scholarly activities and in value-judgements, scorned the
exclusiveness of individual (as against collective) work, and gave
little credence to the thematic unity of teaching and research...these
transgressions proved to be strategic in the Durkheimians' long-term
struggle for the legitimation of sociology in Academe...their success
depended upon the extent to which the university system was able to
change and except hitherto unacceptable elements."
Nevertheless, theirs was a Pyrrhic victory: "Durkheim was in every
respect an influential grand universitaire. But in the narrow
institutional sphere of sociology, he reigned supreme precisely because
his domain was so tiny" (Weisz 1983b: 114). Karady (1983: 77-79)
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concludes that "since it did not lead to one of the useful teaching
degrees (licence, agrégation) sociology emerged first as an auxiliary
discipline at best,, a superfluous academic luxury at worst.. .thus,
apparently, sociology achieved its complete academic recognition, but
on conditions that effectively deprived the discipline of its
independence and made it, Institutionally a minor ancilla philosophlae.
Ironically, the Durkheimians' success in this respect turned into a
semi-failure. Its institutional dependence was counter-
productive. . .Though significant for the personal career of group
members, the Durkheimians' collective academic success was in fact less
than conspicuous.. .sociology's entrenchment in philosophy turned, by
its own operative logic, into a self-perpetuating process. Because the
Durkheimians recruited scholars from among young agrèges de
philosophie, they failed to achieve the group's original ideal, which
was to become the meeting point of all the social scientific
disciplines. Without adequate institutional prospects, the
Durkheimians1 synthetic ambition was soon reduced, for all intents and
purposes, to a career pattern that excluded students of the social
sciences proper (historians, geographers)...Even while Durkheim lived,
there was an apparent contradiction between the aggregation of
disciplinary subject-matters, upon which rested the intellectual
legitimacy of the new science, and its rather narrow academic base."
In short, the Durkheimian cercle embraced that balance of ephemeral
glory and dynastic disappointment which has been the lot of the palace
eunuch throughout history.
A Hypothesis: the Unduly Easy Confinement of Archaeology
To the reader who has followed the argument so far, I offer a
hypothesis which I hope others, better qualified and with more time and
resources, may wish to test: that archaeology in Britain entered
Academe without running the gauntlet of criticism from other
disciplines which might have proved beneficial in the long run. It has
often been observed that those ex-colonies which had to fight for their
independence have fared better since than those to whom freedom was
painlessly granted through an administrative concession; in my opinion,
the lack of theoretical awareness endemic in the discipline, which so
nettled David Clarke, has been due in no small way to its
uncontroversial institutionalisation, which was in turn a function of
its Ideological acceptability to the Establishment and relative
popularity among the former elite. In a superficial way, one can
detect two modes of institutional acceptance:
(i) 'Historical accidents' such as the endowment of Cambridge
University with the Disney chair and, in particular, the peculiarly
specific conditions which John, Lord Abercromby, attached to the chair
of Prehistoric Archaeology with which he endowed Edinburgh (Green 1981:
46, 56-57; Trigger 1980: 60-61). Only two years after the publication
of the first edition of The Dawn of European Civilization, V. Gordon
Childe was elevated from his librarianship at the Royal Anthropological
Institute into this office, whereby he was enabled to pursue research
of sufficient depth and breadth as to provide prehistoric archaeology
with a paradigm which survived his own decease;
(ii) 'Wheelering and dealing', i.e. the adroit acquisition of
resources from the great and good, in the manner typified by R.E.
Mortimer Wheeler (the archaeologist as Nietzschean superman, or the
genesis of archaeology and the decline of morals?) of whom John
Bintllff has observed, in a review of Jacquetta Hawkes' biography
(Bintliff 1982) that "... his great flair for manipulating the
national media on behalf of the hitherto poorly-funded
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discipline...created a respectable 'profess!on1 out of a gentlemanly
diversion, squeezing out the dilettanti in favour or Wheeler's own
creation - the university-trained, career archaeologist...Wheeler was
in effect able to persuade the country...to offer archaeology a worthy
place in the university curricula, In the share-out of government
funds...As a result we can thank him for the London Institute of
Archaeology and the rapid spread of the subject into other universities
over the world, for the shift from minor to major state funding in
Britain for the profession, and for the diet of 'popular
archaeology'...through his secretaryship of the British Academy, he
stirred to effective life that vital network of British Schools of
Archaeology" - in short, he established the material structure within
which ideatlonal paradigms such as Childe's could thrive and a critical
mass of practitioners capable of eventual self-renewal accumulate.
The researches of Fox, Rudwick, Besnard, Karady and Weisz provide
models for the fine-grained explicitly interrogative historiography of
archaeology which has yet to be written, but which is essential for the
self-appraisal overdue in a discipline which has perhaps got more
reason than most to adhere to the Delphic imperative alluded to
earlier.
PEDAGOGIC PROSPECTION
Nursing the Doctors
In effect, there is very little point in introspection as to the
historical or scientific affinities of the discipline if the real
question is one of simple survival. Archaeological activity may go on
in the HBMC/ English Heritage and its counterparts in Wales, Scotland
and Ulster, in the museums, county offices and units - but does not of
itself ensure an institutional future in Academe for archaeologists.
Given that university appointments are regarded primarily in terms of
teaching students, with a specific ratio or quotient thereof, while
pure research posts are doled out in miserly numbers and in competition
with more prestigious disciplines with the humanities and social
sciences, the maintenance of a critical mass of practitioners capable
of carrying out minimal professional obligations depends on the volume
of students drawn to undergraduate courses, and to a lesser extent on
their quality. Would-be students can hardly be unaware of the
impossibility of their pursuing a professional career in academic
archaeology, even if they make the further investment in a research
degree: supply has risen, demand declined to zero. Before passing on
to consider how undergraduate numbers might be held steady or even
increased under such circumstances, it is advisable to contemplate the
present and future status of the Ph.D. and its pursuer.
The days of the open-ended sink-or-swim peripatetic Ph.D. are
clearly over; not a bad thing, many would say (I write as a coelocanth
miraculously preserved in the viscously fluid lower depths of Caius
from the Higgsian era). Research studentships will evermore resemble
assistantships, in that the supervisory and/ or grant-giving body will
specify not only the duration but the content as is already the case
with SERC studentships: the tragedy of the old system was that the
freedom and originality of the student (perceived as a future
practitioner) were prized above the utility of the research performed;
as a 'tinkerer' hired to carry out some specific task within a
collective and cumulative research project the postgrad, might have
performed some permanently useful service. Instead, the archaeology of
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the 'boom years' when the Cambridge department had at any one time some
75 research students on its books has left behind as its enduring
memorial a Holywood-Western Main Street facade of a film-set, a
Brazilian Gold Rush opera-house encroached upon by lianas and leeches:
a monuments to unfulfilled paradigms and puzzles that passed in the
night. Such eager little beavers as will be set to the Ph.D.s of the
future will obviously be unable to lecture over a broad enough field to
be employable unless they receive futher grooming through compulsory
courses in a 'Graduate School' with or without low-level experience as
teaching assistants. Two questions arise: firstly, do we regard the
Research Fellowship as the logical means of allowing the Ph.D. of the
future to catch up with the Ph.D. of the past, to learn how to do
original research? Or, alternatively, do we reserve Research
Fellowships/Readerships for established lecturers on a sabbatical or on
a competitive basis, to enable them to perform teaching and research
duties in turn? Secondly, will such research be carried out in
individual departments under individual supervisors - on a sort of-
patron-client basis - or under the aegis of a national-level research
institute charged with their care and cultivation as a cadre, within
coherent research policy? Much will depend on rationalisation plans
currently being negotiated.
To return to the question of undergraduates, it is obvious that the
only way to maintain, let alone raise, the volume of students is to
offer courses which reduce the vocational aspects to a minimum (i.e.
the study of excavational, post-excavational and contextual
techniques). Such 'Professional' training should logically be carried
out by a professional body, competent to award diplomas for achieving
recognised standards after experience accumulated in on-the-job
practice under certified 'master-craftsmen' at recognised training
centres, whether before, during or after the completion of a degree.
Archaeological science and related courses which require the use of
laboratories and access to collections are a different matter; it is
perhaps more a matter of preventing their proliferation and the
resultant dumping of a mass of semi-trained laboratory proletariat onto
a market which is likely to provide about as much secure and adequately
paid employment as the latifundia of Andalusia or central Sicily to
their casual labourers.
Archaeology within the universities must therefore validate itself
as an academic subject in terms of the idea of a liberal education
(Hirst 1974a), competing with better established and more prestigious
disciplines for a share of the humanities and social sciences market.
This in turn requires that archaeologists decide what it is that they
are teaching - what 'facts', what 'judgement', what is to be the level
of competence of the student, in terms of a form or at least a field of
knowledge (Hirst 1974a, b, c).
As Hirst (1976c: 117-120) points out, "In all subjects surely, we do
not just want the learning of a string of propositions.. .What we want
is that pupils shall begin, however embryonically, to think
historically, scientifically or mathematically; to think in the way
distinctive of the particular subject involved and even to achieve some
style and imagination in doing so...This is in fact to say that the
effective teaching of a subject necessarily depends on knowing certain
features which characterize it, which can be disclosed only by logical
analysis of the meaning of 'historical thinking'". It seems tome that
Hirst's admonitions raise two questions:
(i) The necessity of defining archaeology as a field or form of
80
knowledge. I have explained above what this entails; it is here a
question of the logical consequences of such a definition in terms of
the organization of teaching within universities;
(ii) The necessity of examining course structures and introductory
textbook's in the light of Hirst's (1974c: 129-130) reflections on John
Dewey's concept of a 'logical order'.
With regard to the first question, the rationalisation of
archaeology departments currently contemplated only makes sense if it
is assumed that archaeology really is an independent form of knowledge,
rather than a 'field' like geography or perhaps merely a sector within
a historico-social scientific whole. Current thinking makes sense only
if it is indeed a form , if indeed specialist teaching and research
will advance only when a critical mass of practitioners is assembled on
a given campus, in order that they offer not only a broad core
curriculum but a range of course options sufficiently diverse to
attract the potential consumers. On the research front, one might
suppose that such a critical mass could be coerced, cajoled or
convinced the more readily to undertake useful integrated projects of
genuine value; but there is that old saw about horses and water.
Colleagues who have no time for each other apart are unlikely to submit
to the ego-bypass surgery or altruism-grafting necessary to effect the
postulated harmonious interaction. There was, I recall, a spate of
attempted couplings of Giant Pandas not so long ago along similar
lines. Whatever became of them?
If, however, the professional consensus were to admit that
archaeology is more of a field than a form of knowledge then there
would be much more to be said for staying put and indulging in some
long-overdue bricolage with such departments of history, geography, and
the social sciences, the earth sciences or whatever is available in
order to build up courses which feature 'archaeology' as a body of data
and a rather slimmer skeletal theory relevant to a wide range of multi-
or inter- disciplinary issues such as the emergence of social
complexity, life in small-scale societies, man's use and misuse of the
earth, etc. It is perhaps symptomatic of the inferiority complex which
grips archaeologists that they assume that they would inevitably lose
out in such an arrangement.
Respecting the second, I confess to only belatedly discovering the
sheer inadequacy of the literature available, on appointment to teach
.an Introductory course in later prehistory (sc. the transition to food
production and the emergence of the first civilisations in the western
Old World). If one conceives of the problem as one of Saussurian
langue and parole - of importing the learning necessary for the novice
eventually to be capable of uttering a statement which is grammatically
correct, meaningful, yet a unique creation, then the procedure followed
in, say, setting an essay topic resembles rather a demand that a
certain piece of particularly tortuous figurative prose be translated
by someone with no knowledge of the tongue, provided only with a range
of grammars and dictionaries all of which disagreed over fundamentals.
There are of course some singularly primitive primers, mostly written
as pot-boilers by pensioners, handbooks on digging techniques,
collections of readings from the pens of the illustrious, and the
excellent if eccentric work-book of Daniels and David (1982), but there
is nothing which looks as if a concern with pedagogic practicality let
alone the philosophy of education, had entered its author's head. How
many high-quality students are thus needlessly alienated? Bearing in
mind Hirst's suggestion that there may not be in fact a precise logical
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order in which the network of concepts must be taught, that learning
may proceed by a sort of 'mapping' of unfamiliar terrain - elsewhere he
uses the analogy of finding one's way through a strange town -
presumably towards the achievement of a personal 'gestalt' experience
of the logical grammar of a subject, the workbook approach offers the
most promising channel. It seems to me that we could turn once more to
the history of the discipline to identify historically significant
'hotspots' or paradigmatic puzzles, whether at the level of the
interpretation of the features on a site or the genesis of a
civilization, in order to scale them down, simplify them, perhaps
incorporate an element of the 'playfulness' characteristic of mammalian
learning patterns, in order to allow the student to assimilate through
a series of such 'gestalt* experiments ranging from the conceptually
simple to the complex.
CONCLUSIONS
(i) If my interpretation of the working practice of scientists and
historians is at all valid, then archaeologists must pay more attention
to constructs and concepts and less to the concrete. In other words,
they must stop blaming the inadequacy of the data for all their woes
and concentrate on 'tinkering' with a few well chosen models in order
to achieve solid if unspectacular success through a series of
infinitesimally small adjustments to some sort of given 'asset'. The
rule is to bring such an initial model into the best possible agreement
with observations of reality without sacrificing logical coherence at
any point. The trouble with what passes for theoretical debates at
present is that concepts and models have a shorter half-life than some
fundamental particles; the established rite de passage of the research
student attending his first conference is to prove his virility by
demonstrating at least as much skill in vituperation against all
previous solutions as in upholding the paternity of his own. The
difference between physics and political science is very much that of
the hedgehog and the fox, respectively - the physicists concentrate on
the One Big Truth while the political scientists rush around being
clever Renard and end up foxing themselves - to mix Berlin with La
Fontaine! No-one supposes that scientists do this because they are
cleverer, or because they want to- the institutionalisation of their
discipline has simply operated so as to select for an optimum between
creativity and 'normal science', achieved very largely through
hierarchic discipline and the control of assets.
(ii) such activity must be carried out collectively through a
restructuration of research, conference and publication norms.
Conferences should resemble workshops in scientific disciplines; they
should take place in well stocked libraries issuing a draft resolution
on a given puzzle at the end of a given period. Publication reviews
are another Achilles' heel of the discipline, as is the peer refereeal
of manuscripts in a small profession where all are either friends or
enemies. Nothing will stop the individual scholar from having the
right to go off and write his own big book, but something must be done
to cope with the increasingly chaotic channelling of ephemeral
knowledge and the creation of a consensus on given topics, if only for
pedagogic purposes and in order to impress competitive disciplines,
(lii) Archaeol'ogy possesses a body of characteristically archaeological
puzzling every bit as important as its material assets. Archaeologists
should spend less time demonstrating the manipulation of materials,
more that of ideas, if the high-quality students are to be drawn to the
subject and high-quality graduates attractive to business turned out.
Academics should be freed from the chores of training excavations,
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field trips, museum visits and teaching 'practicals' unless they
specificallly choose to undertake such activity as extra-curricular
professional commitments under separate auspices. The rest can thereby
concentrate on teaching and on major collective research projects,
(iv) Teaching cannot be regarded as a tiresome nuisance to be sped
through if it is to be the key to disciplinary survival and perhaps
expansion (imperialism). The abundant literature on the Machiavellian
intrigues of fin de siècle French disciplines should go a long way
towards providing stolid Anglo-Saxon minds with the necessary
strategies and rhetorical tropes. In principle, there is no logical
reason why strong archaeological departments should not swallow weak
groupings of historians, geographers, etc.; it is time for a release
from institutional confinement.
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EXPLANATION AT THE METHOD AND THEORY INTERFACE
C.F.Gaffney
During the last ten years archaeology has drifted into two factions;
the split is said to be between the most esoteric of theoreticians and
the grind of the full-time excavator. In retrospect, it is not only-
felt that the full- time excavator had so much pressure due to the
growing concept, and reality, of rescue archaeology so that he or she
could not contribute to the wider issues, but also that the
theoreticians were producing theories and hypotheses that were
impossible to test. Of course, this divide arose during a boom period,
not only in funds but also in theory for archaeology. It was an
academically 'free' period where, in many cases, it did not matter what
the practitioners of our discipline did as long as we were seen to be
doing something. As funds for both unit and university projects have
been cut back, it has been realised how unacceptable the resulting pot-
pourri is to the paymasters and the profession as a whole. Hodder
(1984) described this divide as an unnatural one. He correctly based .
his reasoning on the fact that archaeological theories are not 'tested'
.on archaeological data, but merely on other theories. Following on
from that statement, Hodder argued that if data is viewed as inherently
dependant on theory, then field work must be valued as an
interpretative experience, rather than as a practical experience.
Therefore we are all theoreticians. This confident theoretical stance
is a positive by-product from the 'New Archaeology' of the Sixties.
Certainly this school raised the conciousness of a whole generation of
archaeologists, but the 'New Archaeology' also "...raised an image of
Man the passive and efficient animal controlled by laws which cannot be
usurped...The human past legitimated and made universal the principles
of the technocratic West." (Hodder 1984, p.30). Not unnaturally there
has been a healthy reaction against the law and order brigade in
archaeology.
Pryor's observation that Middle Range Theory was "a sorry attempt to
cloak honest interpretive fieldwork in a cap and gown of respectibilty"
(Pryor 1983, p.99) was deserved. The implication that the area where
the vast majority of university educated graduates employed in
professional archaeology are working as "low" was somewhat negative, if
not self-defeating. For perhaps the first time in its brief history
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our discipline has a professional body working day-in, day-out in the
field; we are a profession that can improve methodology on the ground,
not for its own sake, but to approach relevant and topical theoretical
problems. Pryor has suggested that we are limited only if we attempt
to structure our information within models that are exclusively derived
from non-archaeological sources (Pryor 1983). undoubtedly
archaeologists have listened with a sympathetic ear to the view that
most theoretical and anthropological studies, because of their limited
time span, give us models with no context in our studies of greater
time depth. Hcwever, we must be wary of demanding simply explicitly
archaeological theory, because in the real world hardly any of cur data
are interpreted via only archaeological inference. As a subset of the
study of man, we have to go further afield and experience the full
diversity of his adaptation to the environment. In doing so we must
relate to many disciplines if we are to reconcile ivory towers with
empirical barricades.
THE NEW ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Historically, the advent of the New Archaeology brought with it a
myth-like concept called the scientific method (eg Watson et al, 1971).
This method aimed to lower the input of illogical assumptions and
fanciful imagination in archaeological thinking. Such imagination, it
was argued, could only be personal and convey little in terms of
general or covering laws. To be sure when such fancies erode our
ability to explain archaeological phenomena then they must be rejected
if we are to be regarded with more respect than the 'fringe'
archaeology that we readily condemn. Most archaeologists are aware
that philosophers of science disagree on a definition of the scientific
method and that among such scholars there are at least three major
schools of thought that attempt to explain how science works. They
are:-
1. The Hempelian school, which looks at the 'probability' of an
event being true in the light of experience.
2. The Popperian school of falsification which requires criteria of
'improbability' or 'a degree of falsification'.
3. The group of behavioural concepts of explanation proposed by
Kühn and others, who suggest that the rejection of an hypothesis or
theory is a matter of faith rather than logic.
(After Yorston, forth)
However, what most archaeologists would regard as the scientific
method is no more than the classic 17th century scheme suggested by
Bacon (Richards 1983, p.128). In such a method data are, via
observations, recorded, and an hypothesis may be deduced; a prediction
made from such an hypothesis is testable by more observations. Hence
from observations, we may deduce generalised, universal laws. Within
science we are told that there is a degree of falsification emeshed
within the overall concept of 'the scientific method' (Yorston, forth).
In many scientists' eyes the two rationalist schools mentioned above
are inherently linked. An alternative to these 'cook book' methods is
to be found in the literature from the 'behavioural school'. This
school suggests that we have to broaden out the scientific perspective
and treat theories as structures (eg Kühn 1962, Lakatos 1978).
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What, then, is the evidence for suggesting that any of the above
verification routes should be used in archaeology? The most quoted
justification stems, from Kaplan's discussion of the work of Mill, the
19th century positivist, who said "There can be no fundamental logical
differences between the principles according to which we explain
natural changes and the way we explain social changes" (Quoted in Winch
1958, p.71). Kaplan (1964) has interpreted this as meaning that the
same logic of justification and the same syntax may be employed in all
disciplines. This does not imply that either the techniques or the
conceptual content of explanation should be similar. Indeed, those
choices are undoubtedly pragmatic and need justifications of their own.
What was believed in the Sixties, was that if we could embrace the
methodology that had made science work, then archaeology would be more
scientific and, at least at a conceptual level, would have a
methodology that could cope with the quantitative revolution that the
discipline was carried away by.
However, an increasingly attractive alternative to the above three
validation schools suggests that these methods are too simple and do
not explain the essentially anarchistic way in which science works (eg
Feyerabend 1975). By definition, such a school cannot provide
archaeologists with easy rules to follow, but it would increase the
freedom of the individual through the removal of all methodological
constraints. It would allow us to make implicit ideology explicit and
to recognise that archaeological knowledge cannot be divorced from the
archaeological community from which it was derived. Yorston (forth)
states that scientists accept what amounts to no more than the public
image of science, based on inductivism with falsification
embellishments; nor do they make a conscious effort to keep to such a
methodology. The implication for archaeology is that if we want to
have a scientific methodology then perhaps we ought to ignore what
scientists say they do. Science as a whole has concentrated on small,
easily defined problems. A result is that science does not want, or
perhaps does not need, to go beyond simple mechanical determinism and
has not got a methodology that is appropriate for archaeology. It may
be argued that archaeologists have turned away from simple determinism.
However, we must ask ourselves, is this reversal a product of rational
argument against the low-level, 'Mickey Mouse' laws (Flannery 1976)?.
Indeed is this reversal a product of the traditionally conservative
.nature of our discipline. If so did our discipline ever really change?
THE RATIONALITY OF EXPLANATION
Toulmin (1960) has suggested that the need for explanation
originates from a reaction of suprise to some experience which has been
generated by a conflict between our expectations in a given situation
and our actual experience of it. The major problem with such a
definition is that in a practical discipline we are attempting to
elucidate substantive archaeological problems and not simply
attempting, as the philosophers of science have done, to elucidate the
form of experience (Harvey 1969). undoubtedly, experience and
explanation must go hand in hand, but to what extent? We have to
examine the relationships between our experience and the positive
avenues that may be pursued and explained by such experience. It is
only through such reasoning that we can credibly focus upon the
significance of philosophy to solve archaeological problems. At best
we can suggest that explanations are only acceptable if they answer
questions within a paradigm (or set of rules) common to practising
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archaeologists.
At a philosophical level, Braithwaite has suggested that the aim of
scientific explanation "...is to establish general laws covering the
behaviour of empirical events or objects with which the science in
question is concerned, and thereby to enable us to connect together our
knowledge of the separately known events, and to make reliable
predictions of events yet unknown." (Braithwaite 1960, p.l). In
reality, the major problem is that the criteria for judging
satisfaction are highly subjective. Scientists are said to judge
whether or not explanations are reasonable by setting up conventions or
'norms'. Although these levels ensure similar conclusions from similar
results, they are dependant upon the initial setting up of levels. Not
only is there a problem of applicability in a semi-quantitative subject
such as archaeology, but such tests do not necessarily convey any
broader sense of explanation.
The major problem at the method and theory interface is therefore a
conceptual one. The problem concerns the control of the symbiotic
relationship between data and theory. It is probably true, as Harvey
has suggested, that all disciplines experience periods where they have
become too enamoured of questions that have no real interpretation in
terms of everyday experience or that they have simply set up
unrealistic questions with a neat mechanism for providing seemingly
satisfactory, if equally unreal answers (Harvey 1969, p.13).
Archaeology certainly does have to compromise, either due to
difficulties of controlling the phenomena being examined or,
alternatively, on account of the poor theoretical development at the
interface. It is evident that the syntax and goals of 'theoretical'
and 'field' archaeologists must be intrinsically linked if theoretical
modelling is to be efficiently pursued. Some confusion exist over the
definition of models and theory. Terminololgy is often loosely used,
creating the false impression that models and theory are coextensive.
If the two concepts could be equated then we would call all theorising
or model building theory. Models are simply an interpretation of a
theory; or more likely, partial, formalised expressions of a theory.
They should be pieces of machinery that relate observations to
theoretical ideas (Clarke 1978). Due to the fact that any definition
of 'models' depends upon the function of a model, and that such
functions are infinite it would appear that a more useful definition
would be that "Essentially models are hypotheses which simplify complex
.observations whilst offering a largely accurate predictive framework
structuring these observations - usefully separating 'noise' from
information. Which aspects are noise and which count as information
are solely dependant upon the frame of reference of the model."
(Clarke 1978, p.31)
If such models work efficiently, then, models may act as cognitive,
visualising devices, as organisational or classificatory devices, as
explanatory devices, or as constructional devices in the search for or
extension of existing theory (Harvey 1969, p. 141). However, the way in
which we construct and use archaeological models has been criticised in
recent years. Pryor (1983) has criticised the archaeological
inapplicability of most models, whilst Evans (1984) has suggested that
the archaeological models are cognitively inadequate. As
archaeological goals and models become increasingly separated, then so
must the elusive concept of explanation give way to imagination. The
problem may be simplified since not all models are theories, nor are
all theories models, hence a theory may exist in limbo; in fact, only
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In the imagination of theoreticians. The format in which many theories
are stated often makes the theories redundant, as they have no obvious
practical consequences.
The rationale for models in archaeology has been clearly linked with
the quantification or 'scientific' horizon of arts subjects during the
sixties (eg Clarke 1968, Harvey 1969). However, if such models of
analysis as described in the Sixties and the early Seventies are not
realistic then our goal of the explanation of archaeological phenomena
may prove illusive. It is time to reassess the whole foundations of
model building which are inexorably linked with scientific method.
Morgan, in his critique of 'Explanation in Archaeology' (Redman et al
1971), criticised the narrowness of' one analytical method. Indeed,
"Scientists should be pragmatists - whatever leads to knowledge is
worthwhile, and that which interferes with the search for knowledge is
to be abandoned" (Morgan 1973, p.275). Moreover, it must be stressed
that archaeologists also must be flexible if they wish to explain the
complex phenomena with which they deal (Gaffney, forth). The very
foundations of scientific model building are increasingly under attack
and are being eroded. The author does not wish to argue against a
scientific archaeology, or against an archaeology that is challenging
in its use of theoretical concepts. However, it is thought that a
reconsideration of the fundamental 'building blocks' of our discipline
would be of great value. The challenge is to explain archaeological
data in a satisfying manner to public and colleagues alike. Such a
challenge is worthy of a discipline that seeks to understand the whole
of man's past.
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HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY
J.Chapman
INTRODUCTION
The crystallization of the synthetic field of discourse known as
'Sociobiology' in the mid-1970's provided an instant battleground for
politicians, radicals, revolutionaries, biologists, écologiste,
sociologists, anthropologists and historians. The acrimonious
exchanges of the 1970's (Allen et al 1975; Sociobiology Study Group
1976; Wilson 1975) have for the most part been avoided in the 1980's
(but see Leach's (1981) review of Lumsden and Wilson 1981) in favour of
the more patient research required to test and refine the earlier
conceptualizations. Now that aggressive eidetic competition has given
way to a more peaceful colonization strategy, it is clear that
Sociobiology has much to offer her sibling human sciences as a source
of adaptive hypotheses about human social action and organisation. For
the human problem, one must leave 'genes' in the formula because no-one
has produced a human without them yet!
In this article, it is my aim to examine the origins of
Sociobiology, discuss the relationship between general sociobiology and
human sociobiology and analyse the relationship of the individual to
group dynamics and cultural change. In the final section, I shall
discuss the theoretical links between sociobiology and other current
archaeological paradigms.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It was Sir, Julian Huxley, writing in 1923, who was one of the
earliest to discuss with enthusiasm the idea of "the correlation of
biology with sociology" (Huxley 1923). Misled down the blind alley of
social Darwinism, pre-war biologists trod basically divergent paths
from social scientists who focused on other more sociological
paradigms. But in the period of the 1930's - 1950's, concepts such as
'cultural evolutionism' became part of the anthropological mainstream
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(Bintliff 1984; Slaughter 1984), despite the dangers of using the terms
cultural and natural 'selection' and cultural and biological
'evolution' as interchangeable or analogous descriptors (for a fuller
discussion of these dangers, see Dunnell 1980). Despite the early
introduction of ecological concepts and taxonomie procedures into
archaeology, these approaches remained unquantified for much of this
century (cf. Doran and Hodson 1975). This was one of the reasons why
archaeology could not benefit from the great theoretical advance of the
1960's in biology - the so-called 'Modern-Synthesis' (Note 1). The
Modern Synthesis represented an integration of numerical taxonomy,
population genetics and quantitative ecology into neo-Darwinian
evolutionary theory (Wilson 1975). In this breakthrough, the full
theoretical force of natural selection at the individual level was
applied to the hitherto more static fields of taxonomy and ecology in
order to provide a dynamic and quantified baseline for evolutionary
theory. The success of the new synthesis can be judged from the
innovative mathematical modelling of animal behaviour which became the
hallmark of the sociobiology of the 1960's and early 1970's (Hamilton
1964; Trivers 1971; Glutton-Brock 1974).
The theoretical advances of early non-human sociobiological research
can be summarised under two headings: the level at which natural
selection operates, and the explanation of altruism by kin selection.
With respect to the former, there are four levels at which natural
selection can potentially operate:- (1) kin selection (where natural
selection operates at the level of the gene, not only on individuals),
(2) individual selection, (3) inter-demic or group selection (where
selection acts upon the entire breeding population) and (4) species/
families level (where entire species or groups of species are selected
on). The debate over which level was more important has lasted many
decades (Fisher 1930; Huxley 1942). The Wynne-Edwards hypothesis of
group selection was developed to explain the widespread tendency of
animal population sizes to be regulated rather than fluctuate wildly
(Wynne-Edwards 1962; see Wright 1922; Carr-Saunders 1922). But
Williams (1966) was able to demonstrate that those individuals who
chose a selfish reproductive strategy of non-reproductive restraint
would be selected for faster than the time necessary for group
selection to come into effect. Williams' study laid the basis for the
primacy of individual selection over other slower-moving forms of
selection, without solving the problem of co-operative behaviour
between individuals.
One of the major developments in sociobiological theory is the
discovery of the principle of kin selection. Hamilton (1964) proposed
that altruistic behaviour by ego in favour of consanguineous relations
could actually carry greater inclusive fitness for ego's genes than
many forms of selfish behaviour, since the fitness of kin relations
could be substantially improved by such altruism. Since Hamilton's
work the kin selection hypothesis has been tested against a wide
variety of animal behaviour, and has received much support (for
aggression, see Colman 1982; for eidetic behaviour, see Elbl-Eibesfeldt
1975; for social behaviour, see Glutton-Brock 1974; for mating theory,
see Emlen and Oring 1977).
Another important area of development in sociobiology is the
modelling of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS)(Maynard Smith and
Price 1973; Hamilton 1967). Briefly, game theory as developed in
Economics (Von Neumann and Morganstern 1953) has been used in biology
to model evolutionary processes at the phenotypic level, when the
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success of each actor depends on what other actors are doing and when
the Darwinian fitness of particular phenotypes depends on their
frequencies in the population. An ESS is a long-term, stable and
optimal solution to such a game.. In the biological application, the
criteria of rationality and self-interest are replaced by those of
population dynamics, stability and Darwinian fitness. In
sociobiological applications so far, ESS has been modelled for contests
between animals (Maynard-Smith 1982), sexual allocation (Charnov 1982),
inter-specific competition for resources (Lawlor and Maynard-Smith
1976), animal dispersal (Hamilton and May 1977) and plant growth and
reproduction (Mirmirani and Oster 1978). In a paper of particular
interest to social scientists, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) use game
theory to explain the evolution of cooperation. Likewise, it is also
instructive to view reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) as an ESS for
cooperation.
The more sophisticated models in game theory take account of the two
main objections to using ESS in human situations, viz. the absence of
perfect information about the game, and the mechanism for transfer of
information about the ESS. Whilst there are few examples of game
theory which include competitions against relatives or multi-facetted
competitions between many actors through time, there is no a priori
reason why such complex models cannot be developed.
A third important area of sociobiological research concerns theories
of learning and cultural transmission. Since strategies of learning
are at once biological and cultural, recent research has focussed on
co-evolutionary processes of transmission (Lumsden and Wilson 1981;
Sforza and Feldman 1981; for discussion of this and other work on
learning, see Chapman nd a). One of the links between ESS theory and
thoeries of learning is the search for a suitable mechanism of cultural
heredity which would permit the reintroduction of evolutionary game
theory into the social sciences.
The crucial and disputed advance in sociobiology concerns the
application of its kin selection and other hypotheses to human
behaviour. For the last decade, human sociobiology has grappled with
the convoluted inter-relations between nature and culture, developing
ever more complex models of human action. At this juncture, I shall
not attempt more than a summary of these research strategies concerned
with kin selection and social behaviour.
GENERAL SOCIOBIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY
In Wilson's (1975) dictum, the crux of sociobiology is the
relationship between populations (as controlled by gene flow) and
societies (as controlled by information flow) (Fig 1). In the human as
in the animal context, these relationships take a spatial and
chronological form; in the human context, there is an additional
complicating factor of cultural groupings which are not necessarily co-
terminous with either 'populations' or 'societies'. An important
primary problem in studies of human behaviour is the definition of the
degree of overlap between cultures, societies and populations as
defined above.
Application of any theory of general sociobiology to the human
biogram inevitably means adaptation of the general principle to
different historical and cultural circumstances. Before such
adaptations can be discussed, it is important to recognise and meet an
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Figure 1: Two patterns of population-
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anthropological objection to sociobiological theories of kin selection.
The anthropological record is full of examples of the non-coincidence
of biological and social parentage. Both Sahlins (1976) and Leach
(1981) have argued that, since human relations are determined socially
rather than biologically, the theory of kin selection is inapplicable.
This objection has been met by Robin Fox (1979) who maintains that
breeding classifications are the key to social and biological
organization in small-scale societies. Provided that the distinction
between breeding networks and socially perceived relations is borne in
mind (not ignoring the question of paternity - see Kurland 1979), the
kin selection hypothesis remains a valuable addition to anthropological
the ory.
For small-scale, pre-state societies, introduction of the principles
of individual and kin selection into social theory stimulates a
critique of the consensus view of group processes as a determinant of
cultural action (ie the social parallel to Wynne-Edwards' theory of
group selection). Whereas many social anthropologists from Tylor
onwards accept a super-organic view of 'culture' (see more recently the
witty diatribe by Flannery 1982), with its social norms and its
overtones of cultural determinism (Boas 1940), sociobiologists such as
van der Berghe (1978) lay more stress on the importance of each
individual actor and reject the reification of 'social groups' and
'group norms' over and above the individual. If there is no evidence
that social 'laws' are more than the average or aggregate of individual
human behaviours, the reification of the group should be rejected. In
its place, it is important to look for the complex interplay of
individual interests within all social behaviour.
Historians such as Bock (1980) and anthropologists such as Sahlins
(1976) have attacked sociobiology for its emphasis on the individual,
claiming that sociobiologists recognise only populations and not
societies (Bock 1980), and that a super-organic view of culture is
crucial for understanding the core of human belief and action (Sahlins
1976). Yet both objections miss the mark, since they fail to take
inclusive fitness into account. At the most general level of human
organisation, it can be proposed that human social structure is based
on kinship organization because of the principle of inclusive fitness.
This hypothesis opens up approaches to social analysis not yet explored
.by anthropologists and archaeologists.
At a more specific level, it is apparent that the inter-dependence
of individual and inclusive fitnesses among members of a breeding
population is the social 'glue' holding those individuals together.
One may propose that the degree and type of interdependence defines the
characteristics of the 'social structure' of any given group. And
because of the interdependence of individual and inclusive fitnesses,
it follows that cultural action must be a compromise between
individuals and groups. The effects of this compromise may well be
very similar to the results of a 'superorganic' view of cultural
action.
In summary,.the spatial and social framework for kin selection in
small-scale societies can be derived from a biological extension of
Sahlin's (1965) well-known typology of reciprocity (Fig 2). In the
case of failed reciprocity, the other widespread biological behavioural
strategy is coercion (viz. reciprocity for the few at the expense of
many). Aspects of sociobiological theories of aggression are currently
under analysis (see Chapman, n.d. (b)).
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Figure 2 - Correlation of (a) social relationships, (b) patterns of
reciprocity, and (c) factors selecting for altruism in
primitive human cultures. The first two phenomena were
identified by Sahlins (1965); they accord with
sociobiologic predictions based on genetic relatedness as
well as the conditions required for the evolution of a
reciprocal altruism. (After Friedman 1979).
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS, RELATIONS AND GROUPS: SOME
EXAMPLES
The basis of social life is the interplay between social belief,
whether individually or collectively held, and social action, whether
undertaken individually or collectively. Whilst the individual and
group basis of ritual beliefs is discussed elsewhere (Chapman n.d.
(c)), the analysis of social action has been attempted in several
small-scale societies*
Relatively few anthropological studies have been designed to answer
the question 'how do individuals interact?' (Blur t on-J one s 1972; Draper
1975, 1976; cf the micro-sociology of authors such as E.Goffman 1966).
An early example was Weissner's (1977) study of !Kung Bushmen
reciprocity, in which she concluded that meat exchange is a function of
kin relatedness - the more closely related the individuals, the more
frequently they exchanged meat. One problem with the !Kung study is
that the factor of distance is not separated from the factor of kin
relatedness. In a study of the Ain of Yekwana, Hames (1979) discussed
the relationships between economic activity, breeding relationships and
residential propinquity for all 88 members of a single Ain village,
where the division of labour was structured through age-sex groups and
the nuclear family was demographically the main economic unit. Using
the time-budget data from 29,000 observations of economic activity,
Hames discovered a highly significant correlation between degree of
relatedness and intensity of economic interaction. Whilst strong
interaction within a nuclear family was expected, an interesting
finding was that the intensity of interaction continued to decline
consistently as the coefficient of relatedness fell, even below 0.25.
Hames interprets residential propinquity as a proximate mechanism which
accounts for high levels of interaction, identifying relatedness and
reciprocity as the reasons why such interactions are adaptive in a
biological sense.
Building on this theoretical triad of reciprocity, relatedness and
residence, Irons (1979a) used four tribal societies to test the
proposition that interaction amongst individuals' primary allies is
governed by 'investment' choices aimed at maximising inclusive fitness.
Since intense interaction with all close kin is impossible, choices are
made on the basis of four classes of 'investment' effort:- reproductive
effort (including mating effort and parental effort), kin effort
(including some parental effort) and resource-gathering effort
(including the acquisition of wealth, political power and knowledge as
well as food). Basing his results on the Nayar, the Timi, the Yomut
Turkmen and the Yanomamo, Irons concluded that female investment was
less variable than male, with concentration on resource-gathering and
parental effort and what little kin effort was made being largely
reciprocal. By contrast, male behaviour shows wider choice in what is
perceived as optimal, with mating effort often but not always valued
above kin effort but kin effort generally supported more than parental
effort because of the low probability of paternity. Hence, for women,
high reproductive success comes from low fertility and high parental
investment, whilst the reverse (high fertility, low parental
investment) applies to men. In this study, the hypothesis of
maximising inclusive fitness was not disconfirmed. Anthropological
studies such as this are helpful in establishing a data base for
feminist studies in both archaeology and anthropology.
A third case study is instructive for archaeologists studying the
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spread of human communities into new areas. Chagnon has directed a
long-term research programme into the Yanomamo Indians of South
America, a tribe of warlike shifting agriculturalists whose responses
to attacks or village population increase is often village fissioning.
An analysis of coefficients of relatedness (r) measured for parental
villages before fissioning and daughter villages after fissioning
revealed a clear patterning of higher values in the new settlements
(Chagnon 1980). This was interpreted as a tendency for close relatives
to migrate together. Once again, the proximate mechanism of
residential propinquity is not discussed; it is possible that
households moved as single units in the village migration.
There can be little doubt that close kinsfolk co-operate; the
likelihood is that the higher the inbreeding coefficient of a group,
the greater the co-operation and group cohesion. Such a situation can
be envisaged for early hominid groups, whose very survival as bands of
generalists required social cohesion. But at some, as yet undefined,
point in time, a second and new factor became important in human
societies - genetic competition between the co-operators. Given an
excess of land and other resources over labour for much of prehistory
(perhaps until the late Neolithic/Early Bronze Age), the main resource
that was unequally divided in egalitarian societies was kin. Taking
into account the stochastic fluctuations of small-group demographic
processes, even within the broader framework of breeding networks
(Wobst 1974; 1976), there is a strong likelihood of competition over
labour in early prehistory, in patrilineal and/or polygynous societies;
this competition tends to be expressed in terms of male competition for
women.
At this juncture, it is useful to draw a distinction between those
societies within which most individuals pursue satisficer strategies
(where per capita possessions are more or less equal between
households) and societies where most individuals pursue a maximization
strategy of increasing possessions beyond domestic consumption
requirements. Clearly, for the latter, one way to acquire more wealth
is to increase household size. If this strategy is adopted, economic
inequalities can readily emerge from reproductive inequalities. In his
researches with the Yomut Turkmen, Irons (1979b) discovered positive
correlations between (1) household wealth and the number of able-bodied
adults in the household, and (2) household wealth and the number of
adult labourers in the household. Such manifestations of the domestic
mode of production (Chayanov 1923; Sahlins 1974) are potentially
testable in the archaeological record, in terms of changes in house
size or farmstead organization.
Irons' conclusions concerning household units are reinforced by
another Yanomamo study by Chagnon (1979), who defines the problem of
inequality not as unequal access to resources but as unequal use of
resources. Chagnon finds a positive feedback relationship between
greater reproductive success, larger pools of labour and greater
generation of status-linked products. Comparing a range of Yanomamo
individuals in terms of the size of their kinship network, Chagnon
finds that the most prestigious leaders have over 60% of their village
populations related to them. This principle is extended to ancestor
worship, insofar as the degree to which males achieve important
positions in the ancestor cult is a consequence of their political
roles and reproductive success in the marriage system. There are
important differences in the structure of patrilineal and matrilineal
kinship systems vis-a-vis reproductive success, which have obvious
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archaeological significance. In summary, whilst there is less variety
in the size of matrilineages, the political advantages of patriliny are
predicted on the greater potential for expansion, in turn underpinned
by the sexual asymmetry of reproductive success. It is also
interesting to note that, as material items become more important for
status definition, there is a decline in the significance and
variability of reproductive success, matched by a comparable decline in
the frequency of polygyny (Chagnon 1979).
A final case study emphasises an important question that is central
to sociobiological theory - the level at which selection operates in
human populations. Using the Yomut Turkmen as his study population,
Irons (1980) designed a field test of the Wynne-Edwards group selection
hypothesis versus the hypothesis of individual selection versus a
hypothesis of non-adaptive behaviour. For Irons, one form of behaviour
is more adaptive than another if it consistently leads to higher
genetic representation in future generations for individuals exhibiting
that behaviour in that particular environment. Irons proposes the
following predictions of the competing hypotheses:
(1) The Wynne-Edwards hypothesis when per capita resources increase,
the expectation is a lower mean age of marriage and higher birth rates.
This pattern was not found.
(2) The individual selection hypothesis when per capita resources
increase, net reproduction will increase as a. result of competition
over key resources. This pattern was indeed found.
(3) The non-adaptive behaviour hypothesis no relationship between
increases in per capita resources and reproductive levels. This
pattern was not found.
In the Yomut case, the scarce resource was reproductive women, and the
commonest strategy to gain women was the formation of coalitions of
young men converting resources into brideprice for mates.
In the Yomut study, then, Irons (1980) has demonstrated that natural
selection at the individual level explained the relevant data in the
most effective way. Irons argues that in so far as cultural systems of
meaning are consistent with behaviour which increases the inclusive
fitness of individuals, such systems of meaning can be integrated with
hypotheses based on kin selection.
In summary, the evidence presented in the above case studies
demonstrates the relevance of sociobiological principles of kin
selection and inclusive fitness to studies of the social behaviour of
small-scale societies. Given appropriate modifications, the principles
of general sociobiology can be transformed into important principles of
human s'ociobiology. Two questions remain:- what are the limits, if
any, of the relevance of the kin selection hypothesis, and how is this
theoretical framework related to archaeological theory-building?
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE APPLICATION OF SOCIOBIOLOGICAL THEORY
It is a truism of socio-cultural evolution that the larger and more
differentiated the society in question, the more circumscribed the
significance 'of kinship in the overall social structure. In his
discussion of social evolution, Flannery (1972) underlines the
importance of general-purpose as well as special-purpose institutions
in state-level societies for the integration of social action (cf
Johnson 1978). More recently, the' causes of the decline in the
importance of kinship in complex societies have been identified, in a
biological context, by Dunnell (1980) as the fast rate of culture
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change, the importance of functionally-interdependent units over equal
and analogous units and the specialization consequent upon increase in
information load until excessive for any single individual. In a more
general context, Washburn (1978) argues that the more people there are,
the greater their mobility, the greater the variety of selective
pressures and the shorter the time-span, the less useful will be the
principle of inclusive fitness.
For all these reasons, then, it appears likely that kin selection is
of little explanatory value in complex, state-level societies. Yet if
the individuals concerned in state societies are considered in terms of
their roles in politics and production, a different viewpoint emerges.
If one follows the epigenetic model of Friedman and Rowlands (1977) as
an example of the development of stratified societies, the inclusive
fitness of the leaders plays an important role, at each successive
phase of social development. At local lineage and conical clan level,
kinship principles are generally accepted as important and kin
selection clearly applies. As the conical clan develops into an
'Asiatic state', all the noble lineages are said to owe their position
to their kinship relationships to a single royal line. At a lower
hierarchical level, the court nobles are sent out to local centres to
begin new domains, linked to the centre by marriage alliance. Whilst
kinship links between royalty and commoners are severed, this does not
preclude the continuation of kinship ties, linked to kin selection
principles, in different social strata.
Similar kinship principles occur in the prestige goods economy (the
importance of royal lineage for the definition of royal status, the
kinship links between ruling mother at state centre and aristocratic
son in peripheral chiefdom) and even in territorial and city states
with their more commercial economies (the rivalry between different
conical clans, the development of family entrepreneurial activities,
etc). The assumption over dwindling importance of kinship depends on
viewing states in their complex, inter-dependent entirety. If
relationships between different individuals in each stratum of society
are analysed separately, kinship principles and kin selection re-emerge
as important and neglected principles of sociobiological organization.
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY-BUILDING
There is a central contradiction about the political perceptions of
human sociobiology and the potential of its theory for social analysis.
Sociobiology has been pressed as a scientific support for laissez-
faire, traditional attitudes to individuals whose future choices are
strongly constrained by the genetically-determined human biogram. In
point of fact, although sociobiologists such as Lumsden and Wilson
(1981) are vitally concerned with genetically-coded frameworks for
cultural transmission, major research efforts are being devoted to the
biological and cultural frameworks of choice for individual actors.
The radical individualism of this research confronts reified social
formations with the realities of conflict and compromise within human
groups. The stress laid on competition and conflict between co-
operators provides a theoretical alternative to the search for Marxist
principles of contradictions between mode and relations of production
in pre-capitalist societies (Spriggs 1984). In this sense, the
emphasis on individual social action of the recent 'post-processual
archaeology' of Ian H odder is 'close to sociological theory, whilst
lacking any framework for integrating biological and cultural insights
(Hodder 1986).
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SociobiolQgical theory is ripe for integration with the recent
developments in bio-archaeology and palaeo-pathology (Buikstra and Cook
1981; Wing and Brown 1979). Palaeo-pathological studies of group
demography with their emphasis on quantified statements about the
public health of biological populations (eg Cohen and Armelagos 1984)
are beginning to provide data with which sociobiological hypotheses can
be tested. An example is the data collected for a cross-cultural test
of human health, diet, stature and demography at the transition from
foraging to farming (Cohen 1986). The overall trend in the data is
that the early farmers combined better health with a lower rate of
population growth than late foraging groups, a juxtaposition of trends
that stimulate interpretation from a kin selection viewpoint.
A second important development in physical anthropological studies
is the determination of consanguinal relations based on inherited
dental and other abnormalities (for the Natufian of the Levant, Smith
1973; for the Bronze Age of C.Europe, Ullrich 1972). Such innovatory
research provides new insights into the social relationships of
prehistoric skeletal populations.
The potential for sociobiological contributions to the demography of
small-scale societies is therefore linked to developments in the
general field of bio-archaeology. The utility of kin selection theory
in the historic period, in the context of state formation and
consolidation, has been largely ignored until now because of what
appear to be spurious arguments of the complexity of the total society
rendering kinship principles less relevant. As argued above, kinship
principles continue to be important within complex societies but
generally within mutually exclusive social strata. The challenge to
explore inclusive fitness hypotheses with the help of the written
records of literate states has yet to be met.
In conclusion, few archaeological paradigms since the birth of 'New
Archaeology' have attempted to integrate a genetic perspective into
theories of social change. Whilst critics may object that no-one has
yet demonstrated the feasibility of testing sociobiological hypotheses
using archaeological data, the point remains that sociobiological
theory is too important to exclude from middle-range theory building..
This paper presents not a commentary on past inter-disciplinary
interactions but rather a challenge to current and future researchers -
to develop testable sociobiological hypotheses suitable for bio-
archaeological data. The motivation for meeting this challenge is
straightforward: the impossibility of developing mature human sciences
without a biological perspective on cultural development.
NOTES
(1) Other reasons included the lack of attention paid to evolutionary
theory by those interested in post-Pleistocene research, and the
importance of 'functional' explanations in then current archaeology.
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PALAEOPATHOLOGY: COTTAGE INDUSTRY OR INTERACTING DISCIPLINE?
C.A.Roberts
INTRODUCTION
The study of human bones from archaeological sites has traditionally
been undertaken in the past, and indeed today, by interested parties
such as the local doctor, dentist, archaeologist or anthropologist in
their own homes. This has led to, and is still leading to, a
proliferation of bone reports consisting merely of a catologue of
skeletons with no interpretation. This may be because many of these
workers have no archaeological background. This is not the ideal
situation for any specialist to work in and indeed, the bone reports
produced have often not been the ideal way of presenting the data.
Should we not be asking that human bone study be rationalised and only
undertaken in organised departments of archaeology/anthropology where
there can be co-ordination between the archaeologist and all the other
specialist disciplines? The existence of a 'cottage industry' of bone
report producers is perhaps why some archaeologists are heard to say
that,
"palaeopathological studies, in Britain at least are unco-ordinated and
desperately understaffed [therefore] there is little possibility of
constructive exchange of views between archaeologist and
palaeopathologist" (Cramp 1983, p. 19).
HUMAN BONE REPORTS
The human bone report is perhaps the central focus of human bone
studies even today. To pose several questions is perhaps appropriate.
How many bone reports have been what the archaeologist wanted or indeed
expected? Did he/she know what should or could be expected and what
potentials there were for studying human bones with reference to the
rest of the archaeological site? It is likely that many archaeologists
are not aware of the possible information that human skeletal remains
can provide, not because they are unwilling to learn, but because the
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palaeopathologist has not enlightened them. Until specialists,
including palaeopathologists, explain their data in a comprehensive
fashion they will not be taken seriously.
Rosemary Cramp (1983, p.12) has said that she believes
archaeologists are often more concerned with the social (i.e. funerary
archaeology) than the pathological side of burials. Is this because
bone specialists have not tried to develop and explain this aspect of
study in simplified terms for the archaeologist to understand or is it
that the archaeologist is dubious about the contribution that patterns
of pathological process can make to the rest of the site data?
Archaeologists should not wish to see the bone report forever relegated
to the end of the main archaeological report and neither should the
specialist.
Human remains have probably never been a fashionable preoccupation
in archaeology, unlike pottery, flint or metalwork. To emphasise this
point, archaeology is about excavating the past lives of people and not
just their buildings, animals or pottery.
PALAEOPATHOLOGY
Palaeopathology is the scientific study of disease processes in
earlier peoples- It represents an examination of the corporeal changes
resulting from the interaction of man with his environment. Much of
the pathology seen on skeletons is the product of developmental
accident, chance exposure to pathogens or the ravages of the inevitable
ageing process. Improved methods of excavation and analysis have
encouraged research on specific pathological conditions found in human
skeletal remains. Now some pathologists are beginning to understand
more fully how they fit into the archaeological scene. Having said
that, as archaeologists we should be trying to determine the total
picture of past societies and not a fragment of their lives. There are
obvious limitations in all archaeological data but this is not the
subject of the present paper. There should be a more positive approach
to the problem providing that the limitations in the data are
recognised.
In the Institute of Field Archaeologist's code of conduct,
archaeology is defined as the "study of the nature and past behaviour
of man in his environmental setting. [This study] is carried out
through the investigation and interpretation of the material remains of
man's activities". As the archaeological heritage is a finite,
vulnerable and diminishing resource, it is the archaeologist's
responsibility to make the most of the material remains available.
In an ideal world every archaeological site would generate all types
of evidence from structures to insects, but often, certainly in
skeletal study, there may only be a cemetery with no associated
settlement. In these cases inferences from nearby sites of the same
period could help to make our primary data more interprétable.
In order to explain how palae opath ology can contribute much more
than has been believed in the past, use of several examples of specific
pathologies found in skeletons will be made.
(i) PRESERVATION
First, something of the preservation of human remains and their
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excavation should be discussed. In the past there was frequently
incomplete recovery of skeletons, often only the skull and long bones
were retained. There are different states of preservation from various
archaeological sites depending on the soil conditions and excavation
techniques. A necessary condition of palaeopathology is the
completeness of the skeleton.
The completeness of the skeleton is vital to our understanding of
pathological processes. Brothwell (1972, p.86) has said that, "there
are still very few British archaeologists who are prepared to spend
enough time and care to ensure that the skeletal material will provide
unbiased information". Excavation techniques and processing have
fortunately improved since that time.
There are two points concerning the preservation of skeletons which
are of extreme importance in palaeopathology.
a. There is a need to know the sex and age of individuals, not only to
produce mortality rates for populations which of course are directly
related to pathology, but to interpret specific pathological processes.
The completeness of the skeleton determines whether we can age and sex
a skeleton accurately. Diseases are, in many cases, age and sex
related in incidence. For example, rheumatoid arthritis affects
females three times more frequently than males and the average age of
onset is about 35-40 years today. If it was believed that a skeleton
had suffered from rheumatoid arthritis (a difficult diagnosis to make
at the best of times) an accurate age and sex assessment could be a
valuable aid to diagnosis.
b. Only specific areas of the skeleton are affected in some diseases.
For example, specific changes in the face, hands and feet may be
pathognomonic of leprosy (Moller-Christensen 1961 and Figure 1).
In the past the small bones of the hands and feet were missed or
Ignored on excavation but with the advent of sieving on archaeological
sites recovery of these small bones has improved.
Before considering some pathological conditions it should be
emphasised that it is not only the pathological condition which is
important in palaeoclinical interpretation but also medical history
(art and literature), ethnography and modern clinical medicine. They
all have their part to play in the interpretation of palaeopathology
and should not be ignored.
(ii) PALAEOPATHOLOGICAL EXAMPLES
There are four examples of particular pathological conditions which
simply illustrate the value of palaeopathological studies with
reference to the other archaeological site data.
a. A study by Merbs published in 1983 concerning the occupât!onally
induced pathologies of a Canadian eskimo population from Southampton
Island, Canada'must be one of the most pioneering studies of human
bones and their relevance to the population's lifestyle. It showed one
of the directions which pathologists should be working towards. Merbs
of course had an ideal population, well preserved and almost complete.
With historical ethnographic accounts, he could be more or less certain
of their basic behavioural patterns and that their behaviour was
sexually dichotomous (1983, p.4). Admittedly there are not many past
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populations in Britain with such complete recovery and associated
ethnographic accounts.
Herbs stated that he believed some kinds of actions will be
performed over and over again especially if the culture defines them as
'correct'/necessary for survival (1983, p.4). Some actions will be
intermittent or seasonal. Bone pathology is either due to abnormal
stress on an individual over a short period (traumatic) or normal
stress for a long time e.g. osteoarthritis. Merbs was looking at
trauma and osteoarthritis specifically. Interesting patterns emerged
in the natterns of osteoarthritis (a degenerative disease related
specifically to age and occupation).
Osteoarthritis of the foot (Figure 2) was seen more in males. He
could relate this to the fact that men were hunting on foot over rough
terrain and females were not engaged in these activities.
Vertebral compression (due to a force acting through the vertebral
column causing collapse of the vertebral bodies) was found to be
greater in females (Figure 3) and was related to them riding on
toboggans (minus shock absorbers). The shock of riding over rough
terrain would have been transmitted directly to the spine. Women also
carried babies on their backs (Figure 4) which also contributed to
vertebral compression.
Vertebral osteophytosis is a pathological condition related to
degeneration of the intervertébral disc. It is recognised on the
vertebral bodies as bony outgrowths usually on the anterior and lateral
margins. Vertebral osteophytosis occurred in the thoracic region in
females and more in the lumbar vertebrae in males (possibly due in the
past to lifting heavy objects).
The general picture of osteoarthritis (Figure 5) showed that the
shoulder was affected more in males and related to harpoon throwing and
kayak paddling. The temporomandibular joint was more affected in
females due to their occupation of softening frozen or dried skins with
their teeth before making items for everyday use.
Merbs concluded his study by stating that, "the general findings of
this study suggest that the reconstruction of activity patterns
from patterns of pathology has considerable potential" (Merbs 1983,
p.184). In circumstances such as these there is no doubt of the value
of such a study.
b. If the diet of past populations is considered, there are basic
observable features of the bones to indicate the type of deficiencies a
person may have been suffering. Without even considering the chemical
analysis of bone to reach conclusions about whether a person was a
vegetarian or a carnivore (strontium:calcium analysis - Sillen and
Kavanagh 1982) there is a vast potential for the contribution of human
bone studies to past diets.
Cribra orbitalia and por otic hyperostosis are pathological features
easily recognised in the bone of the eye sockets and skull vault. They
are indicators of anaemia (probably iron deficiency, in the temperate
zones) in childhood (Stuart Macadam 1982). Any palaeopathologist who
isolates these conditions should be looking at the archaeological site
as a whole. What diet were these people eating? It is accepted that
iron mainly occurs in meat. Were there any animal bones recovered from
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the site? Was the population vegetarian rather than carnivorous?
Seeds and pollen from a site can also help to reconstruct diet. Does
the diet reconstructed by a seed, pollen or animal bone specialist have
any relation to the pathologies which are being observed?
To diverge further, anaemia is not always due to a dietary
deficiency in iron. There are many causes. It could be due to a
disease of the gastrointestinal tract preventing absorption of iron
from the intestine or chronic blood loss therefrom. In some cases
there may be parasite eggs preserved on the site to give an indication
of the prevalence of human intestinal infection (Jones 1983). In
exceptional circumstances there may be documentary records available to
reconstruct the picture. For example, in Medieval Winchester much of
the manure from the stables and byres was dumped in the side streets
(Keene 1982). Apparently in the Medieval period the problem of rubbish
was paramount in town governmental activities. This is relevant to
what is being considered here, especially palaeopathology.
Perhaps Greig's study of the 15th century barrel-latrine deposit
published in 1981 illustrates what there is to learn about the diet of
a particular population of a specific period solely from the analysis
of material from one barrel (Figure 6).
He could interpret the kind of diet the population may have been
eating, their living conditions, health and general surroundings. If
there had been any human bones from the site there would have been a
little more to say on these aspects. As for the environment, he
isolated seeds and mosses with possible origins ranging from wetlands
through cultivated woodland to heathland. A possible origin for all
the contents of the barrel were suggested (Figure 7).
It is not proposed that this was the correct interpretation, in fact
this is only a possible reconstruction, or, that we could reconstruct
every site like this; but isn't this what we should be thinking about?
c. Dental disease is, again, a feature that is common in
archaeological populations but is rarely interpreted with reference to
other archaeological data.
Caries or rotten teeth is a condition which is associated with a
diet high in carbohydrates especially sucrose. We know from
documentary evidence that sucrose was not introduced into this country
until about the 12th century A.D. (Figure 8).
Correspondingly, the caries rate increased after that time (Moore
and Corbett 1978). Apart from an indication of the diet which was
being eaten, caries can begin to illustrate the standard of oral
hygeine which our ancestors had, and even a little about dentistry.
Who were these people practising dentistry? Were they like the
dentists we know today? Certainly documentary evidence for dentistry
in the past is extensive. Here we are beginning to think more about
the social aspects of a society.
Calculus (plaque), a calcium deposit which builds up on the tooth
surface is a good indicator of an individual who did not possess a
toothbrush and probably didn't even know what one was. Again we have
evidence of the level of the oral hygeine being practised in a
population.
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d. Looking at a specific disease in antiquity we see tuberculosis, a
chronic infection caused by a known bacterium, as a disease of
considerable antiquity which affects the soft tissue of the body,
primarily the lungs and gut and secondarily the bone. Today there is
effective treatment available at least in the Western world. It is a
condition most often seen in the spines of skeletons and as
iconographie representations of the signs of spinal collapse.
The earliest evidence of human tuberculosis in Europe comes from the
Neolithic. Osteoarchaeological and documentary evidence indicates
that, in Britain, tuberculosis remained as an endemic disease from the
Roman period, increasing in prevalence and reaching a peak incidence in
the post-Medieval period.
Tuberculosis is a mycobacterial disease, and the two bacteria
responsible for the infection in humans are M. tuberculosis and M. bovis.
In taxonomy, these two may be considered as human and bovine
subvariants of a single species, M.tuberculosis. A recent hypothesis
proposes that tuberculosis as a human infection developed by
transmission from infected cattle (Figure 9), and that this
transmission was facilitated by domestication (Manchester 1984).
The infection is mainly transmitted via the respiratory system if
the infection is from another human or mainly via the gut if the
infection is from the infected cow (via infected meat or milk). It is
also possible that cow to human transmission could occur through the
respiratory tract dependent upon the close association of uninfected
man and infected animal, and a lung focus of infection in the animal.
The disease is obviously relevant in terms of the type of economy which
a population was pursuing and the conditions in which it was living.
Even today a constant preoccupation of the World Health Organisation is
the connection between malnutrition, bad housing and disease. From
experiments on animals, it is believed that poor nutrition in an
individual would have to be extreme for it to affect the immune status
of the person to tuberculosis (Bates 1982). However, poor housing,
hygeine and overcrowding is linked to the development and spread of
tuberculosis.
There is corporeal evidence in Egypt for tuberculosis as early as
1000 B.C. (Zimmerman 1979) although there is earlier (4th millenium
B.C.) iconographie evidence (Grmek 1984). At this time, multistoried
and close packed houses were built on narrow winding streets in fairly
large urban centres. This probably favoured the spread of infections
with close personal contact. Consider an example af a Medieval house
plan to appreciate how different living conditions, certainly in the
Western world, were in the past (Figure 10). This must have had an
effect on disease patterns and spread (Figure 11).
CONCLUSION
It has become clear in this short review of some pathological
conditions that whilst other classes of evidence can help put flesh on
the bones, the bones can give information to supplement the
archaeological evidence and are, in essence, the nearest we can get to
past peoples. The evidence of past lives of people is well known from
depictions in art but whether this is an honest picture is debateable.
Hopefully in the future we may move towards this type of presentation
and look from distant cottages to castles in our synthesis of
archaeological evidence, and not only in palaeopathology. All types of
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data are equally Important. But It Is essential that the relegation of
bone reports to mere appendages to archaeological reports must stop
bef ore-the stage is-reached where the archaeologist feels that it Is
not even worth analysing the bones. Greig in his work on the latrine
deposit believed that, "The scientific analysis of these remains cannot
be done by any one person, for each evidence needs to be dealt with by
the appropriate specialist, and the various data brought together and
discussed to obtain the maximum information" (Greig 1981, p.281).
There may be widespread agreement for this statement but does it in
practice actually happen? Archaeologists are reconstructing the lives
of people regardless of whether they are the common folk or from the
upper echelons of society. They are both important. Finally what is
the aim of this work? Are archaeologists working for each other in the
academic interest or are they working ultimately for the public?
Finance for archaeology comes from the public so should there perhaps
be an effort on everyone's part to make the data intelligible for them
more than anybody?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to Keith Manchester for making useful comments on the text
and to Jean Brown of the Photography Department at Bradford University
for the figures. The National Museums of Canada (Jerome Cybulski) and
Prof. Charles Merbs gave permission to use Figures 2,3,4 and 5. James
Greig allowed reproduction of Figures 6 and 7.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bates,J.H., 1982 - "Tuberculosis: susceptibility and resistance"
Bull. New York Acad. Med., Vol.55(6), pp.604-8.
Bianca,W., 1976 - "The significance of meteorology in animal
production" Int. J. Biornete or, Vol.20(2), pp.139-156.
BrothwelljD., 1972 - "Palaeodemography and earlier British populations".
W orId Ar chae ology, Vol.4, pp.75-87.
Cramp,R., 1983 - "The archaeologist's view-general" in G. Hart (Ed),
Disease in Ancient Man. Clarke Irwin, Toronto.
Greig,J., 1981 - "Investigation of a Medieval barrel latrine from
Worcester" J. Arch. Sei., Vol.8, pp.265-82.
Grmek,M., 1984 - Les maladies a l'aube de la civilisation occidentale.
Paris.
Jones,A.K.G., 1983 - "A coprolite from 6-8 pavement", pp.225-229, in
A.R.Hall, H.Kenward, D.Williams and J.Greig (Eds), Environmental· and
living conditions at two Anglo-Scandinavian sites. Council for British
Archaeology, London.
Keene.D.J., 1982 - "Rubbish in Medieval towns" in A.R.Hall and
H.Kenward (Eds) Environmental archaeology in the urban context. C.B.A.
Res. Rep., Vol.43, pp.26-30.
Manchester,Κ., 1984 - "Tuberculosis and leprosy in antiquity: an
116
interpretatiοα" Medical History, Vol.28, pp.162-73.
Herbs,C., 1983 - Patterns of activity in a Canadian Inuit population.
Museums of Canada.
Moller-Christensen.V., 1961 - Bone changes in leprosy. Copenhagen,
Munksgaard.
Moore,W.J. and Corbett.M.E. , 1978 - "Dental caries experience in man"
pp.3-19, in N.H.Rowe (Ed), Proc. of Symposium on Diet, Nutrition and
Dental Disease. Universy of Michigan School of Dentistry and Research
Institute.
Sillen.A. and Kavanagh,M. 1982 - "Strontium and palaeodietary
research: a review" Yearbook of Physical Anthropology, Vol.25, pp.67-
90.
Stuart Macadam,?., 1982 - A correlative study of a palaeopatholgy of
the skull. Cambridge University Department of Anthropology unpublished
PhD thesis.
Zimmerman,M.R., 1979 - "Pulmonary asseous tuberculosis in an Egyptian
mummy" Bull. New York Acad. Med., Vol.55, pp.604-8.
117
Figure 1 - Principle areas of the skeleton affected by leprosy
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Figure 2 - Osteoarthritis distribution in the foot (after Herbs 1983,
fig.43)
• ι \
R i g h t L e f t Right Left
Distribution of osteoarthritis in the foot. Darkened.areas indicate frequency values
of at least 10 percent or intensity values of at least .05.
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Figure 3 - Distribution of vertebral compression fractures (after Herbs
1983, fig.50)
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Figure 4 - Sadlermint woman (after Herbs 1983, fig.76)
Sadlermiut woman and infant riding on
sled. (Drawn by Charles Josiin.)
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Figure 5 - General picture of the distribution of osteoarthritis (after
Merbs 1983, fig.45)
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Figure 6 - Possible sources of the finds from a 15th century barrel in
Winchester (after Greig 1981)
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An illustration showing possible sources of the finds from tru
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Figure 7 - Pathways of plant and animal products (after Greig 1981)
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A diagram showing some of the pathways of plant and animal
products from the sea and countryside, through use(s) to eventual disposal as
various types of rubbish, accumulating various kinds of insect fauna in the
process.
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Figure 8 - Caries rate and sugar consumption from the Iron Age to
1900 AD (after Moore and Corbett 1978)
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Figure 9 - Evolution of tuberculosis
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Figure 10 - Medieval house plan: both human and animal living under
one roof
MEDIEVAL HOUSE PLAN
Living area
Manger
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Figure 11 - The possible environmental changes inside a building housing
cattle (after Bianca 1976, fig.7)
PARTICLES L I T T E R
JPARTICLES
The indoor environment of cattle houses.
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HARD SCIENCE: TOO HARD FOR ARCHAEOLOGY?
A.Aspinall
The title chosen for this paper may be appropriate in view of our claim
at Bradford that we are providing training in, as well as an awareness
of, aspects of hard science in archaeology. Our experience is that
these goals are difficult both for students and tutors.
How do we define hard science? As a physicist my immediate reaction
is to think of physics and mathematics but also acknowledge the
influences of chemistry and other physical sciences. The biological
sciences present faces of science in archaeology which, in
environmental archaeology, give us the closest integration with the
least anguish of "traditional" archaeology and, therefore, does not,
perhaps, qualify as "hard" science for the archaeologist. If we limit
our attention to the physical sciences we find ourselves describing
Archaeometry. It is useful, at this point, to quote from Aitken
referring to the growth of Archaeometry: "There has been much crossing
of. barriers between disciplines, and archaeologists have shown
themselves as capable of this as physicists. This book does not
attempt to spoon-feed archaeologists by isolating technicalities but
presumes on their ability to step back when they find themselves
sinking, so that they may move on to drier land. For those that
survive there are several journals..." (Aitken 1974, ρ·ν). For those
who have not read Aitken's book, let me state that there is an
excellent exposition of the science of Archaeometry pitched at about
the University entrance level in Physics, and pointing the finger at
aspects of hard science which go to far realms of the basic properties
of matter. In fact, Aitken1s book limits itself to the clearly defined
concepts of Physics with the chemical and biological sciences in a
subsidiary role. If, however, we embrace them all, we may, somewhat
arbitrarily, list the occurrence of scientific techniques in
Ar chae ol ogy as be 1 ow :
1) Geophysical prospection
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2) Dating methods
3) Analyses of materials
4) Mathematical treatment
5) Studies of the ancient environment
Of all the disciplines I feel that it is in mathematical treatment that
the "hard" in hard scence becomes oppressive for the archaeologist.
This is not surprising when we examine the diversity of disciplines
reliant on the mathematical sciences. Thus an example of three-
dimensional analyses arising in pure nuclear physics bears a striking
superficial resemblance to the projective geometry used in the
rectification of oblique aerial photographs containing archaeological
features.
If we examine any one of the main divisions of Archaeometry as
defined above we can approach it on a series of levels, and the
question confronting the archaeologist is 'at what level?', before, as
Aitken suggests, he starts to sink! I suggest that the archaeologist
must be prepared to tackle the level at which he is satisfied that, by
objective thought on his own part, he knows that the scientific data
provided is reliable archaeologically. The scientist (correctly) will
tell the archaeologist that the science is good - ie the technique is
good - but is the result archaeologically valid? The archaeologist
must have sufficient appreciation of the "goodness" of the scientific
data to ask f or a 'recount' if necessary. This implies a mutual
understanding between the "hard" scientist and the archaeologist such
that the former understands the weakness of his result relative to the
letter's requirements.
There are good examples of the interplay, and lack of it in all
branches of Archaeometry. Perhaps the most striking arise in the
matter of dating, through the methods of radiocarbon and thermoremanent
magnetism, where the refinements of calibration have followed necessary
criticism from archaeologists who "know" that experimentally determined
dates are incorrect and can point to errors. Thus we now have the so-
called "precision" radiocarbon calibration which was derived from
dendrochronology and high quality laboratory determinations of
radiocarbon contents. It now falls to the archaeologist critically to
appreciate this curve and to apply his skills to the procurement of
samples for dating commensurate with the calibration he has been given.
In magnetic dating the ambiguities arising from the convolutions of the
calibration curve require close collaboration and understanding between
the scientist and the archaeologist. Furthermore, the archaeologist
must be abreast of current scientific controversy in the methods of
obtaining dates so as to step back, or preferably contribute
constructively to the argument. This implies risking getting the feet
wet in the joint cause!
The requirement for hard science understanding in geophysical
prospection is, on the face of it, not so acute. In fact, the
understanding of elementary science would be often appreciated. The
cynicism of the physicist to an enquiry as to whether the magnetometer
can locate coin hoards as effectively as a metal detector is
understandable. Even so there is again a need for appreciation at a
"hard science" level of the interpretation of geophysical data and its
limitations. Often complex techniques of data filtering and
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presentation are used by the scientist. Whether these are actually
relevant to the particular problem can often only be answered by the
archaeologist knowing what effect such processing may have on the data
(this is as much a matter of economic use of resources as of academic
usefulness).
Inevitably however the question as to the understanding of hard
science, or lack of it, by the archaeologist falls back to
interpretation of data and thus the mathematical treament aspect. More
and more the archaeologist is asked to accept mathematical procedures
which "justify" data. Methods of sampling traditionally employed in
field and post-excavation studies are open to question by
statisticians. It is only by understanding the questions asked that
the archaeologist can defend himself. Perhaps these methods are
indefensible. Then, and only then, should he accept a change! Data
processed from scientific analyses óf artifacts etc are often presented
in a convincing form to archaeologists. Notorious amongst the
techniques employed is cluster analysis which is often applied in one
of its several forms to produce acceptable results and is often
deceptively elegant. The question should be offered - why one method
rather than another? Other approaches, more intuitively acceptable,
must be used to test apparent groupings and, even then, their
reliability verified. We are often presented with attractive pictures
showing apparent groups but there should be enquiry about the
reliability of the experimental work and even the significance of the
scales used.
In many ways the methods of hard science are too naive for
archaeological problems. They have often been developed within the
confines of the problems of physical science. The problems of
archaeology, involving temporal, cultural, technological and
geographical parameters are, by their nature, very complex in the
scientific sense. Quoting Renfrew in a statement made to the
Washington Round Table on 'Future Directions in Archaeometry' in 1981:
"I have come to believe that (the solution) lies, not only in the need
for the archaeologist to understand something of the scientific
techniques and their limitations but, more particularly, for the
analyst to have some grasp of the complexity of the archaeological
problems". Perhaps I ought to start again therefore with, the quotation
"Hard Archaeology: too hard for scientists?"
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